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Abstract 
There is an emerging consensus that the threat of global warming, as well as 
regulatory and market initiatives for the reduction of GHG-emissions, result in 
significant costs for companies today and in the future. The magnitude of these costs 
is unknown to investors and transforms climate change into a market-wide financial 
risk. An efficient stock market prices this risk and rewards investors with higher 
returns for assuming higher levels of systematic risk. The purpose of this thesis is to 
analyse the efficiency of stock markets with regard to climate change induced 
systematic risk. To that end, a Carhart 4 Factor Model extended for industry effects is 
applied to a sample of 433 European companies in the years 2005 to 2009. This 
research thus contributes to the understanding of the behaviour of stock prices towards 
the financial implications of climate change. 
 
Results indicate that the stock market was inefficient in pricing all six proxies for 
climate change induced systematic risk applied in this study, i.e. a company’s 
affiliation to the European Emissions Trading Scheme or high carbon industries, the 
existence of disclosure of GHG-emissions, the completeness of such disclosures, the 
absolute level GHG-emissions and GHG-efficiency. Persistent economically and 
statistically significant arbitrage opportunities exist when trading on publicly available 
information concerning these proxies. In this evidenced state of market inefficiency, 
investors are not rewarded for assuming higher levels of climate change induced 
systematic risk, but instead can achieve abnormal risk-adjusted returns by exploiting 
the inefficiently priced positive effects of (complete) climate change disclosure and 
good corporate climate change performance in the short-term. In conclusion, the 
financial market did not fulfil its role to correctly allocate ownership of the economy’s 
capital stock with regard to the risk induced by the financial implications of climate 
change during the time period analysed in this study.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Climate change has developed into a widely accepted serious threat to our planet that 
requires urgent regulatory responses (IPCC, 2007; Stern, 2006). In the European 
Union, the European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), the emergence or 
discussions on the introduction of carbon taxes, as well as the EU policy guiding 
principles to “make polluters pay” (European Council, 2006, p. 5) represent just few 
examples for such regulatory responses. These political initiatives in conjuncture with 
market initiatives for the reduction of GHG-emissions aim at the creation of a low 
carbon economy. It is safe to assume that these initiatives have the potential to 
significantly impact the financial performance of companies. The exact future costs 
resulting from the transition to a low carbon economy for companies are however 
unknown.  
 
The fact that climate change impacts or potentially impacts their financial 
performance is widely recognised among companies: Out of the 358 FT500 
companies that responded to the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) in 2006, 87% 
reported that climate change constitutes a commercial risk and/or challenge to their 
business (Carbon Disclosure Project, 2006). On financial markets, as a consequence 
of these risks and the imminent challenge to transform to a low carbon economy, a 
significant re-distribution of shareholder wealth is expected to take place (Carbon 
Trust, 2006, p. 4). Nevertheless, and despite the growth of the socially responsible 
investment (SRI) industry in recent decades, market participants are only slowly 
adjusting their investment behaviour to incorporate the financial risks represented by 
climate change. For example, it was estimated that during the time of this study less 
than 0.10% of the over $ 40 trillion in assets of the investors that are signatories to the 
CDP were “invested in any investment strategy which explicitly and systematically 
takes climate risk into account” (Innovest, 2007, p. 3). It is generally expected that 
financial markets are “only beginning to recognise the magnitude of impact the 
transition to a low carbon global economy will have on companies’ competitive 
positions and long-term valuations” (The Goldman Sachs Group, 2009, p. 2). As a 
result, the financial risk represented by political and market initiatives for the shift 
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towards a low-carbon economy “may not yet be fully reflected in share prices” (FTSE 
Group, 2012, p. 4). 
 
These statements from the investment practitioner community are in stark contrast to 
the financial theory of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). According to EMH, 
an efficient financial market represents ‘[a] market in which share prices always 
“fully” reflect available information’ (Fama, 1970, p. 383). Only if share prices 
“fully” reflect information, they give accurate signals for resource allocation and the 
financial market can fulfil its task to correctly allocate ownership of an economy’s 
capital stock (Fama, 1970). Surprisingly, there is no research that allows making 
conclusive judgements on the level of market efficiency towards information on the 
market-wide financial impacts of climate change on companies. To fill this gap in 
existing research, this thesis assesses the level of market efficiency towards the 
systematic financial impact of climate change on companies in the European Union. 
The goal of this research therefore is not to prove or disprove EMH, but to apply the 
theory to contribute to the understanding of share price behaviour with regard to 
climate change induced systematic risk.  
 
For the assessment of the level of market efficiency towards climate change induced 
systematic risk, first EMH is introduced and its important notions, methodologies and 
shortcomings are illustrated in the light of SRI in the following chapter. 
Subsequently, in chapter 2.2 Literature linking CSP and SMP, existing research 
relating corporate sustainability performance (CSP) to stock market performance 
(SMP) is examined with the aim to possibly derive a judgement on the level of semi-
strong market efficiency towards CSP and disclosure of CSP. Semi-strong market 
efficiency stipulates that prices fully reflect all readily-available public information 
(Fama, 1970). In chapter 3 Hypotheses Development, it is argued that the various 
regulatory and market initiatives for the reduction of GHG-emissions inflict unknown 
future costs on large parts of the economy and consequently the financial impacts of 
climate change on companies in the EU constitute a systematic risk. Overall, six 
hypotheses are developed for the six proxies for climate change induced systematic 
risk introduced in this research.  
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The data gathered for each of the six proxies, as well as the sample created to test the 
hypotheses, are described in chapter 4 Sample and Data. Overall, the 433 companies 
from the European Union that were part of the FTSE All World Index in the years 
2005 to 2009 constitute the sample of this research. The data necessary for several of 
the proxies for climate change induced systematic risk applied in this research was 
gathered from corporate reports, corporate websites and the CDP and is oftentimes 
reported in an incomplete manner by companies. To be able to control for the 
incompleteness of, for example, the readily-available public GHG-emissions data 
reported by companies, the data is categorised according to its completeness. As such, 
in chapter 4.4 Understanding Sample Characteristics, this research also presents the 
first large-scale analysis of the completeness of quantitative GHG-emissions 
disclosure by companies. 
 
Based on the six proxies for climate change induced systematic risk, portfolios are 
constructed and regressed on the models used in this research to test the hypotheses 
developed (cf. chapter 5 Methodology). Next to the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) (Lintner, 1965; Mossin, 1966; Sharpe, 1964), which was traditionally used 
in early tests of market efficiency, this research applies the Carhart 4 Factor Model 
(C4FM) (Carhart, 1997), which has more recently become a standard model for 
testing market efficiency (Fama & French, 2010). Furthermore, in this research the 
C4FM is extended for industry control variables (cf. Derwall, Guenster, Bauer, & 
Koedijk, 2005; Geczy, Stambaugh, & Levin, 2005; Hoepner, Rammal, & Rezec, 
2011a) with the result that next to factors generally known to explain stock 
performance, the more recently emerged practice in tests of asset pricing and SRI to 
control for industry effects is accounted for.  
 
Regression results obtained are illustrated and discussed in the light of the hypotheses 
formulated in chapter 6 Regression Results. In chapter 7 Conclusions and Discussion, 
the results obtained are discussed in the light of EMH, their contribution to 
knowledge and their implications for investment practitioners and companies as well 
as the methodologies applied in SRI. This thesis concludes with a discussion of the 
limitations of this study and an illustration of the avenues it opens up for future 
research.  
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Chapter 2 
Embedding of the Research in Related Literature 
Two bodies of literature are of relevance to this assessment of the market efficiency 
towards climate change induced systematic risk. In the remainder of this chapter this 
research is embedded in these two streams of literature, namely research into the 
efficiency of financial markets and research relating corporate sustainability 
performance to stock market performance. In chapter 2.1 Literature on EMH, the 
short history of EMH is briefly illustrated and the definitions and important notions of 
EMH are discussed in the light of SRI. Subsequently, the conditions for an efficient 
market are discussed in the context of SRI, and methodologies and findings of tests of 
EMH are presented. After presenting existing criticism towards EMH, its application 
in this research is discussed. In chapter 2.2 Literature linking CSP and SMP, research 
linking corporate sustainability and stock market performance is discussed in the light 
of EMH with the aim to possibly derive a judgement on the level of semi-strong 
market efficiency towards CSP and disclosure of CSP. To that end, five criteria are 
developed that need to be fulfilled in association studies relating CSP to SMP to 
allow drawing conclusions on the level of semi-strong market efficiency. Each 
criteria is briefly discussed conceptually before being applied in the review of studies 
from the field at the end of this chapter. 
2.1 Literature on EMH 
2.1.1 The Short History of EMH 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis is one of the most discussed theories in financial 
economics. Nevertheless, the underlying idea of the hypothesis that “actual prices at 
every point in time represent very good estimates of intrinsic values” (Fama, 1965, p. 
90), was established only half a century ago. At the beginning of the 20th century, 
although work by scholars like Cowles (1933) and Working (1934) showed evidence 
to the contrary, it was the general belief that past movements of stocks prices can be 
used to determine the future price movements of a stock (cf. Alexander, 1961; Fama, 
1963; Keynes, 1936). It was only in the late 1950s, more than half a century after the 
basic idea appeared in the PhD thesis of Louis Bachelier (1900), that a public 
discussion of what today is referred to today as Random Walk Theory picked up.  
- 5 - 
Random Walk Theory claims that stock prices do not follow a pattern and that 
consequently past stock performance does not give any indication for the future 
performance of a stock (Fama, 1965). Whilst advocates of Random Walk Theory 
agreed on the fact that prices are random with regard to their past performance, they 
did not agree on the underlying reason for that fact (for a collection of papers on the 
topic see Cootner (1964)). It was however one of the early supporters of Random 
Walk Theory, Eugene F. Fama, who would supply a possible economic rationale 
behind the studied phenomenon, which established itself as the widely known 
Efficient Market Hypothesis.  
 
While Fama (1965) already formulated his original concept of an efficient market in 
1965, his path-breaking paper would become Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of 
Theory and Empirical Work published five years later (Fama, 1970). In this paper 
Fama gathers existing evidence from a large number of empirical studies and lets his 
efficient market model undergo three tests: a weak form test, a semi-strong form test 
and a strong form test. The research design of those tests is what is referred to today 
as weak market efficiency (i.e. prices fully reflect all past market prices and data), 
semi-strong market efficiency (i.e. prices fully reflect all readily-available public 
information) and strong market efficiency (i.e. all information in a market, whether 
public or private, is accounted for in a stock price). The strong form of market 
efficiency has been widely rejected and was mostly introduced by Fama as a 
theoretical completion of the two more restricted versions of the hypothesis. The 
weak and semi-strong form of the EMH however were largely accepted as valid in 
the 1970’s and 1980’s (Jensen, 1978; Pane, 1995) and are still accepted by various 
scholars and investors today (Arnold, 2002; Dimson & Mussavian, 1998) but remain 
subject to controversy and constant tests by advocates and opponents. 
 
The body of literature that emerged from advocates and opponents testing EMH is 
broad and Fama (1991, p. 1575) argues in his own summary Efficient Capital 
Markets II that “the literature is now so large that a full review is impossible”. 
Interesting summaries on the literature testing the hypothesis of market efficiency at 
different points in time have been provided by many others (Dimson & Mussavian, 
1998; Fama, 1991; Kothari, 2001). In the remainder of this chapter, relevant articles 
are discussed in the context of SRI that are able to illustrate the definitions and 
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important notions of EMH, its conditions, the relevant methodologies for and findings 
from testing the hypothesis, as well as critique towards EMH. The chapter ends with 
an outline of the application of EMH in the SRI context of this study. For the sake of 
this study, SRI is defined as “a generic term covering any type of investment process 
that combines investors’ financial objectives with their concerns about 
Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) issues” (Eurosif, 2010, p. 7). 
 
2.1.2 Definitions and Important Notions of EMH 
Unfortunately, no single definition of EMH exists that summarizes all of its important 
notions. Initially, Fama (1965, p. 94) defined an efficient market as “a market where 
prices at every point in time represent best estimates of intrinsic values” or a market 
in which “actual prices at every point in time represent very good estimates of 
intrinsic values” (Fama, 1965, p. 90). This interchangeable use of the words best and 
very good within one paper indicates that, according to the inventor of EMH, the best 
estimate of a share price in an efficient market is at most a very good estimate. 30 
years later, Fama (1995, p. 76) has seemingly further reduced his expectations 
towards an efficient market when writing that “in an efficient market at any point in 
time the actual price of a security will be a good [italics added] estimate of its 
intrinsic value“. The important notion here is not the intangible definition of good or 
very good estimates of intrinsic value, but the fact that Fama did not conceptualize 
the efficient market to be able to perfectly predict the intrinsic value of a stock 
correctly. This point is revisited later in this chapter. 
 
The notion of “intrinsic values”, i.e. fundamental value, is crucial to the theory and in 
the context of EMH represents the sum of future cash flows of a stock discounted to 
its present value. The intrinsic value of a stock consequently corresponds to its future 
earnings potential, which in turn depends on fundamental factors such as the quality 
of management of the company or the general outlook for the industry or the 
economy. Consequently, in the reality of an uncertain world, the intrinsic value of a 
stock can never correctly be determined due to the lack of knowledge of future events 
and their impact on future cash flows. Important in the light of this research is the 
notion that intrinsic values are consequently not static. Fama (1995) states that 
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intrinsic values can themselves change across time as a result of new 
information. The new information may involve such things as […] a tariff 
imposed on the industry's product by a foreign country […] or any other 
actual or anticipated change in a factor which is likely to affect the company's 
prospects. (p. 76)  
 
Relating this quote back to this research, it is hypothesised in chapter 3 Hypotheses 
Development that with the emergence of the EU ETS and other regulatory and market 
initiatives for the reduction of GHG-emissions, a company’s exposure to the market-
wide financial implications of climate change has become a fundamental factor that 
impacts its future earnings potential, i.e. its intrinsic value. 
 
Early in the history of EMH, Fama (1970, p. 383) defined an efficient market as ‘[a] 
market in which prices always “fully” reflect available information’. The use of 
quotation marks, which are perpetually omitted when reference is made to this 
definition of EMH, is quite relevant here as Fama further clarifies that he does not 
expect the market to fully incorporate all available information, but – as the name 
would suggest – introduces EMH as a Null-hypothesis with an interest to research 
“the level of information at which the hypothesis breaks down” (Fama, 1970, p. 383). 
In 1991, Fama (1991, p. 1575) merged these two points when opening his landmark 
paper Efficient Capital Markets II with the following statement: “I take the market 
efficiency hypothesis to be the simple statement that security prices fully reflect all 
available information”.  
 
Only if security prices fully reflect information, they give accurate signals for 
resource allocation and the stock market can fulfil its primary task to correctly 
allocate ownership of an economy’s capital stock (Fama, 1970). The basic 
mechanisms at work in order for stock prices to reflect information are summarized in 
the following definition (Fama, 1995):  
 
An "efficient" market is defined as a market where there are large numbers of 
rational, profit-maximizers actively competing, with each trying to predict 
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future market values of individual securities, and where important information 
is almost freely available to all market participants. (p. 4) 
 
The here mentioned rational, profit-maximising investor is at the heart of the EMH. 
The rational investor tries to predict the correct future price of a stock exclusively 
based on relevant and available information concerning the future earnings potential 
of a firm (Sharpe, 1970) and is only interested in highest possible risk-adjusted 
returns.  
 
In an efficient market the level of expected returns represent a compensation for the 
level of risk an investor assumes (Fama, 1970). While the notion that investors want 
to receive a financial incentive for adopting risk seems like good common sense, it 
was only with the development of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) that this 
relation became quantifiable (Campbell, Lo, & MacKinlay, 1997). Within the CAPM 
of Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966) risk is depicted by the 
coefficient beta, also referred to as systematic risk, and is calculated by dividing the 
covariance between the market return and asset return by the variance of the market 
return (Brooks, 2008). Less technically speaking, risk results from the relative 
volatility of stock returns compared to market returns, while taking into account the 
correlation of stock returns with market returns. As according to the EMH investors 
are rewarded for taking risk, this means that within the framework of the CAPM: the 
higher the beta the higher the return a rational investor would expect to receive from 
his or her investment.1 On a risk-adjusted basis, no abnormal returns can persistently 
be achieved by investors trading on costlessly and readily available information in an 
efficient market. (Kothari, Shanken, & Sloan, 1995) 
 
Not adjusting return-figures for systematic risk is at the core of many of the discre-
pancies of early results in studies relating CSP to SMP. For example, as Cochran and 
Wood (1984) and Gordon and Buchholz (1978) elaborate, the contradictory results of 
                                            
1     The strong positive relationship between systematic risk and returns, which has 
been identified in early tests of EMH, is argued to be weaker in some (Fama, 
1991) but not all recent studies of the relation between beta and returns (Kothari, 
Shanken, & Sloan, 1995). 
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Moskovitz (1972), who found that firms with high CSR ratings outperform, and 
Vance (1975), who found just the opposite, can partially be attributed to not taking 
into account the systematic risk of the companies during the time-horizon analysed. 
There is a large body of literature trying to identify the determinants of systematic 
risk (cf. Mandelker & Rhee, 1984). Theoretically, systematic risk is associated with 
macroeconomic variables (Bansal & Clelland, 2004) or other factors that affect a 
large share of companies and therefore cannot be eliminated through diversification. 
Relating the concept of systematic risk back to this research, it is hypothesised in 
chapter 3 Hypotheses Development that the EU ETS, in conjuncture with other 
political and market initiatives for the reduction of GHG-emissions, has transformed 
the market-wide financial impact of climate change on companies into a new source 
of systematic risk (“climate change induced systematic risk”). 
 
Next to systematic risk, there is unsystematic risk, which is not correlated with 
market returns but is company specific. Note that in contrast to systematic risk, 
investors are not rewarded for bearing unsystematic risk in an efficient market 
(Barnett & Salomon, 2006). Unsystematic risk usually does not rest in the centre of 
interest of EMH, as it can be eliminated in portfolio creation by means of 
diversification (Markowitz, 1952). However, in the context of SRI, unsystematic risk 
is argued to play an important role. From an EMH perspective, according to Fama 
and French, SRI investors are not rational as they are willing to trade in parts of their 
risk-adjusted return for knowledge that their investments do not violate their social or 
environmental conscience (Bollen, 2007; Fama & French, 2007). This argument 
stems from the notion that the exclusion of any stock from the investable universe, for 
example as a result of social or environmental concerns, results in a not optimized 
risk-return-relation of the portfolio. As a consequence of exclusion, it is argued, a 
portfolio cannot be optimized for diversification purposes and consequently carries 
higher risk (O'Brien Hylton, 1992). While this concern seems theoretically reliable 
and was confirmed in early studies of SRI (Langbein & Posner, 1980), more recent 
empirical evidence suggests that the limiting effect of SRI on diversification is not as 
straight-forward as theoretically proposed (Bello, 2005).  
 
Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001) show that in recent times a portfolio can be 
reasonably diversified with as little as 50 stocks. Applying this number as a rule of 
- 10 - 
thumb is an oversimplification, as the efforts necessary to diversify unsystematic risk 
depend on the respective unsystematic risk of the companies in a portfolio. 
Nevertheless, the number proposed by Cambell et al. invites the common sense 
conclusion that it should be possible to reasonable diversify a portfolio with the over 
50.000 stocks listed globally (WFE, 2008) even if large numbers of companies are 
excluded from the investable universe as a result of a SRI strategies (Barnett & 
Salomon, 2006; Diltz, 1995). In fact, scholars found that negative effects on 
unsystematic risk are only true for highly screened SRI funds (Lee, Humphrey, 
Benson, & Ahn, 2010; Renneboog, Ter Horst, & Zhang, 2008a) and that generally, 
SRI funds do as good (bad) as other funds. However, other scholars find that there is 
a curvilinear relationship between SRI screening intensity and risk-adjusted portfolio 
returns (Barnett & Salomon, 2006) or suggest that companies can reduce their 
systematic risk through good environmental disclosure, which in an efficient market 
would reduce expected returns (Reverte, 2011).  
 
Within the concept of EMH, next to these notions of risks and rational investors, 
there are three conditions that facilitate the market to be efficient. These three 
conditions and their relevance as a potential source of market inefficiency are 
discussed in the next section in the context of SRI. 
 
2.1.3 Three Conditions for an Efficient Market 
Fama (1970) initially introduced his concept of an efficient market with three explicit 
conditions: (1) there are no transaction costs, (2) all available information is 
costlessly available to all market participants and (3) all market participants agree on 
the implications of information to the future price of a stock. These conditions were 
specified over time and it must be noted that Fama initially introduced them with the 
notion that they are sufficient to ensure market efficiency, but may not be necessary. 
He clarified that “transaction costs, information that is not freely available to all 
investors, and disagreement among investors about the implications of given 
information are not necessarily sources of market inefficiency, they are potential 
sources” (Fama, 1970, p. 388). 
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(1) There are no transaction costs 
The fee an individual investor faces when buying or selling a stock through his or her 
bank or broker is identical in SRI to any other investment and consequently it does 
not present a bigger potential source of market inefficiency than in any other 
assessment of market efficiency. Management fees of mutual funds, however, are 
argued to be higher in SRI due to the increased cost of information of managed SRI 
mutual funds (Luther, Matatko, & Corner, 1992), which are discussed in the 
following paragraphs. 
  
(2) All available information is costlessly available to all market participants 
Fama (1970, p. 388) actually relaxed the condition that all available information is 
costlessly available to all market participants by stating that ‘the market may be 
efficient if “sufficient numbers” of investors have ready access to available 
information’. Nevertheless, this condition represents a potential source of market 
inefficiency in the context of SRI, where it might be argued that information on CSP 
is not available free of charge to a sufficient number of market participants. This fact 
stems from the reality that not every company informs the public about its 
sustainability performance, for example, in the form of a dedicated report, website or 
integrated report. This gap in information on CSP is reduced by professional 
information services, which gather the respective information via written 
questionnaires and interviews (Aslaksen & Synnestvedt, 2003). This information is 
however not available free of charge to market participants. 
 
It might consequently be argued that due to the lack of comprehensive legal 
requirements for the reporting on CSP, no sufficient numbers of investors have access 
to information on CSP free of charge and that, as a consequence, the semi-strong 
efficient market cannot be expected to be efficient with respect to that information. 
This argument is of slightly reduced validity in the special case of corporate climate 
change performance, where, as a result of the interest of institutional investors 
represented by the CDP, information on corporate climate change performance is 
gathered and was readily available to the public free of charge during the time of this 
study. While this information is also not available for all companies and often 
incomplete (Kolk, Levy, & Pinkse, 2008; Stanny, 2010), the CDP represents a 
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potential and extensive source of costless information on corporate climate change 
performance. For example in 2008, 1550 companies responded to the CDP (Carbon 
Disclosure Project, 2008a). Furthermore, the rankings derived from the CDP data are 
readily available to the public via the “Key stats and ratios” section of Google 
Finance (Carbon Disclosure Project, 2010a). 
 
According to Fama, with regard to transaction and information cost, Jensen (1978) 
arrived at a less strong but economically more reasonable definition of EMH in which 
”prices reflect information to the point where the marginal benefits of acting on 
information (the profits to be made) do not exceed the marginal costs” (Fama, 1991, 
p. 1575). In Jensen’s version of the EMH the market can consequently expected to be 
efficient to the point where the transaction and information costs of an investment 
strategy do not consume the expected risk-adjusted returns generated by that strategy 
for individuals. So while several scholars argue that SRI investors face a financial 
disadvantage because the relevant information to make an SRI investment decision is 
expensive to gather (Aslaksen & Synnestvedt, 2003; Luther et al., 1992) this fact 
alone does not necessarily imply that the market is inefficient towards fundamental 
information on CSP in Jensen’s version of the efficient market. As long as risk-
adjusted expected returns reward for the level of transaction and information costs, 
the market can be expected to be efficient concerning the underlying information 
(Ball, 1994). With regard to transaction and information costs, both Fama’s and 
Jensen’s version of EMH will be discussed throughout this research.  
 
It is important to note that in Fama’s version of the EMH the strategy of indexing a 
portfolio to the market is superior to any other strategy, as it would involve little or no 
information cost and minimal execution costs (Keane, 1983; Malkiel, 2003b). The 
most important empirical paper in favour of this strategy has probably been published 
by Jensen (1968, p. 415) who found in his study of 115 mutual funds analysed 
between 1945 and 1964 that "on average the funds apparently were not quite 
successful enough in their trading activities to recoup even their brokerage expenses". 
Similar findings were later reported by other scholars (Fama & French, 2010; Gruber, 
1996; Malkiel, 1995). Interestingly, in reality for the market to remain efficient, it is 
however vital that there are small abnormal returns before fees and expenses. 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) showed that some incentive for security analysis must 
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be achievable through costly information gathering in order to arrive at an efficient 
market and that, in turn, the market can never be perfectly efficient. 
 
In summary, with regard to information and transaction costs, the particularly costly 
information gathering in SRI results in the respective information only being 
available to a restricted number of market participants. Consequently, condition two 
can be argued to be a potential source of market inefficiency in Fama’s original 
version of the EMH. 
 
(3) All market participants agree on the implications of information to the future 
price of a stock 
The third condition for market efficiency, which states that in an efficient market all 
investors perceive the value-relevance of available information in the same manner, 
has been the greatest challenge to the EMH. As a matter of fact, there are numerous 
methods available for analysing and valuing stocks, each resulting in differing and at 
times contradictory results. Responding to this criticism, Fama (1970, p. 388) argued 
that “disagreement among investors about the implications of given information does 
not in itself imply market inefficiency unless there are investors who can consistently 
make better evaluations of available information than are implicit in market prices”. 
Fama thus argues that as long as individual investors cannot persistently outperform 
the market trading on readily available information, disagreement does not imply 
market inefficiency. 37 years later, Fama and French (2007, p. 672) expanded on this 
third condition for market efficiency, when stipulating that under conditions 
discussed later in this chapter “testable predictions about how expected returns relate 
to risk are also lost” when there is disagreement among investors. 
 
It is the third condition for market efficiency that encourages the greatest criticism 
from the investment community. As iconic fundamental investor Warren Buffet, who 
consistently derives better evaluation from freely available information than the 
market, once famously put it: “I’d be a bum on the street with a tin cup if the markets 
were always efficient” (Pane, 1995, p. 2). His quote however shows at the same time 
that Warren Buffet believes that markets are not always, yet sometimes, efficient. A 
fair share of fundamental investment strategies built on the fact that stock 
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performance is driven by value-relevant information, which is an argument based in 
EMH. 
 
The discussion of whether information on CSP is value-relevant is a scattered one. 
While several scholars, based on different theoretical frameworks, argue that CSP 
should be relevant to the fundamental value of a firm (Freeman, 1984; Hart, 1995; 
Porter & Kramer, 2006) other scholars disagree (Easterbrook & Fischel, 1991; 
Friedman, 1970; Jensen, 2002; Levitt, 1958) and empirical evidence is ambiguous. 
For the analysis whether the third condition of EMH represent a potential source of 
market inefficiency in the context of SRI it is assumed that, out of the total number of 
market participants, only SRI investors agree on the value-relevance of information 
concerning CSP. According to Eurosif research, core SRI products, which include for 
example positive screening, best-in-class approaches and SRI thematic funds, 
correspond to 10% of the asset management industry in Europe in 2009 (Eurosif, 
2010). Consequently, it can be concluded that there is no homogenous belief among 
investors concerning the financial implications of information on CSP for the future 
price of a stock.  
 
Assuming that SRI investors are incorrectly assessing the intrinsic value of a stock by 
incorporating information on CSP in their assessmen, the large number of correct 
investors would not wipe out the price effect of SRI investors completely. Some 
effect on prices would remain until SRI investors corrected their erroneous belief 
(Fama & French, 2007). In that case, SRI investors, by acting on their social and 
environmental conscience rather than rational risk-return-considerations, would 
consequently make the market less efficient. In Fama and French’s (2007, p. 673) 
words: “[T]rading based on erroneous beliefs makes prices less rational. And the 
world is a better place (prices are more rational) when misinformed investors 
acknowledge their ignorance and switch to a passive market portfolio strategy”. 
However, the market can be efficient even if not all market participants agree on the 
implications of information for the future price of a stock, under the condition that 
erroneous investors do not account for substantial amounts of invested wealth (Fama 
et al., 2007b). As core SRI products do not represent substantial amounts of invested 
wealth (Eurosif, 2010), and assuming that information on CSP is not relevant to the 
fundamental value of the firm, SRI currently does not make the overall market 
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inefficient. Consequently, testable predictions about how expected returns relate to 
risk are not lost. 
 
On the other hand, assuming that information on CSP is relevant to the intrinsic value 
of the firm, traditional fundamental investors are mistaken about expected returns by 
not incorporating corporate sustainability information into his or her valuation of a 
stock – and the overall stock market in Europe would currently be inefficient. While 
this is a bold statement it would not be the first time the majority of market 
participants homogenously makes a wrong assessment, as evidenced by any major 
stock market bubble. As Malkiel (2003a, p. 80) summarizes: “As long as stock 
markets exist, the collective judgment of investors will sometimes make mistakes”. 
Evidence that investors do not sufficiently integrate value-relevant information on 
CSP in their investment decisions exists (Campbell & Slack, 2011; Deegan & 
Rankin, 1997; Renneboog, Ter Horst, & Zhang, 2008b). 
 
In summary, from an EMH perspective there seems to be theoretical potential for a 
market inefficiency concerning value-relevant information on CSP, as the conditions 
for market efficiency do not fully apply. This conclusion is based on the fact that 
information costs are comparatively high, only a selective share of investors has 
access to CSP information and market participants do not agree on the value-
relevance of information on CSP. Methodologies for testing a possible inefficiency 
are discussed in the following sections. 
 
2.1.4 Methodologies and Findings 
There are two methodologies which dominate the body of research testing market 
efficiency, i.e. event studies and association studies, which will be discussed in the 
following paragraphs. 
 
Event Studies 
Event studies assess the effect of newly emerging information (i.e. “event”) on stock 
prices by estimating the “returns that would have been expected without the event 
(normal returns) and the returns that were caused by the event (abnormal returns)” 
(Bromiley, Govekar, & Marcus, 1988, p. 28). Dolley (1933) was probably the first 
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researcher to perform an event study in his examination of the effect of stock splits on 
stock prices. However, in the late 1960’s, Fama, Jensen, Fisher, and Roll (1969) 
suggested a comprehensive methodology, which marked the starting point for the still 
growing body of literature that uses event studies to test market efficiency.  
 
Event studies have since been performed on various kinds of events, such as 
information on mergers and acquisitions (Lubatkin, 1987; Singh & Montgomery, 
1987), major layoff programmes (Worrell, Davidson, & Sharma, 1991), sudden death 
of CEOs 2  (Johnson, Magee, Nagarajan, & Newman, 1985) and environmental 
performance. For example, the effects of environmental management – expressed as 
negative events such as oil spills and positive environmental events such as 
environmental awards – on stock prices has been researched by Klassen and 
McLaughlin (1996). They found significant negative abnormal returns when firms 
had environmental crises and positive returns when firms received environmental 
awards. Similar findings were reported in an event-study by Shane and Spicer (1983), 
who found that the release of a ranking on corporate pollution control records and 
costs of abatement affected stock prices. In a sample of 436 publicly traded firms, 
Hamilton (1995) found significant negative abnormal returns in 1989 on the day that 
the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) was announced for the first time. The abnormal 
returns identified in the studies discussed above prove that the market classifies the 
underlying information as relevant to the intrinsic value of a company. Especially 
with view to expenses for cleaning-up operations, fines or litigation expenses that 
may come as a result of negative environmental effects, the market incorporates the 
reduced profit expectation of a company (cf. Ambec & Lanoie, 2008). More recently, 
Griffin, Lont, and Sun (2011) documented in an event study on climate change 
disclosures in 8-K reports an almost 2% reduction in stock prices of emission 
intensive companies (Griffin et al., 2011). 
 
In summary, most event studies found the financial market to be efficient in that it 
reacts to new publicly available information that is relevant to the intrinsic value of 
the firm (Jacobs, Singhal, & Subramanian, 2010; MacKinlay, 1997; Yamashita, Sen, 
                                            
2      They found that the sudden death of a CEO is associated with a decrease in stock 
prices unless the CEO was the founder of the respective company. 
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& Roberts, 1999). While these studies were able to prove that stock prices – not 
always but usually – quickly and adequately respond to relevant emerging 
information, the event-study methodology is not able to examine whether a stock is 
constantly over- or undervalued over longer time periods.  
 
Joint Hypothesis Problem 
Leaving aside the time horizon of tests of market efficiency for a while, is must be 
noted that any research carried out in this context does not only test the informational 
efficiency of the market but also the validity of the model applied, i.e. the estimation 
of the normal returns that would have been expected if there was no event (Watts, 
1978). This problem is commonly referred to as the Joint Hypothesis Problem and it 
becomes more relevant in long-window association studies, as the effect of a flawed 
model can be small in a week, but can aggravate into large (apparent) effects over 
years (Fama, 1998). The fact that the EMH cannot be tested without simultaneously 
testing the underlying model used for the estimation of expected returns results in the 
fact that it cannot be tested at all, as a rejection of a joint hypothesis does not allow a 
conclusive judgement on which part of the joint hypothesis is rejected (Lo & 
MacKinlay, 1999).  
 
Nevertheless, testing market efficiency – and a joint hypothesis at the same time – 
over long time horizons has given researchers and investment professionals a lot of 
insight into the behaviour of stock prices. The interpretation of any findings of market 
inefficiencies must however take place in the context of the conditions for market 
efficiency and the Joint Hypothesis Problem. A good example in this context is 
Thompson (1978), who concluded his long range study of 23 closed-end funds, in 
which he found significant abnormal returns of about 4% per year between 1940 and 
1971, with the estimation that the abnormal returns identified are likely due to 
shortcomings of the underlying asset pricing model rather than market inefficiency. 
He built this assessment of the results on the fact that “the data on the closed end fund 
discounts was widely available over the entire period and extensively discussed in the 
professional press” (Jensen, 1978, p. 97).  
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Association studies 
Long-window association studies, such as the one of Thompson discussed above, 
often take the form of cross-sectional tests of return predictability. These studies 
measure the cross section of returns on portfolios, which are formed periodically 
using a specific trading rule, and then examine whether returns are consistent with an 
asset pricing model of expected returns. Cross-sectional tests of return predictability 
in the context of the EMH are often referred to as the anomalies literature, as a 
common motivation of those studies is to identify determinants for abnormal returns. 
 
One of the traditional asset pricing models applied in these association studies is the 
already mentioned CAPM, which is indicative of the functionalist paradigm in which 
EMH is embedded (Ardalan, 2008). Within this functionalist paradigm, CAPM helps 
to acquire knowledge on the level of market efficiency by facilitating quantitative 
empirical test of the assumption that there is a measurable relation between returns 
and risk. The CAPM thus serves well to illustrate the epistemological and ontological 
assumptions that the EMH builds on. The research paradigm underlying EMH is 
oftentimes also referred to as positivism, which in summary “assumes an objective 
world which scientific methods can more or less readily represent and measure, and it 
seeks to predict and explain causal relations among key variables” (Gebhart, 1999, 
para. 1). 
 
For example, in an association study applying the CAPM, small-cap firms, i.e. firms 
which are small in terms of their market capitalization, have been found to show 
higher returns than large-cap firms. Banz (1981) showed that between 1936 and 1975 
small-cap firms on the New York Stock Exchange persistently achieved higher 
average returns than predicted by the CAPM. Advocates of the EMH argue that these 
higher returns of small-cap companies are a result of rational risk compensation and 
are found due to the inability of the CAPM to price this risk correctly, rather than 
market inefficiency (Davis, Fama, & French, 2000). For example, Strugnell, Gilbert, 
and Kruger (2011, p. 14) summarize their examination of this so called size effect 
with the conclusion that “it is significant and pervasive, and either indicative of some 
level of market inefficiency or, perhaps more likely, a misspecification of equilibrium 
pricing models such as the CAPM, which assume that market covariance alone 
constitutes rewarded systematic risk”. Advocates of EMH thus argue that investors in 
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small-cap companies are rationally rewarded for the additional risk taken on when 
investing in companies that are more risky due to the fact that they may be starting up 
or are not well-equipped with capital for times of crisis (Varamini & Kalash, 2008). 
However, opponents of the EMH dispute these risk-based explanations and regard the 
abnormal returns of small-cap firms as an evidence for market inefficiency. For 
example, non-risk based explanations have been suggested on the size effect by Liew 
and Vassalou (2000), who stipulate that it may forecast future economic growth.  
 
Interestingly enough, after Banz’s publication of the size effect in 1980, the risk 
premium for small-cap stocks decreased for a certain period (Schwert, 2003). Schwert 
argues that investors acted upon the information published and consequently 
corrected the small-cap inefficiency in the market. The development of this size effect 
empirically confirms an interesting characteristic of the EMH, which was already 
discussed theoretically: stock markets are made efficient by market participants 
believing it is inefficient (Dimson & Mussavian, 1998; Grossmann & Stiglitz, 1980), 
searching for inefficiencies and acting on potentially identified arbitrage 
opportunities. Lee (2001, p. 237) summarizes that “[i]f a particular piece of value-
relevant information is not incorporated in price, there will be powerful economic 
incentives to uncover it, and to trade on it. As a result of these arbitrage forces, price 
will adjust until it fully reflects the information”.3  
 
Beside the size effect, over the last four decades researchers argued to have found 
numerous other anomalies, among them the turn-of-the-year effect (Roll, 1983), 
which describes the phenomenon that abnormal returns are more common in the 
beginning of January, the weekend effect (French, 1980), which describes the fact 
that average returns were negative over weekends in the period between 1953 and 
1977, or the value effect that describes the effect that firms with high dividend or 
high earnings-to-price ratios earn positive abnormal returns (Ball, 1978). Research 
has shown that these effects had predictive power for returns in many markets and 
                                            
3     In line with Lee (2001, p. 237) arbitrage throughout this research is defined “as 
information trading aimed at exploiting market imperfections”. This definition of 
arbitrage is consequently broader than in some other streams of academic 
literature. 
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different periods. Fama (1991), somewhat more reserved when it comes to accepting 
the existence of anomalies, however argues that: 
 
If a past anomaly does not appear in future data, it might be a market 
inefficiency, erased with the knowledge of its existence. (Or, the historical 
evidence for the anomaly may be a result of the profession's dogged data-
dredging.) On the other hand, if the anomaly is explained by other asset-
pricing models, one is tempted to conclude that it is a rational asset-pricing 
phenomenon. (But one should be wary that the apparent explanation may be 
the result of model-dredging.). (p. 1593) 
 
Until today, Fama has only acknowledged the (1) existence of the post-earnings-
announcement drift evidenced by Ball and Brown (1968), which stipulates that a 
portion of the price response to new information in the form of earnings 
announcements is delayed, (2) the discussed size effect of Banz (1981), (3) the effect 
that stocks with a high ratio of book value to market value (value stocks) generated 
higher returns than stock with a low book to market ratio (growth stocks) (Fama & 
French, 1992) and (4) the momentum effect of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), which 
showed that stocks that performed well in the past six to twelve months (past 
winners) tend to outperform stocks that underperformed (past losers) in the future.  
 
As briefly discussed above with regard to the size effect, opponents of the EMH tend 
to interpret these and any abnormal risk-adjusted returns as evidence for market 
inefficiencies, while advocates of the EMH are inclined to point towards the Joint 
Hypothesis Problem and search for a risk-based explanation of the abnormal returns 
identified. If there is a risk-based explanation, and the abnormal returns exist in 
different markets and time periods, the abnormal returns can be attributed to 
shortcomings in the underlying asset pricing model. A risk-based explanation of 
abnormal returns “may therefore be consistent with an efficient market in which 
expected returns are consistent with risk” (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2008, p. 245). 
Nevertheless, in some cases, even if there is no risk-based explanation, as in the case 
of the momentum effect (Liew & Vassalou, 2000; Muga & Santamaria, 2007), but the 
effect continues to exist in different periods and market and cannot be attributed to 
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data or model dredging, advocates of the EMH accept it without a further discussion 
of its implications for market efficiency. Consequently, while the question whether 
there is a risk-based explanation for the size or momentum effect is ideological when 
interpreting regression results in the context of EMH, it is important to control for 
these factors generally known to explain stock performance in a test of market 
efficiency, irrespective of their explanation (Fama & French, 2010). Controlling for 
these factors is facilitated through multi-factor-models. 
 
Multi-factor-models 
As a response to the emerging evidences of patterns in stock returns based on size and 
book to market ratios, Fama and French (1993) incorporated factors that control for 
company size and the continuous abnormal returns of value over growth stocks into 
the CAPM (Fama & French, 1992). This inclusion of additional factors – from the 
perspective of advocates of EMH – controls for additional risk. Carhart (1997) 
incorporated the momentum effect of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) into the model of 
Fama and French and the resulting Carhart 4 Factor Model (C4FM) is the dominant 
asset pricing model currently applied in tests of market efficiency (Fama & French, 
2010) and one of the models applied in this study. Applying C4FM ensures that any 
potential market inefficiency identified cannot be explained by factors generally 
known to explain abnormal stock performance.  
 
After the emergence of the C4FM in 1997, the discussion of whether abnormal 
returns found qualify as a new risk factor that requires incorporation into the 
established asset pricing models has usually resulted in a lengthy academic debate. 
Such a debate requires contributions not just from the scholar that initially identified 
the abnormal returns, but various other scholars evidencing the existence of the risk-
adjusted abnormal returns in different markets and time periods. A good example is 
the on-going debate on whether accounting quality is a priced risk factor (cf. Core, 
Guay, & Verdi, 2008; Francis, LaFond, Olsson, & Schipper, 2005; Francis, LaFond, 
Olsson, & Schipper, 2004; Kim & Qi, 2010; Ogneva, 2008). As briefly illustrated, 
after almost 20 years the discussion is still on-going whether the size and value effect 
are risk-based effects, and consequently correct for a shortcoming in the CAPM, or 
represent market inefficiency.  
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Given the fact that one study is not sufficient to establish a shortcoming in the 
established asset pricing models, any potential risk-adjusted abnormal return 
identified in this research is regarded as a result of market inefficiency relating to the 
specific market and period analysed in this study. Where there is a potentially risk-
based explanation for abnormal returns found, this explanation is discussed in depth 
to illustrate that it might be possible to align results with the notion of the EMH that 
investors are rewarded for risk in the long term. However, evidence on whether a 
potential inefficiency found exists in other markets and different time periods, and 
therefore qualifies as a factor that requires incorporation in existing asset pricing 
models, cannot be delivered in this research. It can only be a conclusion of lengthy 
academic debate with contributions from various scholars. This logic for the 
interpretation of risk-adjusted abnormal returns in the context of EMH is depicted in a 
simplified manner in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: Interpretation of risk-adjusted abnormal returns in EMH 
 
2.1.5 Critiques of EMH 
When discussing EMH it must be noted that many academics and even more 
investors completely reject the idea of EMH on the argument that share prices move 
for many other reasons than fundamental information (Lee, 2001). Proponents of an 
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inefficient market often stem from the area of behavioural finance, where it is argued 
that, instead of rationally seeking compensation for risk, investment decisions are 
made based on emotional factors. Opponents to the EMH are however not limited to 
the field of behaviour finance. O'Brien Hylton (1992) summarizes that proponents of 
the inefficiency hypotheses believe, for example, that investors base their decisions on 
noise rather than information (Blacks, 1986), that the volatility of stock prices is 
higher as can be derived from publicly available information (Cutler, Poterba, & 
Summers, 1989), that stock prices overreact (DeBondt & Thaler, 1985), that the 
volatility of stock prices is due to investor emotions and intuitions and not real 
economic events (Haugen, Talmor, & Torous, 1991), that investors can influence 
stock prices with irrational behaviour (Lee & Schleifer, 1990).  
 
In the light of the growing evidence on anomalies, Fama addressed the question 
whether EMH should be discarded due to the arguments of behaviour finance and 
denied it. He argues that there is an even split between the apparently observed over- 
and underreaction to events and that this in in line with market efficiency (Fama, 
1998). This argument is actually as old as EMH. Fama (1965, p. 94) wrote in the 
1960’s that “when an intrinsic value changes […] the actual price will initially 
overshoot the new intrinsic value as often as it will undershoot it”. He further argues 
that most long-term return anomalies can (1) reasonably be attributed to chance or (2) 
represent methodological illusions stemming from shortcomings in the underlying 
asset price model, (3) are economically marginal or statistically marginal or (4) 
disappear when portfolios are value-weighted, suggesting that anomalies are limited 
to very small stocks or that (5) small stocks are sources of problems in the asset 
pricing model (Fama, 1998). 
 
It becomes clear from this list that EMH required quite some defending in recent 
times, whereas in the 1970s and 1980s the idea that prices fully reflect information 
was a fact of life in many academic disciplines (Ball, 1994; Jensen, 1978; Malkiel, 
2003a; Pane, 1995) and findings contradicting EMH were rare (Fama, 1970). 40 years 
later, moderate proponents of EMH argue that markets are fairly but not always 
efficient (Renshaw, 1984; Worthington & Higgs, 2004) and this is the attitude 
towards the EMH in the context of this research. This attitude also builds on 
Malkiel’s (2003a, p. 60) summary that “our stock markets are more efficient and less 
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predictable than many recent academic papers would have us believe” based on the 
argument that flashy results are likely to get published while confirmations of older 
stories are not.  
 
2.1.6 Application of EMH in this Research 
While Fama (1991, p. 1602) declared in the Journal of Finance that “[a]ttacks on 
efficiency belong, of course, in the camp of the devil” this research uses EMH – as its 
name suggests – as a hypothesis to be tested in the light of its conditions and the 
emergence of climate change induced systematic risk. Consequently, market 
efficiency as much as market inefficiency with regard to information on a company’s 
exposure towards the market-wide financial implications of climate change are 
considered as possible outcomes. As discussed, any risk-adjusted abnormal returns 
found in this research are interpreted as a result of market inefficiency relating to the 
specific market and period under investigation. Conclusions on shortcomings in 
existing asset pricing models to price climate change induced systematic risk cannot 
be delivered in one study, but can only be a conclusion of contributions of various 
scholars examining different markets and time periods.  
 
Despite its discussed shortcomings, this research is rooted in EMH because it offers 
an useful benchmark (Brown, 2011) and an interesting theoretical construct with 
important practical implications that have not been extensively discussed in its 
entirety in the recent literature relating CSP to financial performance. There is an 
extensive body of literature that already examined the relation between CSP and SMP 
via association studies. This literature is examined in the following section from the 
theoretical perspective of EMH and taking into account the potential sources for a 
market inefficiency concerning SRI identified in this chapter. 
2.2 Literature linking CSP and SMP 
The question whether good CSP or disclosure of CSP impacts financial performance 
– positively, negatively or not at all – has been studied for more than four decades. 
Nevertheless, reviewing this literature in the light of market efficiency has been of 
only minor interest to scholars recently. Some important contributions were made in 
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the last millennium (Cochran & Wood, 1984; Langbein & Posner, 1980; O'Brien 
Hylton, 1992) on which is built here.  
 
The aim of this chapter is thus not to help finding a consensus with regard to the 
question whether it is financially rewarding for companies to report on CSP or 
perform well sustainability-wise. Rather this chapter aims to examine the results of 
related existing research in light of EMH and possibly derive a judgement on the 
level of semi-strong market efficiency towards CSP and disclosure of CSP. At first 
sight one might be led to believe that any study showing an outperformance of 
investments taking into account good CSP or CSP disclosure is a testimony of market 
inefficiency. However, as is shown in the following this is not the case. Five criteria 
are developed that are necessary for an assessment of existing association studies 
relating CSP to SMP in light of EMH and to draw conclusions on the level of semi-
strong market efficiency.4 These five criteria are (1) the economic significance of 
abnormal returns, (2) the use of a risk-adjusted return figure, (3) the value-relevance 
of the CSP measure applied, (4) the availability of the CSP measure to market 
participants and (5) the reasonable use of control factors. Each of these criteria is 
briefly discussed conceptually before being applied in the review of studies from the 
field at the end of this chapter. 
 
2.2.1 Abnormal Returns 
As it has been shown in chapter 2.1.3 Three Conditions for an Efficient Market, 
Fama’s version of EMH stipulates that in an efficient market no abnormal risk-
adjusted returns can persistently be generated based on costlessly and publicly 
available information (Fama, 1970). Jensen’s adaption of EMH stipulates that in an 
efficient market an investment strategy cannot generate abnormal risk-adjusted 
returns in excess of its transaction and information costs (Jensen, 1978). When 
examining market efficiency in light of Jensen’s adaptation, the economic 
significance of abnormal returns therefore has to be judged taking into account 
information and transactions costs. The market is argued to be efficient in Jensen’s 
                                            
4      As this research is interested in the question whether markets are efficient with 
regard to CSP over longer time periods, only association studies will be reviewed 
here. Event studies are discussed in chapter 2.1.4 Methodologies and Findings. 
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less strong but economically more reasonable version of EMH, when the expected 
risk-adjusted returns of an investment strategy for individuals are consumed by its 
transaction and information costs (Fama, 1991; Jensen, 1978).  
 
Furthermore, in the context of EMH it is interesting to distinguish between abnormal 
returns for which there is a risk-based explanation and abnormal returns which cannot 
be explained with additional levels of systematic risk (cf. chapter 2.1.4 
Methodologies and Findings). Whereas it might be possible to theoretically align 
abnormal returns for which there is a risk-based explanation with the notion of the 
EMH that investors are rewarded for taking risk, the latter case with certainty 
represents market inefficiency.  
 
Consequently, as usually no risk-based explanation exists for abnormal returns of 
sustainability-wise well-performing companies, the market is inefficient when the 
positive effects of good CSP are not priced correctly (Herremans, Akathaporn, & 
McInnes, 1993). For example Derwall, Guenster, Bauer and Koedijk (2005) and 
Renneboog et al. (2008b) argued that the risk-adjusted returns of companies with 
good CSP will only be constantly higher than those of companies with poor CSP 
when the financial market does not price information on CSP efficiently. An efficient 
market would price the financial impact of good CSP and no persistent abnormal risk-
adjusted return would be achievable. If there is a systematic risk related to 
insufficient CSP and this risk is not reflected in beta, sustainability-wise poorly 
performing companies would generate abnormal returns. Presuming a shortcoming in 
the underlying asset pricing model and given that these abnormal returns are 
confirmed in other markets and periods, these risk-adjusted abnormal returns may be 
aligned with the basic notion of the EMH according to which investors are rewarded 
for assuming risk (cf. chapter 2.1.4 Methodologies and Findings), i.e. they would not 
present market inefficiency.  
 
In summary, when assessing existing studies linking CSP to SMP in light of EMH, it 
is consequently important to assess the economic significance of any risk-adjusted 
abnormal return identified, i.e. to assess whether transaction and information costs 
would consume the abnormal return found. If the risk-adjusted abnormal return found 
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is economically significant, it must be examined whether there may be a possible 
risk-based explanation for this outperformance in order to be able to draw a 
conclusion on market efficiency.  
 
2.2.2 Risk-adjusted Return Figure 
As discussed in chapter 2.1.2 Definitions and Important Notions of EMH, in an efficient 
market expected returns compensate for the level of risk undertaken. Whilst in 
different settings differing measures of corporate returns can serve as a suitable 
indicator for financial performance, applying a return figure that is adjusted for risk is 
consequently of crucial importance when reviewing studies that relate CSP to SMP in 
light of EMH.  
 
To be able to examine the results of existing studies from an EMH perspective and 
derive a possible judgement on the level of market efficiency, it must consequently 
not only be observable whether an investor receives persistent above-average returns, 
but whether he accepts a less beneficial relation of risk and return. Studies that do not 
apply a return figure that is adjusted for risk are not able to determine whether the 
“expected returns offer adequate compensation for the inherent level of risk” 
(Anderson, 2006, p. 587). Consequently, from an EMH perspective, only studies that 
apply a risk-adjusted return figure allow for a judgement of market efficiency 
concerning information on CSP.  
 
2.2.3 Value-relevant CSP Measure 
As discussed in chapter 2.1.2 Definitions and Important Notions of EMH, in an efficient 
market only information that is relevant to the intrinsic value of the firm is priced in 
(Fama & French, 1995). As it has been shown in chapter 2.1.3 Three Conditions for an 
Efficient Market, the discussion on whether information on CSP is value-relevant is a 
scattered one. From a theoretical EMH perspective, information on CSP has to be 
priced in to the extent that it impacts the future earnings of a company. The value-
relevance of the underlying measure of CSP applied in related studies therefore has to 
be assessed. For the purpose of this analysis, a CSP indicator is classified as value-
relevant if it can be expected to impact the future earnings potential of a company. In 
turn, it is noticeable that the market can only be expected to be efficient towards 
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information that potentially impacts the intrinsic value of the company. In the absence 
of better measures (Cochran & Wood, 1984), especially older studies relied on 
questionable indicators of CSP (Aupperle, Carroll, & Hatfield, 1985) which at times 
do not meet the criteria of value-relevance. 
 
2.2.4 Readily Available CSP Measure 
As discussed in chapter 2.1.3 Three Conditions for an Efficient Market, it was argued 
in the original version of EMH by Fama that a condition for market efficiency is that 
costless information is readily available to a sufficient number of market participants 
(Fama, 1970). With regard to information on CSP this would mean that a sufficient 
number of market participants are able to perceive differences in the sustainability 
performance across firms (Sharfman & Fernando, 2008) and consequently arbitrage 
forces would result in stock prices reflecting the specific information (Lee, 2001), i.e. 
the market would be efficient. 
 
Jensen adapted the EMH in this regard and argued that the market can be expected to 
be efficient to the point where the transaction and information costs of an investment 
strategy do not consume the expected risk-adjusted returns generated by that strategy 
for individuals (Fama, 1991; Jensen, 1978). As discussed, if information on CSP is 
not readily available free of charge to a sufficient number of market participants, it 
must be assessed whether the risk-adjusted returns generated for an individual by an 
investment strategy carried out with costly information are economically significant, 
i.e. whether they surpass the level of transaction and information costs (cf. chapter 
2.2.1 Abnormal Returns). 
 
2.2.5 Control Factors 
As described in chapter 2.1.4 Methodologies and Findings, there are factors which have 
been identified to determine risk-adjusted returns, such as company size, book to 
market ratio and the momentum factor. When examining literature relating CSP to 
SMP in the light of EMH, factors known to explain abnormal financial performance 
have to be controlled for. If these factors are not controlled for, abnormal returns 
cannot be attributed to the impact of CSP. This is particularly important in the context 
of this study, as SRI portfolios have been found to rely quite heavily on small and 
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value stocks (Cortez, Silva, & Areal, forthcoming), which positively impacts the risk-
adjusted returns of a portfolio. Especially older studies fail to control for factors 
generally known to explain SMP (Callan & Thomas, 2009) because perhaps evidence 
on these factors only emerged after the publication of these studies. 
 
2.2.6 Criteria Matrix 
Table 1 summarizes the criteria and illustrates their discussed implications for 
examining existing association studies in light of EMH and for deriving a possible 
judgement on the level of market efficiency. For the sake of brevity, the impact of the 
specific criteria is only presented exemplarily and ceteris paribus where possible. 
 
In summary, as discussed in chapter 2.1.2 Definitions and Important Notions of EMH, 
in an efficient market generally speaking no risk-adjusted abnormal returns can 
persistently be obtained by investors trading on readily available, value-relevant 
information on CSP. This option of market efficiency is depicted in case number 1 in 
Table 1 and can only be assessed if factors generally known to impact stock 
performance are controlled for. However, and only when presuming a shortcoming in 
the underlying asset-pricing model, investors can receive risk-adjusted abnormal 
returns for investing in companies that perform poorly sustainability-wise with regard 
to a systematic and value-relevant CSP measure, which is readily available. 
Presuming this poor CSP represents a risk-based explanation for abnormal returns, 
these returns might qualify as risk premium and do not necessarily imply market 
inefficiency. 5  As depicted in case number 3 of Table 1, these abnormal returns 
however only be observed if factors that are generally known to explain stock returns 
are controlled for.  
 
 
 
                                            
5      As discussed in chapter 2.1.4 Methodologies and Findings, the results of one 
study would however not suffice to make this case. Nevertheless, this possibility 
is presented here to illustrate that risk-adjusted outperformance does not always 
necessarily imply market inefficiency. 
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Table 1: Criteria for assessing results of studies in light of EMH 
 
In an inefficient market, companies that perform well sustainability-wise, i.e. where 
no risk-based explanation for the abnormal returns exists, can generate abnormal risk-
adjusted returns. This CSP anomaly can however only be observed if the criteria 
introduced above for drawing conclusions on market efficiency are fulfilled (see case 
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1 No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Market is efficient. All conditions for 
judging market efficiency apply. No risk-
adjusted abnormal return is achieved. 
2 No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Market is efficient if risk is priced by 
asset pricing model. All conditions for 
judging market efficiency apply. 
3 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Market might be efficient. All conditions 
for judging market efficiency apply. Risk-
adjusted abnormal returns may present a 
risk premium if further research confirms 
that it is not priced due to shortcoming in 
asset pricing models. 
4 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Market efficiency cannot be judged. It is 
unknown if returns adequately 
compensate for risk. 
5 Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Market is inefficient. No risk-based 
explanation for risk-adjusted abnormal 
returns exists. 
6 Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Market is inefficient. Information that is 
not value-relevant is priced. 
7 Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Market is inefficient if risk-adjusted 
abnormal returns in excess of transaction 
and information costs are achieved. 
8 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Market efficiency cannot be judged. 
Abnormal returns cannot be attributed to 
CSP measure. 
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number 5 in Table 1). If for example, factors generally known to explain SMP are not 
controlled for, as depicted in case number 8 in Table 1, the abnormal returns achieved 
cannot be attributed to CSP, but might for example be driven by the size effect (cf. 
chapter 2.1.4 Methodologies and Findings).  
 
2.2.7 Review of Studies 
By and large the existing body of research relating CSP to financial performance in 
general comes up with mixed results, depending on the underlying measure of CSP 
and financial performance, the methodologies applied, the sample size analysed, the 
time horizon under investigation and the respective industries analysed (cf. 
Horváthová, 2010; Ullman, 1985). Recently, some scholars see the emergence of a 
positive relation (Günther, Hoppe, & Endrikat, 2011; Margolis & Walsh, 2003; 
Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Rynes, 2003; Reverte, 2011). 
 
From the vast body of literature relating CSP to financial performance, only those 
studies that use stock market performance as an indicator for return are of relevance 
to this research. This is due to the fact that only stock market performance reflects the 
valuation by financial markets, which is of interest in this context. Studies that use 
accounting figures or ratios of accounting and financial market performance as return 
figure (including e.g. Tobin’s q, price-earnings-ratios or return on equity) will not be 
discussed in this chapter. These studies represent the majority of studies relating CSP 
to financial performance. They focus on past financial performance or a combination 
of balance sheet and financial market performance, rather than the expected future 
performance as expressed by stock returns, which is relevant to this research. 
Furthermore, the analysis of studies that examine SRI mutual fund performance is 
only undertaken exemplary in the remainder of this chapter. This stems from the fact 
that returns of mutual funds are influenced by fund managers’ skills and unknown 
screening criteria (cf. Derwall et al., 2005; Diltz, 1995; Kempf & Osthoff, 2007; 
Sauer, 1997), which makes it impossible to isolate the impact of CSP and 
consequently hard to derive a clear judgment on the impact of CSP on results or the 
efficiency of the market towards the information on which the investment strategy 
rests.  
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Finally, it should be noted that the following discussion of related studies is not to be 
understood as critique, but rather an attempt to discuss their results from an at times 
different theoretical perspective. The studies reviewed in the following are of 
outstanding academic quality and they are categorized according to the criteria 
established above to facilitate an assessment of their results in an EMH context. 
Results of this assessment are summarised in Table 2 at the end of this chapter. 
 
For example, Gordon and Buchholz (1978) looked at 40 US companies from 1970 to 
1974 and measured CSP by means of a Business and Society Review ranking, in 
which students and businessmen rated companies on their perceived degree of social 
responsibility from outstanding to poor. Gordon and Buchholz used the CAPM, i.e. 
they adjusted return for risk. They find no statistically and/or economically 
significant out- or underperformance and conclude – presuming the market to be 
efficient – that “the effects of the degree of social responsibility on stock prices were 
either non-existent or had occurred prior to 1970” (Gordon & Buchholz, 1978, p. 
485). While the CSP measure applied by Gordon and Buchholz is costlessly and 
readily available to market participants, it is argued here that a company’s rank in the 
Business and Society Review does not represent information that impacts the intrinsic 
value of the firm. As a consequence it would not have been priced by the market. 
Furthermore, as factors known to impact stock performance such as size and book to 
market ratio are not controlled for, no judgement on the level of market efficiency 
towards CSP can be derived from this study.  
 
Anderson and Frankle (1980) compared portfolios of equal systematic risk but 
differing CSP information characteristics by examining the impact of voluntary social 
disclosure in annual reports of 314 Fortune 500 firms for the year 1972. They applied 
the CAPM to compare stock market returns of portfolios constructed from companies 
that only disclose financial information with portfolios composed of companies that 
voluntarily disclose any kind of non-financial information (i.e. information on 
environmental controls, minority employment, personnel responsibility, community 
activities or product improvement). Anderson and Frankle found that in the six 
months period after publication, firms that disclosed any kind of CSP information 
outperformed non-disclosing firms. Their study utilized an indicator of CSP that is 
costlessly and readily available to the market. However, from an EMH perspective, 
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the rather crude indicator of mere existence of any kind of non-financial reporting is 
argued to not have an impact on the intrinsic value of the company. Anderson and 
Frankle (1980, p. 477) themselves mention as limitation of their study “the lack of a 
more critical examination of information contained in each disclosure”. They also 
noticed that “disclosing firms may be those that have sufficient discretionary income 
to permit involvement in social activity” (Anderson & Frankle, 1980, p. 477), which 
suggests that they were not able to rule out the fact that variables other than those 
observed in their analysis would be able to explain the outperformance found, for 
example size or book to market ratio. As a consequence, market efficiency cannot be 
judged. 
 
Mahapatra (1984) looked at 67 US firms from 1967 to 1978. By means of Spearman 
rank order correlations of the six industries included in the study he found that in the 
long term higher pollution control expenditures lead to low market returns and low 
systematic risk. Pollution control expenditures, which were widely discussed during 
the time of the study and published in companies’ financial reports, can be regarded 
as value-relevant CSP information, since possible future costs for e.g. cleaning-up 
operations are reduced. Mahapatra’s results thus hint at market efficiency concerning 
corporate pollution control expenditures, i.e. the market priced in the value-relevant 
information and no higher returns are provided to investors of well-performing 
companies while their systematic risk is reduced. However, as Mahapatra presents his 
results predominantly at industry level and factors generally known to impact stock 
market performance are not controlled for, no judgement on market efficiency can be 
derived. Interestingly, Mahapatra himself interpreted his findings from an inefficient 
market view and concluded that conventional “[i]nvestors view pollution control 
expenditures as a drain on resources that could have been invested profitably, and do 
not reward the companies for socially responsible behaviour” (Mahapatra, 1984, p. 
37). 
 
Diltz (1995) examined the daily stock returns of 159 large US firms in the years 1989 
to 1991. Using publicly available data from the Council on Economic Priorities he 
built portfolios according to different sustainability-related trading rules and 
hypothesized that there are no differences in mean alphas of portfolios from well and 
poor rated firms, i.e. expecting the market to be efficient. He finds that “social 
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screening appears to have little, if any, impact on portfolio performance” (Diltz, 
1995, p. 66) and that there are significant differences in alphas only when nuclear and 
military involvement were scrutinized. He relates these results to the political climate 
at the time of the study and “ongoing woes of the commercial nuclear power 
industry” (Diltz, 1995). He concluded the market to be efficient. Diltz applies the 
CAPM to calculate alphas, but does not control for factors generally known to impact 
stock performance, i.e. it cannot be ruled out that his results are driven by differences 
in company size or book-to-market factors. While he used publicly available 
information that is – at least in parts – of fundamental value to the future performance 
of the firm, his research design does not allow for a judgment on the level of market 
efficiency from today’s perspective. The same conclusion is valid for a study of 
Herremans et al. (1993) which employs a similar research design. 
 
Cohen, Fenn, and Konar (1997) constructed best-in-class portfolios based on the 
averaged environmental performance of S&P500 companies in the years 1987 to 
1989 and looked at risk-adjusted returns from 1987 to 1991. Their nine measures of 
environmental performance are based on data published by the Investor 
Responsibility Research Center and are value-relevant. They measures include for 
example the number of environmental litigation proceedings and the number of oil 
and chemical spills. However, to adjust for company size, Cohen et al. divide their 
measures of environmental performance by company sales. While this is frequently 
done in studies relating CSP to financial performance (cf. Busch & Hoffmann, 2011), 
dividing by sales dilutes the value-relevance of their indicator of environmental 
performance.6 Nevertheless, Cohen et al. find two out of nine high pollution port-
folios (oil spills and toxic releases) to significantly outperform. Assuming their 
diluted measure of CSP is still value-relevant, this result can be regarded as 
reasonable from an EMH perspective, as companies with higher number of oil spills 
                                            
6      Total sales also include the economic value of the cost of supplies, i.e. the cost of 
products that have been produced outside the company and then purchased by the 
company. When relating this financial number to the environmental performance 
of the company, the environmental indicator no longer allows differentiating 
between companies that have a high real net output ratio but a poor 
environmental performance and companies that rely heavily on outsourcing and 
pre-manufactured products and as a consequence would appear to have a better 
environmental performance. 
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and toxic releases can be argued to carry a higher risk. In summary, Cohen et al. use a 
return figure that is adjusted for risk and publicly available data. However, the value-
relevance of their measure of CSP is diluted and they do not control for factors 
generally thought to explain stock market performance. As a consequence, no 
judgment on market efficiency can be derived. 
 
Hughes (2000) looked at the market values of 100 US Utilities in the years 1986 to 
1993 in the context of the Clean Air Act Amendments in 1990, which required 
specific utilities to reduce their output of sulphur dioxide. Sulphur dioxide is a source 
of acid rain, which was a highly discussed environmental problem in the 1980s. 
Hughes examined two groups of companies: one group, high polluting utilities, are 
named in the Clean Air Act Amendments and were expected to be “importantly and 
negatively affected by the Act and another group of utilities whose exposure to future 
abatement costs was expected to be small” (Hughes, 2000, p. 210). He found that the 
mean 1990 share price of the high-polluting utilities decreased by 16%. Hughes uses 
CSP information that is value-relevant and costlessly available to all market 
participants. However, he does not control his results for the effect of systematic risk 
or other factors known to impact stock performance. Furthermore, the methodology 
chosen does not allow for an assessment of any potential abnormal returns and 
consequently market efficiency cannot be judged. For example, Cormier, Magnan, 
and Morard (1993) also conclude a study which takes the market value as a return 
figure with the notion that their research design does not allow for taking into account 
risk or to identify arbitrage opportunities, i.e. does not allow for judging market 
efficiency towards the underlying measure of CSP. The same conclusion is valid for 
more recent studies that apply the market value of companies as a financial return 
figure, some of which examine the effect of GHG-emissions (Griffin et al., 2011; 
Matsumura, Prakash, & Vera-Muñoz, 2011).  
 
Thomas (2001) looks at 291 companies from seven different industries in the UK and 
calculates returns via the CAPM while controlling for company size. Thomas 
regresses the calculated excess returns against dummy variables representing training, 
the adoption of an environmental policy and legal prosecutions (Thomas, 2001) to 
examine whether these factors add to the explanation of the excess returns found. She 
finds that the adoption of an environmental policy by companies in polluting 
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industries and prosecution by an environmental standards agency “have significant 
explanatory power in an analysis of excess returns” (Thomas, 2001, p. 125). Thomas’ 
indicator of prosecution of breach of environmental standards is value-relevant, as it 
indicates financial liabilities. However, she uses private information obtained by the 
Croydon Borough Council Pension Scheme, which is not available to a sufficient 
number of market participants. While Thomas applies a risk-adjusted return-figure, 
her research design does not allow for the assessment of abnormal returns in general 
or in excess of transaction and information costs. Furthermore, Thomas does not 
control for factors generally argued to impact stock performance other than company 
size. As a result of the research design, market efficiency cannot be judged.  
 
Blank and Wayne (2002) examine S&P 500 companies and particularly those 
companies which formed part of the Innovest Strategic Value Advisors (Innovest) 
rating universe, i.e. between 128 and 363 companies in the years 1997 to 2000. They 
examined whether Innovest ratings, which evaluates environmental performance on 
over 60 dimensions, “add value by identifying companies the market will reward for 
their superior management of environmental issues” (Blank & Wayne, 2002, p. 3). 
Focussing on stocks ranked highly by Innovest, Blank and Wayne construct a 
portfolio with a risk profile similar to the S&P 500 Index. In three out of four years, 
the Innovest enhanced portfolio shows a higher Sharpe ratio than the S&P 500, i.e. 
the Innovest enhanced portfolio better compensates the investor for the level of risk 
taken. However, the statistical significance of the differences in Sharpe ratios is not 
addressed and consequently market (in)efficiency cannot be judged (cf. Varamini & 
Kalash, 2008). Furthermore, Innovest rankings are not readily available free of charge 
to a sufficient number of market participants. As a consequence, market efficiency 
would have to be assessed in the light of the transaction and information costs of the 
underlying investment strategy (cf. chapter 2.2.4 Readily Available CSP Measure). 
Unfortunately, while the Sharpe ratio gives insights on how well a portfolio 
compensates for risk, it does not allow for the identification of the economic 
significance of any abnormal returns or facilitates controlling for factors generally 
though to explain stock performance. Consequently, the study of Blank and Wayne 
does not allow making inferences about market efficiency.  
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Derwall et al. (2005) also used Innovest ratings and looked at between 170 and 450 
US companies from 1995 to 2003. Derwall et al. constructed portfolios according to a 
simple trading rule and controlled for factors generally assumed to explain stock 
performance, such as size, systematic risk, book to market ratio and the momentum 
effect, by applying the C4FM. They concluded that firms that “perform relatively 
well along environmental dimensions collectively provide superior returns” (Derwall 
et al., 2005, p. 58). More specifically, they found an annualised alpha of around 6% 
for a strategy that goes long in (i.e. buys) the best-in-class environmental portfolio 
and short in (i.e. sells) the worst-in-class environmental portfolio. The indicators 
chosen by Derwall et al. are at least partially value-relevant and there is no risk-based 
explanation for the abnormal returns identified. Derwall et al. conclude that their 
results hint at an inefficiency of the market to price eco-efficiency correctly. The 
indicators used by Derwall et al. are however not readily available to a large number 
of market participants and therefore the abnormal returns found must be interpreted in 
light of the transaction and information costs of the underlying investment strategy 
(cf. chapter 2.2.4 Readily Available CSP Measure). Derwall et al. report that their 
results hold under transaction costs scenarios of up to 200 basis points. Consequently, 
even when assuming a rather high annual total expense ratio7 of 1.50% for carrying 
out the SRI investment strategy (cf. Geczy et al., 2005; Renneboog et al., 2008b; 
Statman, 2000), i.e. 150 basis points, the strategy of Derwall et al. generates an 
economically significant abnormal return. Consequently, the market is inefficient 
even in Jensen’s less strong but economically more reasonable form of EMH, as the 
risk-adjusted abnormal returns not only compensates the cost of carrying out the 
active investment strategy. However, the abnormal returns found are not surprising in 
light of Fama’s original version of the EMH, given the fact that the underlying 
measure of CSP is not costlessly available to a sufficient number of market 
participants. 
 
                                            
7      The total expense ratio represents the percentage of a portfolio’s total assets that 
corresponds to management fees and other operational expenses, i.e. the 
transaction and information costs of an active investment strategy in % of the 
portfolio’s total assets. The ratio is used throughout this research to approximate 
the economic significance of returns in the context of Jensen’s (1978) less strong 
but more economically reasonable version of the EMH (cf. chapter 2.1.3 Three 
Conditions for an Efficient Market). 
- 38 - 
Using a sample of 103 US, UK and German ethical mutual funds and controlling for 
size, book-to-market, and momentum effects Bauer, Koedijk, and Otten (2005) find 
that, after fees, no fund generates abnormal returns in the years from 1990 to 2001. 
Bauer et al. use funds which apply ethical screens. As unfortunately no further 
information is given on the CSP criteria applied the value-relevance of the underlying 
information cannot be evaluated from an outside perspective. Consequently, results 
do not allow deriving a judgement on market efficiency concerning the ethical funds 
examined. Also, as discussed before, returns of mutual funds are influenced by fund 
managers’ skills and tastes in the investment process and therefore the performance 
of funds cannot exclusively be attributed to CSP. Similar problems occur with other 
studies of SRI mutual funds, which in addition often do not control for factors 
generally known to explain stock market performance (Cortez et al., forthcoming; 
Huimin, Kong, & Eduardo, 2010; Statman, 2000). 
 
Hassel, Nilsson, and Nyquist (2005) looked at 71 Swedish companies from June 1998 
to September 2000 and used quarterly environmental performance rankings 
constructed by the CaringCompany (CC) Research. Using the established Ohlson 
model (Ohlson, 1995) Hassel et al. hypothesized that share prices reflect 
environmental performance next to financial performance, i.e. stipulating that 
environmental performance is value-relevant information and consequently “reflected 
in the current expectations of future earnings that determine market values” (Hassel et 
al., 2005, p. 46). They find that their measure of environmental performance has 
incremental explanatory power for the market value of equity of the companies 
included in their study. More specifically, they find a significant negative relationship 
between environmental performance and the market value of firms. Hassel et al. 
control for differences in company size in their model, but the model applied does not 
take into account risk or other factors generally known to explain stock performance. 
Furthermore, while the Ohlson model allows determining whether information is 
contained in a share price, it does not allow drawing inferences about the level of any 
potential abnormal returns. Furthermore, some of the data used in the measure of 
environmental performance is privately obtained by CC and consequently “parts of 
the market might be unaware of the information in CC’s environmental performance 
measure“ (Hassel et al., 2005, p. 49). As a result of the research design, no judgement 
on market efficiency can be derived with regard to Fama’s or Jensen’s version of the 
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EMH. Identical conclusions are valid for other related studies applying the Ohlson 
model (Chapple, Clarkson, & Gold, 2009). 
 
Over a ten-year period between 1988 and 1997, Murray, Sinclair, Power, and Gray 
(2006) looked at the 100 largest UK companies and the number of pages that these 
firms allocated to social and environmental issues in their annual reports. They found 
by means of Pearson Correlation tests and linear regression that, even after adjusting 
for company size, sustainability disclosure is related to market returns (Murray et al., 
2006). The return figure applied by Murray et al. is not adjusted for risk and the 
regression model applied does not allow for the discussion of any potential abnormal 
returns. Their measure of CSP, i.e. number of pages devoted to CSP in annual reports, 
is not value-relevant. While the impact of size on share performance is accounted for, 
other factors know to impact share performance are not controlled for. In summary, 
the study therefore does not allow to draw inferences about market efficiency.  
 
Ziegler, Schröder, and Rennings (2007) look at 212 European companies from 1996 
to 2001. Using sustainability performance data by the Swiss bank Sarasin & Cie for 
the year 2001 as an independent variable, they hypothesized that sustainability 
performance impacts monthly stock returns. More specifically, their indicator of CSP 
rated on a scale from 1 to 5 the “average sustainability performance (evaluated in 
terms of the environmental and social risks) of the industry in which a corporation 
operates” as well as “the relative sustainability performance of a corporation within a 
given industry (evaluated in terms of the environmental and social activities of a 
corporation compared with all other corporations in the same industry)” (Ziegler et 
al., 2007, p. 662). They used the Fama and French Three Factor Model, i.e. they made 
reasonable use of control factors by controlling for risk, size and book to market ratio, 
but not the momentum factor. Ziegler et al. found that while variables of relative 
sustainability performance of companies had no effect on stock performance, “the 
average environmental performance of the industry in which a corporation operates 
has a significantly positive effect on the average monthly stock return from 1996 to 
2001” (Ziegler et al., 2007, p. 677). As they use CSP as an independent variable and 
only report these factor loadings, their research design does not allow for a judgement 
of the economic significance of abnormal returns in general or in light of transaction 
and information costs. Furthermore, their measure of CSP was not available to the 
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market during the time period analysed, as they relate sustainability performance data 
of the year 2001 to stock performance in the years 1996 to 2001. As a consequence of 
the research design, in summary, market efficiency cannot be judged. 
 
Kempf and Osthoff (2007) looked at 650 stocks in the US from 1992 to 2004. They 
use the C4FM, i.e. control for factors generally assumed to explain stock market 
performance and construct portfolios from KLD ratings data. The KLD ratings data 
used applies qualitative criteria (such as strength and concerns in performance on e.g. 
environment and human rights) and exclusionary criteria (such as company 
involvement in controversial business areas). Kempf and Osthoff find abnormal 
returns in the magnitude of an annualised alpha of around 4% with a long-short 
strategy in the best-in-class investment approach. At least some of the indicators 
applied are value-relevant and there is no risk-based explanation for the abnormal 
returns found. While KLD data is based on publicly available sources, the KLD rating 
is not costlessly and publicly available. Results are consequently not surprising in 
light of Fama’s original conditions for market efficiency. In order to be able to derive 
a judgement on market efficiency with regard to Jensen’s version of the EMH, the 
investment approach has to be examined in light of the transaction and information 
costs involved in carrying out the investment strategy. Kempf and Osthoff report an 
annualised alpha of 3.38% when transaction costs of up to 150 basis points are 
assumed. Consequently, the market is not efficient towards the underlying 
information in Jensen’s version of EMH, as abnormal returns can be obtained in 
excess of the transaction and information costs of the investment strategy.  
 
Olsson (2007) looked at 440 US companies from the MSCI World Index in the years 
2004 to 2006. He uses an environmental risk ratings from GES Investment Services, 
which ranks companies “along more than 60 dimensions based on international 
standards for environmental management and industry-specific key indicators for 
environmental performance, among other things“ (Olsson, 2007, p. 3). Constructing 
portfolios from high and low rated companies, Olsson looks at daily returns and 
applied the C4FM, i.e. controls for factors generally known to explain returns. He 
found that no portfolio produced an abnormal return. Olsson used a measure of return 
that is adjusted for risk and controls for factors generally thought to explain stock 
market performance. All criteria for judging market efficiency are fulfilled. While 
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GES ratings are based on publicly available information, they are not readily 
available to the public free of charge. Assuming that the information incorporated in 
GES rankings is relevant to the intrinsic value of the firm, the fact that no abnormal 
returns are found in excess of information and transactions costs suggest that the 
market is efficient towards the underlying information of CSP. 
 
Ziegler, Busch, and Hoffmann (2011) looked at the monthly stock returns of between 
447 and 1790 European and US firms in the years 2001 to 2006. They built portfolios 
on simple trading rules based on two binary dummy indicators for corporate climate 
change disclosure derived from the Asset4 data base. The indicators represent 
information on whether a company reports if “it believes that climate change can 
represent commercial risks and/or opportunities” (Ziegler et al., 2011, p. 1287) or not 
and if a company reports “on initiatives or new production techniques, to recycle, 
reduce, reuse, substitute or phase out CO2 or CO2 equivalents in the production 
process?” (Ziegler et al., 2011, p. 1287) or not. Applying a C4FM, i.e. controlling for 
factors generally accepted to explain stock market performance, they do not find 
significant out- or underperformance of any portfolio over the whole period under 
investigation. Ziegler et al. use Asset 4 data, which is based on publicly available data 
sources, but not costlessly available to market participants. From an EMH perspective 
the general results of Ziegler et al. hint at market efficiency in Fama’s (and Jensen’s) 
version of EMH, as they use a return figure that is adjusted for risk, control for 
factors generally argued to impact SMP and do not find abnormal returns (in excess 
of transaction and information costs). This perceived efficiency might however also 
stem from the notion, that the indicator applied by Ziegler et al. does not contain 
value-relevant information for market participants – whether or not a company 
answers a question on the expected impacts of climate change or has any initiative in 
place to reduce its climate change impact may not be of relevance to the intrinsic 
value of the firm.  
 
Interestingly, Ziegler et al. (2011) found for the sub-period of 2004 to 2006 that a 
trading strategy which goes long in European companies “releasing carbon reduction 
measures or disclosing both responses to climate change” (Ziegler et al., 2011, page 
1292) and short in companies with no disclosures generated an annualised abnormal 
return of almost 7%. While Ziegler et al. do not account for transaction and 
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information costs, this abnormal return is estimated to be economically significant, 
even when assuming a rather high annual total expense ratio of 1.50% for carrying 
out the SRI investment strategy (cf. Geczy et al., 2005; Renneboog et al., 2008b; 
Statman, 2000).8 These sub-results of Ziegler et al. thus hint at market inefficiency in 
Fama’s and Jensen’s version of EMH towards the underlying information on carbon 
disclosure in Europe in the years 2004 to 2006, either because the market is pricing 
information that is not relevant to the intrinsic value of the firm or – assuming that 
their indicator of CSP is value-relevant – the market is not pricing it correctly. In light 
of the short time-period under investigation (36 monthly observations) these results 
should however be interpreted with caution.  
 
Reverte (2011) looks at 26 Spanish firms from 2003 to 2008 and CSR disclosure 
quality ratings from the Observatory on Corporate Social Responsibility reports. 
Reverte aims to examine the impact of the quality of CSR disclosure on the cost of 
equity, which is another description for expected return and represents the discount 
rate applied to future cash flows to arrive at current stock prices. The cost of equity is 
is estimated by Reverte via analyst forecasts. Reverte finds that as CSR disclosure 
quality increases, the cost of equity capital decreases, i.e. the rate of return required 
by investors decreases due to a reduction in the perceived riskiness of future cash 
flows. This is the case especially in environmentally sensitive industries. He 
concludes that “the cost of equity capital is an important channel through which the 
market prices CSR disclosure” (Reverte, 2011, p. 10), which may contain value-
relevant information that is not included in financial reports. Reverte uses a small 
sample and publicly available information to assess the impact of the quality of CSR 
disclosure on the cost of capital, while controlling for size and book to market ratio. 
His study does however not allow drawing inferences on market efficiency, as he 
uses subjective analyst estimations of expected returns rather than measuring stock 
performance. Consequently, no conclusion on abnormal returns and the level of 
market efficiency can be derived on the basis of Reverte’s study or related studies 
                                            
8      Note that this conclusion is only an approximation. Usually annual total expense 
ratios are not deducted from annualised portfolio returns but split into monthly 
expenses and deducted from monthly portfolio returns before the regression is 
performed again.  
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measuring the cost of equity (Chava, 2010; Matsumura et al., 2011; Sharfman & 
Fernando, 2008). 
 
2.2.8 Conclusions from Review of Related Studies 
This chapter examined the results of related existing research in light of EMH to 
possibly derive a judgement on the level of semi-strong market efficiency towards 
CSP and disclosure of CSP. Table 2 gives an overview on the studies examined.  
 
In conclusion, it can be summarised that while especially older studies that relate CSP 
to SMP argue to have identified market inefficiencies, on closer inspection it shows 
that the research design of these studies does not allow drawing such inferences from 
today’s perspective. One conclusion from the review of existing studies that relate 
CSP to SMP is that due to their research design, a large majority of studies does not 
allow deriving a judgement on the level of market efficiency. No study has come to 
the author’s attention that is exclusively devoted to the question whether the financial 
market is efficient with view to information on CSP. Furthermore, no study was 
found that allows drawing conclusive inferences on the level of market efficiency 
towards the market-wide financial impacts of climate change. This gap in existing 
research is addressed in the remainder of this thesis. 
 
In summary, two convincing market inefficiencies towards CSP were found in this 
chapter (cf. Derwall et al., 2005; Kempf & Osthoff, 2007). For both of these 
anomalies no risk-based explanation is available. They stem from long-short 
strategies of a best-in-class investment approaches that relied on information that is 
not costlessly available to a sufficient number of market participants. The 
inefficiencies found are consequently not surprising given Fama’s original second 
conditions for market efficiency. However, as the abnormal returns identified by 
these studies not only compensate for the transaction and information costs of 
carrying out the investment strategy, but generate abnormal returns even when annual 
total expense ratios of 1.50% are assumed, they represent market inefficiencies in 
Jensen’s less strong but economically more reasonable definition of EMH.  
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Table 2: Overview of examination of related studies in light of EMH 
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Gordon & 
Buchholz 
(1978) 
No Yes N/A No Yes No Market efficiency 
cannot be judged. 
Anderson & 
Frankle 
(1980) 
UNK Yes No No Yes No Market efficiency 
cannot be judged. 
Mahapatra 
(1984) 
No No N/A Yes Yes No Market efficiency 
cannot be judged. 
Diltz      
(1995) 
UNK Yes N/A Yes Yes No Market efficiency 
cannot be judged. 
Cohen et al. 
(1997) 
Yes Yes Yes UNK Yes No Market efficiency 
cannot be judged. 
Hughes 
(2000) 
N/A No N/A Yes Yes No Market efficiency 
cannot be judged. 
Thomas 
(2001) 
UNK Yes N/A Yes No No Market efficiency 
cannot be judged. 
Blank & 
Wayne  
(2002) 
UNK Yes No Yes No No Market efficiency 
cannot be judged. 
Derwall et    
al. (2005) 
Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Market is inefficient. 
Abnormal returns in 
excess of costs are 
achieved. No risk-
based explanation. 
Bauer et al. 
(2005) 
No Yes N/A UNK No Yes Market efficiency 
cannot be judged. 
Hassel et al.  
(2005) 
N/A No N/A Yes No No Market efficiency 
cannot be judged. 
Notes: N/A = Not applicable, UNK = Unknown 
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Table 2: Overview of examination of related studies in light of EMH (cont.) 
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Murray et al. 
(2006) 
N/A No N/A No Yes No Market efficiency 
cannot be judged. 
Ziegler et al. 
(2007) 
UNK Yes N/A Yes No Yes Market efficiency 
cannot be judged. 
Kempf & 
Osthoff 
(2007) 
Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Market is inefficient. 
Abnormal returns in 
excess of costs are 
achieved. No risk-
based explanation. 
Olsson   
(2007) 
No Yes N/A Yes No Yes Market is efficient. 
No abnormal returns 
in excess of costs are 
achieved. 
Griffin et al. 
(2010) 
N/A No Yes Yes No No Market efficiency 
cannot be judged. 
Ziegler et al. 
(2011) 
No Yes N/A No Yes Yes Market is efficient. 
Reverte 
(2011) 
UNK Yes N/A Yes Yes Yes Market efficiency 
cannot be judged. 
Notes: N/A = Not applicable, UNK = Unknown 
 
Recalling Fama’s interest to research “the level of information at which the 
hypothesis breaks down” (Fama, 1970, p. 383) the review of studies relating CSP to 
SMP can hint at the fact that CSP information has to be costlessly available to all 
market participants in order for the financial market to be efficient. The weaker but 
economically more reasonable version of the hypothesis suggested by Jensen does not 
hold with regard to information on CSP. This circumstance is probably facilitated by 
the fact that the value-relevance of CSP information is not generally acknowledged 
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by market participants (cf. chapter 2.1.3 Three Conditions for an Efficient Market). 
As a consequence, insufficient numbers of market participants may acquire costly 
information and arbitrage opportunities continue to exist with regard to CSP. 
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Chapter 3 
Hypotheses Development 
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, research that allows making conclusive 
judgements on the level of market efficiency towards CSP is sparse and no research 
came to the author’s attention that allows drawing inferences on the level of market 
efficiency towards the financial impact of climate change on companies. To fill this 
gap, in this chapter, the hypotheses that allow testing market efficiency towards the 
market-wide financial impacts of climate change will be developed and it will be 
argued that the financial risk induced by climate change is of systematic nature.  
 
Climate change is widely accepted to be a serious threat to our planet that requires 
urgent regulatory responses from governments around the world (IPCC, 2007; Stern, 
2006). Averting the more serious consequences of climate change is expected to “be a 
major structural driver of economic change” (FTSE Group, 2012). In the remainder 
of this chapter, it is argued that the financial impact of climate change on companies 
in the EU constitutes a systematic risk, as various political and market initiatives for 
the reduction of GHG-emissions inflict unknown future costs on large parts of the 
economy (cf. chapter 1 Introduction). As this climate change induced systematic risk 
affects a large share of all companies, it cannot be eliminated in a portfolio through 
diversification and should therefore be rewarded with higher returns. In this context, 
it is noteworthy that practitioners from the field of mainstream finance have argued 
for climate change to be a systematic risk that should be rewarded with a risk 
premium (Litterman, 2010). Academic scholars however have widely ignored the fact 
that the financial risks induced by climate change classifies as a new source of 
systematic risk. Figge (1997, p. 266) nevertheless argued very early that 
environmental problems might lead “to a systematization of economic risks”. 
 
Before the hypotheses are developed that allow assessing the level of market 
efficiency towards climate change induced systematic risk, the important notions of 
EMH on which these hypotheses rest are briefly revisited: In an efficient market 
rational investors are rewarded with a premium for taking on systematic risk, i.e. risk 
that cannot be eliminated in a portfolio through diversification because it affects a 
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large share of the economy (cf. chapter 2.1.2 Definitions and Important Notions of EMH). 
Controlling for this risk and factors generally known to explain stock performance, no 
abnormal risk-adjusted returns can be persistently generated by investors that are 
trading on publicly available information in an efficient market. Consequently, it is 
only when the market is inefficient that stocks generate economically higher returns 
in the absence of higher systematic risk (cf. chapter 2.2.1 Abnormal Returns). In 
chapter 2.1.3 Three Conditions for an Efficient Market, some theoretical potential for 
market inefficiency concerning value-relevant information on CSP has been 
identified, as the theoretical conditions for market efficiency do not fully apply. 
Market inefficiencies towards information on CSP was subsequently evidenced in 
chapter 2.2 Literature linking CSP and SMP, though only in the less strong but 
economically more reasonable definition of EMH of Jensen (1978). Consequently, 
market efficiency as much as market inefficiency towards climate change induced 
systematic risk is considered as a possible outcome of this research (cf. chapter 2.1.6 
Application of EMH in this Research).  
 
To test market efficiency towards climate change induced systematic risk, hypotheses 
based on six publicly available proxies for the systematic risk represented by climate 
change are introduced and grounded in existing research in the remainder of this 
chapter. These proxies are a company’s affiliation with the EU ETS, the existence of 
disclosure of GHG-emissions by companies, the completeness of such disclosures, 
the absolute level GHG-emissions of companies and their GHG-efficiency, as well as 
their affiliation with high carbon industries. 
3.1 European Emissions Trading Scheme 
The first proxy for climate change induced systematic risk is a company’s affiliation 
with the EU ETS. To illustrate why affiliation with the EU ETS classifies as a proxy 
for climate change induced systematic risk, the important features and the future 
development of the scheme are summarized in the following paragraphs.  
 
Launched in January 2005, the EU ETS is the world’s largest cap-and-trade system 
for corporate carbon dioxide emissions. It covers more than 10,000 installations of 
companies with energy-producing activities, companies involved in the production 
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and processing of ferrous metals, companies from the mineral industry as well as 
companies with pulp, paper and board activities. 9 Together these installations are 
responsible for almost half of the EU’s CO2-emissions (European Commission, 
2007). Under the EU ETS, EU member states currently draw up national allocation 
plans, which allocate allowances to each installation in the system. An allowance 
corresponds to the right to emit one ton of CO2. If companies keep their emissions 
below the level of allocated allowances, they can sell their excess allowances at the 
market rate. Companies whose expected emissions surpass their allocated allowances 
can either take measures to reduce their emissions, obtain a limited number of 
Certified Emissions Reductions through investing in Clean Development Mechanism 
projects (Vasa, 2010) and/or buy additional EU ETS emission allowances at the 
market rate. Companies that do not possess the required number of allowances will be 
punished with a fine of € 100 per ton of CO2.  
 
The share of emission allowances that was distributed freely to companies in the first 
phase of the EU ETS, which lasted from 2005 to 2007, corresponded to almost 100% 
of the participating companies’ emissions (and to around 90% in the second phase of 
the EU ETS between 2008 to 2012). The free and over-allocation of allowances in the 
first phase of the EU ETS invited criticism on the validity of the scheme (Carbon 
Retirement, 2010). Especially European utility companies, which often operate in 
oligopolistic markets without international competition, benefited from the lax 
implementation of the EU ETS in the first phase. In fact, due to basically free 
allocation of emission allowances in that phase and the low price of emission 
allowances, the profits made by utility companies from passing on at times inexistent 
costs to consumers compensated for the costs resulting from their affiliation with the 
EU ETS. Not surprisingly, with regard to the first phase of the EU ETS, Obendorfer 
(2009) and Veith, Werner, and Zimmermann (2009) both found that prices of 
emission allowances and the share price of European Utilities were positively related 
in many European countries in the first phase of the EU ETS.  
 
                                            
9      Furthermore, airlines with flights starting from or landing in the EU are included 
in the EU ETS from 2012 onwards. 
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Evidently, the EU ETS is only slowly developing the dimension and importance it 
was designed to have. The free allocation of allowances will be consecutively 
reduced and it is estimated that about 50% of allowances will be auctioned in the 
third phase of the EU ETS starting in 2013, with auctioning increasing to 70-80% 
over time by 2020 (The World Bank, 2009). In the third phase of the EU ETS, no 
allowances will be allocated free of charge for electricity production while the 
auctioning process ensures that allowances are allocated to the highest bidder. 
Despite its initial deficiencies, the EU ETS has been initiated so that in the long-term 
companies face significant additional costs for emitting GHG-emissions. The exact 
magnitude of these future costs is unknown, which means that the impact of the EU 
ETS on the future cash flows of companies is consequently also unknown. 
 
Future costs stemming from the EU ETS are unpredictable in magnitude as they 
either stem from the purchase of emissions allowances at the unknown auction or 
market rate or costs for the reduction of emissions within the company. In this 
context, Engels (2009, p. 498) found in her study of over 300 companies that 
participated in the first phase of the EU ETS that a “large share of companies […] up 
to this date do not know their own abatement costs”. In other words, a large share of 
the companies interviewed could not estimate the costs for CO2-reduction within the 
company. These companies consequently cannot make an informed decision on when 
reducing emissions is more cost-effective than buying additional emissions 
allowances at a specific auction price or market rate. This lack of knowledge is likely 
to further increase the uncertainty around future costs companies incur from the EU 
ETS. 
 
During the time of this study, the uncertainty concerning the magnitude of future 
costs of emitting CO2 in the EU was further amplified because EU member states did 
not communicate their strategy for the allocation of allowances very clearly (The 
World Bank, 2009). For example, the chief executive of the Association of Electricity 
Producers suspected in early 2006 that utility companies “might be singled out for a 
hefty cut in emissions permits when the next allocation plan emerges” (Point Carbon, 
2006). This suspicion turned out correct and as a consequence the British utility 
company Drax Group spent £ 107 million on emission allowances in 2008 (CO2-
Handel.de, 2008), while the German RWE Group spend one billion Euro on emission 
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allowances in 2009 (RWE Group, 2009). While, as discussed, most utility companies 
were able to pass on costs for allowances to consumers due to the specific conditions 
of the markets they operate in, these numbers are able to illustrate the potential of 
uncertain financial impacts that GHG-emissions can have on the intrinsic value of a 
company. The British consulting company Carbon Trust estimates that for example 
companies from the Building Materials and Bulk Commodity Chemicals sector will 
face severe challenges in passing on carbon costs to consumers while showing high 
carbon intensity. Carbon Trust (2006) therefore stipulates that under a realistic 
regulatory scenario these sectors are expected to be significantly impacted by the EU 
ETS, with a value at risk over 10% of EBIT in 2013. For other sectors, Carbon Trust 
does not expect the EU ETS to have a financial impact of above 5% of profit or 
shareholder value in 2013. 
 
The year 2013 actually marks an important date for the EU ETS. Its impact is 
expected to widen significantly as a series of important changes to the way the EU 
ETS works will be introduced, which according to the European Commission (2008, 
p. 6) “will strengthen, expand and improve its functioning”. For example, from 2013 
onwards, allocation plans will be determined at the EU level due to the problems of 
over-allocation of allowances to companies, which occurred in the first and second 
phase of the EU ETS. Furthermore, additional greenhouse gases and companies from 
the petrochemicals, ammonia and aluminium industries are to be included in the EU 
ETS from 2013 onwards (European Commission, 2010). In this context, for example 
the chemical company BASF stated that it sees a distinct cost burden stemming from 
the EU ETS from 2013 onwards (Carbon Disclosure Project, 2008b).  
 
From an EMH perspective, the expected yet unknown future impact of the EU ETS 
on the cash flow of BASF would already be priced in today’s market valuations of 
BASF – and as well as in the market valuation of companies from the petrochemicals, 
ammonia, aluminium and mineral industry, companies with energy-producing 
activities, airlines, companies involved in the production and processing of ferrous 
metals as well as companies with pulp, paper and board activities. It thus becomes 
clear that while the EU ETS is limited to certain industries, it affects large segments 
of the economy. Already in the years 2005 to 2009, on average more than one third of 
the European constituents of the FTSE All World Index had installations in the EU 
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ETS (cf. chapter 4.3 Descriptive Sample Characteristics). This share will rise further 
from 2013 onwards and illustrates that the unknown financial impact of the EU ETS 
on companies cannot be diversified away and therefore classifies as a proxy for the 
systematic risk induced by climate change. 
 
In the long-term, the EU ETS thus inflicts unpredictable future costs on large parts of 
the economy through unknown fluctuations in the future price of emission allowances 
as well as a remaining uncertainty concerning the free allocation of allowances in the 
future. As a matter of fact, the future price of emission allowances is unknown and 
prices have shown significant fluctuation in the past. In the first phase of the EU ETS, 
prices for emission allowances ranged from almost € 0 to around € 27. Some 
companies might be able to hedge the significant risk stemming from short- to 
medium term fluctuations in the price of carbon. These companies however still face 
unknown future costs in the long-term for emitting or reducing their CO2-emissions. 
The systematic risk induced by the EU ETS is consequently conceptually very similar 
to the systematic risk induced by oil prices (Ciner, 2001; Jones & Kaul, 1996; 
Sadorsky, 1999).  
 
As it has been demonstrated, the EU ETS classifies as a proxy for climate change 
induced systematic risk because it inflicts unpredictable future costs on industries that 
present large parts of the economy. In the methodology used for this research, 
systematic risk is depicted by the coefficient beta, which measures the sensitivity of 
portfolio returns to market returns. The returns of companies that are affiliated with 
the EU ETS are expected to be more sensitive to the market-wide risk induced by 
climate change than the returns of companies that are not affiliated with the EU ETS. 
Ceteris paribus, affiliation with the EU ETS would increase companies’ beta, as their 
expected returns are more sensitive to the risk induced by climate change to the 
overall market, which by rule has the average beta of 1.0 (Rosenberg & Guy, 1976). 
In the context of EMH, the rational risk-averse investor would therefore expect to be 
rewarded for the increased systematic risk taken on when investing in companies that 
are affiliated with the EU ETS. If the financial market prices this risk correctly, no 
difference in risk-adjusted returns can be observed between companies that are 
affiliated or not affiliated with the EU ETS on a risk-adjusted basis. It is consequently 
hypothesized:  
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Hypothesis 1a: The market is efficient, i.e. there is no difference in risk-adjusted 
returns between portfolios constructed from companies that are affiliated and those 
that are not affiliated with the EU ETS. 
 
However, as identified in chapter 2.1.3 Three Conditions for an Efficient Market, 
there is a theoretical potential for market inefficiency concerning value-relevant 
information on CSP, as the respective conditions for market efficiency are not 
fulfilled. With regard to information on climate change induced systematic risk, the 
same arguments apply. Taking the possibility of market inefficiency10 into account it 
is hypothesized: 
 
Hypothesis 1b: The market is inefficient, i.e. there is a persistent difference in risk-
adjusted returns between portfolios constructed from companies that are affiliated 
and those that are not affiliated with the EU ETS. 
3.2 Existence of Disclosure of GHG-Emissions 
The second proxy for climate change induced systematic risk in this study is the 
existence of corporate disclosures of absolute levels of GHG-emissions. Showing that 
information on absolute levels of GHG-emissions is relevant to the intrinsic value of 
the firm, this proxy is subsequently related to a stream of studies of estimation and 
information risk in mainstream finance, in which “securities for which there is 
relatively little information are shown to have relatively higher systematic risk” 
(Barry & Brown, 1985, p. 407). While there is on-going academic debate over the 
non-diversifiability of estimation and information risk (Artiach & Clarkson, 2011), 
this research builds on the theoretical and empirical contributions that have shown 
that estimation risk and information risk are – or should be – priced.  
 
                                            
10     As described in chapter 2.1.4 Methodologies and Findings, market inefficiency 
here is defined as any abnormal return, despite the existence of a risk-based 
explanation or not. This is due to the fact that results of one study are not 
sufficient to evidence shortcomings in the asset pricing models to price a specific 
risk correctly. 
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A simplified argument in this stream of literature is that higher levels of value-
relevant information on a stock allow for a better and more reliable estimation of its 
specific future cash flow, which reduces the covariance with market returns and, 
ceteris paribus, its beta.11 In this context, for example Riedl and Serafeim (2009, p. 
25) summarize that various studies suggest that “insufficient firm-specific 
information leads market participants to infer valuation parameters based on non-firm 
specific (e.g. macro-economic) indicators”. In other words, if market participants do 
not have access to company-specific information, they have to rely on more general, 
non-specific information to estimate future cash flows. As a consequence, the 
expected returns of companies with lower levels of value-relevant firm-specific 
information will show a higher covariance with market returns, and consequently a 
higher beta. Before discussing estimation and information risk in the context of 
corporate disclosures of absolute levels of GHG-emissions in more depth, the value-
relevance of this second proxy for climate change induced systematic risk is briefly 
illustrated.  
 
Apart from the EU ETS, there are various other political and market initiatives for the 
reduction of GHG-emissions, which have already been or might be adopted in the 
future. For example, since 1990, various European countries have introduced some 
form of tax on carbon dioxide. The stance of remaining European countries to tax 
carbon is however unpredictable. To name one example, the introduction of a 
significant carbon tax in France was abruptly cancelled one month prior to its 
introduction (Kanter, 2009). The outcomes of the discussed development of national 
cap-and-trade programs for GHG-emissions in the US, Australia and New Zealand 
(Harrison, Klevnas, Nichols, & Radov, 2008) were similarly hard to predict during 
the period analysed in this study. Political uncertainties also exist at the level of  
European policy, where it is one of the policy guiding principles of the renewed EU 
Sustainable Development Strategy to make polluters pay, i.e. to “ensure that prices 
reflect the real costs to society of consumption and production activities and that 
polluters pay for the damage they cause to human health and the environment” 
                                            
11    Recall that the beta of a stock can be calculated by dividing the covariance of 
stock and market returns by the variance of market returns. Consequently, 
reducing the covariance of a company’s stock with market returns, ceteris 
paribus, results in a reduction of beta. 
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(European Council, 2006, p. 5). The renewed Sustainable Development Strategy also 
states as one of its operational objectives to integrate climate change in all relevant 
European policies. During the period analysed in this study it was however unclear 
into which specific measures these intended policies and political guiding principles 
for a reduction of GHG-emissions will translate, given that they can be expected to be 
influenced by various actors (Ellis, 2007). Nevertheless, Sullivan (2009, p. 301) 
generally summarizes that “policy measures directed at reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions will continue to strengthen and companies across the board, not just those 
with significant emissions, will face increasing pressure to reduce these emissions”. 
 
The illustrated uncertainties in national and European policy add to the financial risk 
induced by climate change, as the future impact of these political initiatives on the 
intrinsic values of companies is unknown. In the meantime, companies seem to 
postpone investments in the reduction of GHG-emissions until greater political clarity 
exits (Sullivan, 2009, p. 309), leaving them unprepared for any policy measures for 
the reduction of GHG-emissions that might be introduced in the future. In this 
context, the corporate disclosure of absolute levels of GHG-emissions is value-
relevant, as it allows for a better assessment of a company’s exposure towards the 
discussed regulatory risks.  
 
Interestingly, it is the discussed uncertainty from the political environment that 
nurtured several of the market initiatives that try to grasp or eliminate the risk 
induced by climate change, such as the Carbon Disclosure Project (Carbon Disclosure 
Project, 2008a), the Climate Principles (The Climate Group, 2012), the Investor 
Network on Climate Risk (Investor Network on Climate Risk, 2010) or The 
Institutional Investors Group on Climate Change (IIGCC, 2010). For example, to 
illustrate the functioning of just one market initiative, it is the aim of The Carbon 
Principles to “reduce the regulatory and financial risk associated with greenhouse gas 
emissions” (The Carbon Principles Banks, 2008). Currently restricted to utility 
projects, signatory banks of The Carbon Principles assure to deny financing to clients 
who do not provide the information required to conduct the enhanced diligence 
process described in the principles. In summary, these market initiatives are able to 
illustrate that providers of capital require information to assess climate change 
induced systematic risk. In fact, scholars found that not only investors, but also banks 
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include an appraisal of environmental risk in their credit risk assessment procedures 
(Thompson & Cowton, 2004), even though not in every step of these procedures 
(Weber, Fenchel, & Scholz, 2008). The politically induced value-relevance of 
information on corporate climate change performance is consequently underlined by 
market initiatives, some of which have an impact on the certainty of a company’s 
access to capital. 
 
The value-relevance and risk-reduction potential of corporate disclosures of GHG-
emissions is further reinforced by arguments from the context of stakeholder theory 
(Freeman, 1994). Stakeholder theory stipulates that “managers and entrepreneurs 
must take into account the legitimate interests of those groups and individuals who 
can affect (or be affected by) their activities” (Freeman, Wicks, & Parmar, 2004, p. 
365). In the age of global warming, this relates to the legitimate interest of different 
stakeholders in the reduction of corporate impacts on climate change. Complying 
with stakeholder interests reduces the risk related to for example a company’s relation 
with the government, customers, the media and the communities it operates in 
(Ambec & Lanoie, 2008). Ziegler et al. (2011) suggest that stakeholders may 
withdraw their support if a company does not report on responses to climate change 
and for example Kolk, Levy and Pinkse et al. (2008, pp. 720-721) point out that 
“business is under increasing pressure from investors and environmental non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) to disclose information related to their GHG 
emissions”. Waddock and Graves (1997) argue that socially irresponsible firms may 
face uncertain future explicit claims from stakeholders. In this context and more 
general terms, Herremans, Akathaporn, and McInnes (1993) found that companies 
with poor CSR reputation, which might indicate low levels of legitimacy from 
stakeholders, show a higher systematic risk.  
 
At the same time, the existence of company-specific disclosures of GHG-emissions 
might indicate better management skill. In general, CSR disclosure has been argued 
to be an indication for good management skills (Alexander & Buchholz, 1978; 
Herremans et al., 1993) and scholars argue that “[i]nvestors may consider less 
socially responsible firms to be riskier investments because they see management 
skills at the firm as low” (McGuire, Alison, & Schneeweis, 1988, p. 857). Companies 
disclosing their absolute levels of GHG-emissions to the public may be those that are 
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better managed and prepared to manage their climate change performance and 
climate change induced systematic risk. In fact, in order for companies to be able to 
report absolute levels of GHG-emissions, environmental management systems need 
to be implemented within the company. The proxy of existence of disclosure of 
absolute levels of GHG-emissions consequently allows distinguishing companies that 
are able to manage their GHG-emissions, and whose performance can be assessed 
and traced over time, from companies that only make “soft, unverifiable claims to be 
committed to the environment” (Clarkson, Li, Richardson, & Vasvari, 2008, p. 309). 
Generally speaking, it has been found that good management skills may insulate 
stock returns from market wide effects (McAlister, Raji Srinivasan, & Kim, 2007), 
which would reduce the covariance of stock returns with market returns and 
consequently systematic risk. Furthermore, it has been found that companies 
reporting on CSP are subject to less negative market reaction in times of intra-
industry environmental crisis (Blacconiere & Patten, 1994). This reduces their 
covariance with market returns and thus their systematic risk. In fact, with regards to 
systematic risk and information on CSP, several studies find a negative relationship, 
i.e. companies with good environmental information practises show low systematic 
risk, while companies with poor environmental information practises show higher 
systematic risk (Sharfman & Fernando, 2008; Spicer, 1978).  
 
In summary, there are numerous political and market initiatives, as well as arguments 
rooted in stakeholder theory and relating to the indicative power of environmental 
disclosure for better management skills, which illustrate the value-relevance of 
corporate disclosures of GHG-emissions and the systematic risk related to a 
company’s choice to disclose GHG-emissions. Having established the value-
relevance of disclosures of GHG-emissions, these are now related to a stream of 
studies of estimation and information risk in mainstream finance. 
 
For financial disclosures, for example Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter (2003) show that 
a company’s beta and risk premium is affected by its disclosure strategy choice. As 
discussed at the beginning of this chapter, in mainstream finance it is argued that 
more company-specific information reduces the covariance of returns with the 
market, which, ceteris paribus, in turn would reduce a company’s beta (Riedl & 
Serafeim, 2009). In the context of this study, it is analogously argued that companies 
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that chose to disclose their absolute level of GHG-emissions to market participants 
allow for a better estimation of their specific future cash flows, as market participants 
do not have to infer their estimates on less specific information on exposure to 
climate change induced systematic risk. The returns of companies that choose to not 
disclose their GHG-emissions would shower higher covariance with market returns, 
and, ceteris paribus, a higher beta.  
 
For example, Barry and Brown (1985) or Coles, Loewenstein, and Suay (1995) also 
showed “that securities for which there is little information will have higher expected 
returns. These securities are riskier for investors than securities about which they 
have more information” (Easley, Hvidkjaer, & O’Hara, 2002, p. 2188). On this note, 
companies that disclose their absolute levels of emission give investors the possibility 
to better judge the financial risk induced by climate change and thus reduce the 
estimation risk that may result from incomplete information. Information asymmetry 
between investors and managers is consequently reduced (Grossman, 1981; Milgrom, 
1981).  
 
The discussed estimation and information risk related to disclosures of GHG-
emissions affects large segments of the economy. In the years 2005 to 2009, on 
average more than one third of the European constituents of the FTSE All World-
Index (FTSE AWI) did not disclose absolute levels of GHG-emissions to market 
participants (cf. chapter 4.3 Descriptive Sample Characteristics). The ratio of non-
disclosing firms varies significantly among sectors, for example on average only half 
of the European Technology and Health Care companies in the FTSE AWI reported 
absolute levels of GHG-emissions between 2005 and 2009. This means that the risk 
induced by non-disclosure of GHG-emissions cannot easily be diversified away. 
Clarkson, Guedes, and Thompson (1996, p. 71) summarize that “where low 
information securities are a nontrivial component of the final portfolios chosen by 
investors, estimation risk is likely to have a meaningful, nondiversifiable element”.  
 
In summary, companies not disclosing absolute levels of GHG-emission are argued to 
show a higher beta. According to the EMH, the rational risk-averse investor would 
consequently choose to hold stocks that allow assessing the climate change induced 
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systematic risk through the disclosure of absolute levels of GHG-emissions or expects 
to be rewarded for the increased systematic risk taken on when investing in 
companies that do not allow assessing this risk. Adjusting for risk, no difference in 
returns between companies that disclose or do not disclose absolute GHG-emissions 
would be achievable in an efficient market. Taking the existence of corporate 
disclosures of absolute levels of GHG-emissions as a proxy for climate change 
induced systematic risk it is consequently hypothesized:  
 
Hypothesis 2a: The market is efficient, i.e. there is no difference in risk-adjusted 
returns between companies that report and those that do not report GHG-emissions. 
 
Only in an inefficient market, companies that report absolute levels of GHG-
emissions would consistently generate abnormal risk-adjusted returns, as in this case 
value-relevant information and systematic risk would not be priced correctly. As 
identified in chapter 2.1.3 Three Conditions for an Efficient Market, there is 
theoretical potential for market inefficiency concerning value-relevant information on 
CSP, and consequently climate change induced systematic risk. This potential results 
from, for example, the third condition for market efficiency not being fulfilled, which 
stipulates that all market participants agree on the implications of information to the 
future price of a stock. In fact, while environmental disclosure has been shown to 
improve analysts forecast by reducing the uncertainty concerning future cash flows 
(Aerts, Cormier, & Magnan, 2008), scholars found that stock brokers and mainstream 
analysts do not incorporate environmental information in the majority of their 
decision making processes or investment recommendations (Campbell & Slack, 
2011; Deegan & Rankin, 1997; Hassel & Nilsson, 2006). This circumstance 
illustrates that not all market participants agree on the value-relevance of 
environmental information.  
 
Taking the possibility of market inefficiency towards the existence of disclosure of 
GHG-emissions as a proxy for climate change induced systematic risk into account it 
is hypothesized: 
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Hypothesis 2b: The market is inefficient, i.e. there is a persistent difference in risk-
adjusted returns between companies that report and those that do not report GHG-
emissions. 
3.3 Disclosure Completeness 
The third proxy for climate change induced systematic risk in this study is the 
completeness of corporate disclosures of absolute levels of GHG-emissions, i.e. the 
information quality of GHG-emissions disclosure. This proxy also relates to the 
before discussed estimation and information risk, as well as to studies in mainstream 
finance that argue that information quality can be a source of systematic risk (Francis 
et al., 2005; Kim & Qi, 2010; Leuz & Verrecchia, 2005).  
 
Information quality in this study is represented by the completeness of corporate 
disclosures of GHG-emissions, which is measured by means of a Disclosure 
Completeness Index. The Disclosure Completeness Index is constructed in line with 
the dominant reporting guidelines of the GHG Protocol (WBCSD, 2004), the Carbon 
Disclosure Project (CDP) (Carbon Disclosure Project, 2011) and the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI) (Global Reporting Initiative, 2000-2006) (cf. chapter 4.2.1 
Collection of GHG-emissions Data). In summary, a company is classified as 
reporting completely if it discloses scope 1 and scope 2 GHG-emissions for a group-
wide reporting boundary. A company is classified to report incomplete if it, for 
example, only reports scope 1 carbon dioxide emissions for parts of its manufacturing 
activities, i.e. does not allow for a truthful assessment of its climate change 
performance and its exposure to the systematic risk induced by climate change. 
 
Companies that disclose complete numbers of absolute levels of GHG-emissions 
allow investors to accurately judge their exposure to the systematic risk induced by 
climate change and thus reduce the estimation risk that may result from incomplete 
information (cf. chapter 3.2 Existence of Disclosure of GHG-Emissions). For 
example, the completeness of corporate disclosures of absolute levels of GHG-
emissions determines the reliability with which investors can estimate the future 
liability of firms under the systematic risk of the EU ETS. Complete disclosures of 
the level of absolute GHG-emissions thus enable investors to reduce the degree of 
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error in estimating future cash flows (cf. Cormier & Magnan, 2007) and consequently 
can reduce the estimation and information risk of a stock, which in turn would reduce 
its beta (Barry & Brown, 1985). At the same time, referring back to the discussed 
signalling effect of good management practise, which might insulate company returns 
from market wide effects, it is stipulated that companies that disclose complete levels 
of GHG-emissions are better managed and represent those companies that are truly 
committed to managing their environmental performance (cf. Al-Tuwaijri, 
Christensen, & Hughes II, 2004). 
 
The discussed estimation and information risk induced by incomplete disclosures of 
GHG-emissions affects large segments of the economy. In the years 2005 to 2009, on 
average only 15% of European constituents of the FTSE AWI disclosed complete 
absolute levels of GHG-emissions to market participants (cf. chapter 4.3.2 Disclosure 
Completeness). This means that climate change induced systematic risk as depicted 
by the proxy of incomplete disclosure of GHG-emissions cannot easily be diversified 
away.  
 
In summary, lower levels of completeness of GHG-emissions disclosure are expected 
to negatively influence the beta of a stock. According to the EMH, the rational risk-
averse investor would consequently choose to hold stocks that allow correctly 
assessing its climate change induced systematic risk through the complete disclosure 
of absolute levels of GHG-emissions or expects to be rewarded for the increased level 
of systematic risk taken on when investing in companies that do not allow assessing 
the risk induced by climate change accurately. Adjusting for risk, no difference in 
returns between companies that disclose completely or do not disclose absolute GHG-
emissions completely would be achievable in an efficient market. Taking the 
completeness of corporate disclosures of absolute levels of GHG-emissions as a 
proxy for climate change induced systematic risk it is consequently hypothesized:  
 
Hypothesis 3a: The market is efficient, i.e. there is no difference in risk-adjusted 
returns between companies that report complete and those that report incomplete 
GHG-emissions. 
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Only in an inefficient market, companies that report complete GHG-emissions would 
consistently generate an abnormal risk-adjusted return, as in this case value-relevant 
information and risk are not priced correctly. As the value-relevance of the 
underlying proxy for climate change induced systematic risk is not generally agreed 
upon (cf. chapter 2.1.3 Three Conditions for an Efficient Market) and the majority of 
market participants is not able to distinguish between completely and incompletely 
reporting companies, the possibility of market inefficiency is taken into account. The 
assumption that market participants are not able to differentiate between completely 
and incompletely disclosing companies is based on the fact that the verification of 
reported corporate GHG-emissions data for its completeness is a complex task. For 
example Kolk et al. (2008, p. 721) argue that “voluntary carbon disclosure remains 
inconsistent and difficult to interpret”. Furthermore, the common corporate practise 
of incomplete GHG-disclosure, as evidenced at a later stage in this thesis (cf. chapter 
4.3.2 Disclosure Completeness), has gone largely unnoticed and did not generate any 
significant public disapproval. If market participants do not take notice of the value-
relevant publicly available data, the market cannot be expected to be efficient with 
regard to this proxy for climate change induced systematic risk. Taking the possibility 
of market inefficiency into account it is consequently hypothesized: 
 
Hypothesis 3b: The market is inefficient, i.e. there is a persistent difference in risk-
adjusted returns between companies that report complete and those that report 
incomplete GHG-emissions. 
3.4 Absolute Levels of Emissions 
The fourth proxy for climate change induced systematic risk in this study is the level 
of absolute GHG-emissions reported by companies. Arguing that the risk induced by 
climate change is a market wide effect, it is argued that the level of absolute GHG-
emissions of a company determines its exposure and the sensitivity of its returns 
towards the systematic risk induced by climate change. 12  The exposure and 
sensitivity determine the covariance of its returns with market returns, which would, 
                                            
12    The effect of incomplete reporting of GHG-emissions is controlled for in a test of 
robustness.  
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as discussed in chapter 3.2 Existence of Disclosure of GHG-Emissions, impact its 
beta.  
 
More specifically, the future cash flows of companies with low absolute levels of 
emissions are less sensitive towards external events on climate change that 
systematically affect firms, which would reduce the covariance of their returns with 
market returns and, ceteris paribus, their beta (Balabanis, Phillips, & Lyall, 1998). On 
the other hand, the large share of companies with comparatively high absolute levels 
of GHG-emissions is more exposed to, for example, the uncertain future financial 
liabilities under the EU ETS. Companies with comparatively high levels of GHG-
emissions are furthermore more principally targeted by the discussed political and 
market initiatives for the reduction of GHG-emissions, which makes the future cash 
flows of these companies more sensitive to the unknown future impact of these 
initiatives.  
 
It can further be argued that companies with lower levels of GHG-emissions are 
generally perceived as environmentally better performing and are thus exposed to less 
risk in their relation to stakeholders. From the view of stakeholder theory it can be 
argued that “[b]etter environmental performance may make the relations between the 
firm and its external stakeholders (e.g., government, ecological groups, media, 
communities) easier and reduce the risk associated with these relations” (Ambec & 
Lanoie, 2008, pp. 50-51). At the same time, low absolute levels of emissions reduce 
the risk related to relations with customers in the business-to-business segment. In the 
business-to-business segment, companies increasingly try to reduce the 
environmental impact along their supply chain. For example Toshiba ranks their 
suppliers according to their environmental performance (Toshiba, 2009) and a study 
commissioned by the CDP found that of the 44 companies interviewed 56% expect to 
deselect suppliers in the future which do not meet the carbon management criteria set 
by the companies (A.T. Kearney, 2010). The future cash flows of companies that do 
not meet certain climate change performance criteria are consequently less secure, as 
these companies might have to invest to meet a specific emissions threshold in the 
future or lose access to certain revenue streams.  
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Furthermore, Porter and Van der Linde (1995) argued that pollution is often 
associated with a waste of resources and Bloom, Genakos, Martin, and Sadun (2010) 
confirm this notion for absolute levels of GHG-emissions. They showed that better 
management practices are associated with improved energy efficiency and lower 
greenhouse gas emissions. As discussed in chapter 3.2 Existence of disclosure of 
GHG-emissions, management skill influences the riskiness of future cash flows and 
may insulate stock returns from market wide effects (McAlister et al., 2007), which in 
turn would reduce systematic risk. 
 
In fact, with regards to systematic risk and environmental performance of CSP, 
several studies find a negative relationship, i.e. companies with good environmental 
performance show lower systematic risk, while companies with poor environmental 
performance show higher systematic risk. Looking at 67 firms from six industries 
from 1967 to 1978, Mahapatra (1984, page 37) found that “in the long run, high 
pollution control expenditures result in low profitability (market returns) and low 
systematic risk”. Good CSP, as measured by Fortune Magazine’s MAC survey, has 
also been found to decrease systematic risk by Luo and Bhattacharya (2009). Salama, 
Anderson, and Toms (2011) also find that community and environmental 
responsibility rankings are marginally inversely related to systematic risk for UK 
companies between 1994 and 2006. This inverse relation between CSP and 
systematic risk is confirmed in a meta-study by Orlitzky and Benjamin (2001). 
Connors and Silva-Gao (2008) find that the level of chemical emissions of a company 
from highly polluting industries is related with the uncertainty of its future cash 
flows. They argue that “investors are pricing the risk associated with environmental 
performance because of the uncertainty of the future cash flow effects of the 
consequences of poor performance such as lawsuits and regulatory exposure” 
(Connors & Silva-Gao, 2008, p. 5). However, not only investors and banks (cf. 
chapter 3.2 Existence of Disclosure of GHG-Emissions) factor in environmental 
performance. Different scholars found that bond markets increasingly take into 
account the financial impact of environmental performance (Bauer & Hann, 2010; 
Graham, Maher, & Northcut, 2001), which impacts the certainty of a company’s costs 
of capital.  
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To include the level of absolute GHG-emissions reported by companies as a proxy for 
climate change induced systematic risk in this study, absolute levels of GHG-
emissions have been hand-collected from publicly available sources (cf. chapter 4.2.1 
Collection of GHG-emissions Data). Following Fama and French (1995) in their 
categorisation of companies’ market capitalisation for the investigation of the size 
risk premium, companies in this study are arranged in three categories for absolute 
emissions levels: companies with the highest 30% of emissions are classified as high 
emitters, companies with the medium 40% of absolute levels of emissions are 
classified as medium emitters, and companies with the lowest 30% of absolute levels 
of emissions are categorized as low emitters (cf. chapter 5.3 Portfolio Construction). 
In summary, the returns of high and medium emitters are comparatively more 
exposed and are more sensitive to the systematic risk induced by climate change. 
According to the EMH, the rational risk-averse investor would choose to hold stocks 
of low emitters or expects to be rewarded for the increased level of systematic risk 
taken on when investing in companies that have comparatively high levels of GHG-
emissions. Adjusting for risk, no difference in returns between companies that have 
high, medium or low levels of absolute emissions should be observable. Taking 
absolute levels of corporate GHG-emissions as a proxy for climate change induced 
systematic risk it is consequently hypothesized:  
 
Hypothesis 4a: The market is efficient, i.e. there is no difference in risk-adjusted 
returns between companies that have high and those have low levels of absolute 
GHG-emissions. 
 
Only in an inefficient market, companies with e.g. low absolute GHG-emissions 
would consistently generate abnormal risk-adjusted return. As identified in chapter 
2.1.3 Three Conditions for an Efficient Market, there is a theoretical potential for a 
market inefficiency concerning value-relevant information on CSP and consequently 
climate change induced systematic risk. In this context, for example, FTSE Group 
argues that share prices might not fully reflect the financial risk represented by 
political and market initiatives for the reduction of carbon yet (FTSE Group, 2012). 
Taking the possibility of market inefficiency into account it is hypothesized: 
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Hypothesis 4b: The market is inefficient, i.e. there is a persistent difference in risk-
adjusted returns between companies that have high and those have low levels of 
absolute GHG-emissions. 
3.5 GHG-efficiency 
The fifth proxy for climate change induced systematic risk in this study is the level of 
GHG-efficiency of a company, expressed as the net income in Euro per ton of GHG-
emission.13 It is argued that, for the reasons discussed before, the ratio of net income 
to GHG-emissions determines a company’s exposure and the sensitivity of its returns 
towards the systematic risk induced by climate change, and consequently its beta.  
 
For example, the future cash flows of companies that only generate comparatively 
low levels of net income per ton of GHG-emissions will be impacted more heavily by 
any future regulatory or market initiatives for the reduction of GHG-emissions. The 
future cash flows of companies with a high GHG-efficiency, on the other hand, are 
less sensitive towards external events on climate change. This reduced exposure and 
sensitivity of companies with a high GHG-efficiency would reduce the covariance of 
their returns with market returns and, ceteris paribus, their beta. Furthermore, a high 
GHG-efficiency might indicate good environmental management practices and 
consequently good management skills, which may insulate stock returns from market 
wide effects (McAlister et al., 2007). In this context, for example Clarkson, Li, and 
Gordon (2004) showed that relative environmental performance developed from TRI 
emission data serves as a good indication for future environmental liabilities of 
companies in the pulp and paper industry. 
 
Again following Fama and French (1995) in their categorisation of companies’ 
market capitalization for the investigation of the size risk premium, companies are 
allocated to three categories for GHG-efficiency, i.e. High GHG-efficiency, Medium 
GHG-efficiency and Low GHG-efficiency (cf. chapter 5.3 Portfolio Construction). In 
summary, the returns of stocks from companies with a low GHG-efficiency are 
expected to be more exposed and more sensitive to the systematic risk induced by 
                                            
13 The effect of incomplete reporting is controlled for in a test of robustness.  
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climate change. The rational risk-averse investor would consequently expect to be 
rewarded for the increased level of systematic risk taken on when investing in 
companies that have a low GHG-efficiency. Adjusting for risk, no difference in 
returns between companies that have a high, medium or low GHG-efficiency would 
be observable in an efficient market. Taking GHG-efficiency as a proxy for climate 
change induced systematic risk it is consequently hypothesized:  
 
Hypothesis 5a: The market is efficient, i.e. there is no difference in risk-adjusted 
returns between companies that have a high GHG-efficiency and those have a low 
GHG-efficiency. 
 
Only in an inefficient market stocks of companies with e.g. a high GHG-efficiency 
would consistently generate abnormal risk-adjusted returns, as in this case value-
relevant information and risk would not be priced efficiently. Taking the possibility 
of market inefficiency into account it is hypothesized: 
 
Hypothesis 5b: The market is inefficient, i.e. there is a persistent difference in risk-
adjusted returns between companies that have a high GHG-efficiency and those have 
a low GHG-efficiency. 
3.6 High Carbon Industries 
The final proxy for climate change induced systematic risk in this study is a 
company’s affiliation with high carbon industries. Companies from high carbon 
industries are more likely to be targeted by the discussed political and market 
initiatives for the reduction of GHG-emissions. These external climate change effects 
are consequently expected to have a stronger impact on the future cash flows of 
companies from industries that are carbon intensive. It is consequently hypothesized 
that affiliation with a high carbon industry determines a company’s exposure and the 
sensitivity of its returns towards the systematic risk induced by climate change and 
consequently the covariance of its returns with market returns. 
 
For example, the unknown future costs of reducing exposure to future regulation or 
reducing GHG-emissions are higher in high carbon industries than in low carbon 
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industries. In this context, Konar & Cohen (2001) argued that for high polluting 
industries the costs of environmental preparedness and improving environmental 
performance are higher. Furthermore, regulatory constraints on company operations 
in high polluting industries affect operational uncertainty and financial performance 
(Semenova & Hassel, 2008). As the relation between CSP and CFP is generally 
thought to be much more stringent in high polluting industries, many studies have 
investigated this link focussing on environmental sensitive industries (cf. Clarkson et 
al., 2004; Hughes, 2000).  
 
A classification of high and low carbon industries has been adopted from Stanny and 
Ely (2008). Stanny and Ely classify the Utilities industry, Basic Materials industry, 
Industrials and Oil & Gas industry as high carbon industries, which are the industries 
with the highest average reported GHG-emissions per company in this research. 
Companies from high carbon industries represent a large segment of the economy: In 
the years 2005 to 2009, on average 45% of European constituents of the FTSE AWI 
belonged to a high carbon industry (cf. chapter 4.3.4 Industry Affiliation and 
Affiliation with the EU ETS). This means that climate change induced systematic risk, 
as depicted by the proxy of affiliation with high carbon industries, cannot easily be 
diversified away.  
 
The returns of stocks of companies that are affiliated with high carbon industries are 
consequently expected to be more exposed and show a higher sensitivity to climate 
change induced systematic risk. According to the EMH, the rational risk-averse 
investor would expect to be rewarded for the increased level of systematic risk taken 
on when investing in companies from high carbon industries. Adjusting for risk, no 
difference in returns between companies from high or low carbon industries would be 
observable in an efficient market. While the proxy of absolute levels of GHG-
emissions (cf. chapter 3.4 Absolute Levels of Emissions) applied in this research 
examines market efficiency towards climate change induced systematic risk at 
company level, this proxy looks at the efficiency of the financial market to price 
climate change induced systematic risk at industry level. Taking affiliation with high 
carbon industry as a proxy for climate change induced systematic risk it is 
consequently hypothesized:  
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Hypothesis 6a: The market is efficient, i.e. there is no difference in risk-adjusted 
returns between companies from high carbon and those from low carbon industries. 
 
For reasons discussed above, the possibility of market inefficiency is taken into 
account and it is consequently hypothesized: 
 
Hypothesis 6b: The market is inefficient, i.e. there is a persistent difference in risk-
adjusted returns between companies from high carbon and those from low carbon 
industries. 
 
These six proxies for climate change induced systematic risk – affiliation with the EU 
ETS, the existence of disclosure of GHG-emissions, disclosure completeness, 
absolute levels GHG-emissions, GHG-efficiency and affiliation with high carbon 
industries – are used to build mutually exclusive portfolios in chapter 5.3 Portfolio 
Construction. For example, all companies affiliated with the EU ETS are allocated to 
one portfolio, while those companies that are not affiliated with the EU ETS are put 
in a second portfolio. To determine whether the market is efficient or inefficient in 
pricing the different proxies for climate change induced systematic risk, the 
respective portfolios are regressed on different statistical models. Before detailing the 
methodology used to test the hypotheses developed in more depth in chapter 5 
Methodology, the sample construction and data collection processes for this study are 
now described. 
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Chapter 4 
Sample and Data 
The hypotheses developed in the previous chapter are tested with the sample and data 
described in the following paragraphs. After illustrating the process of sample 
selection in chapter 4.1 Sample Selection, the data collected to the test the hypotheses 
is described in chapter 4.2 Data Collection. The descriptive statistics for the data used 
are summarized in chapter 4.3 Descriptive Sample Characteristics, before an in-depth 
analysis of sample characteristics concludes the chapter (cf. chapter 4.4 
Understanding Sample Characteristics). 
4.1 Sample Selection 
The population that served as a starting point for sample construction is the FTSE 
AWI as of January in each year of this study. The FTSE AWI represents an 
established and widely applied source for investment professionals and researchers 
(cf. Cao, Harris, & Shen, 2010; Chang & Lin, 2010; Lin, Strong, & Xu, 2001). The 
FTSE AWI covers companies with large or medium-sized market capitalisation, 
which in total represent between 90% and 95% of the global investable market 
capitalisation (FTSE Group, 2011b). Given the fact that the FTSE AWI only includes 
companies with large or medium-sized market capitalisation, the problem that the 
performance of equal-weighted portfolios is driven by micro-caps, i.e. very small 
companies, is significantly reduced (Fama & French, 2008).
14
 This circumstance will 
be important for the interpretation of results in chapter 6 Regression Results. 
 
The decision rule for sample selection in this study is depicted in Figure 2 and 
described in detail in the following paragraphs. In summary, companies included in 
this study were selected based on the following criteria: Firstly, non-European FTSE 
AWI constituents were excluded from the population on account of the fact that this 
                                            
14    No agreed upon official definition determining the size of a micro-cap exists. 
Only 17 companies in this sample have a market capitalisation of below € 300 
million and would consequently qualify as a micro-cap by the most rigorous of 
definitions. 12 of these 17 companies only qualify as a micro-cap in the year 
2008, i.e. during times of financial market crisis. 
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research focuses solely on companies from the EU. On average, 617 EU index 
constituents – as represented by the Stock Exchange Daily Official List (SEDOL) – 
formed part of FTSE AWI in the years 2005 to 2009. These 617 constituents 
represented on average 26% of the FTSE AWI global market capitalisation in the 
years 2005 to 2009. Subsequently, the FTSE Industry Classification Benchmark 
(ICB) (FTSE Group, 2010) was applied to classify companies according to their 
industry affiliation and companies from the financial service industry (ICB industry 
code 8000) were excluded from the sample. 15  The common practise to exclude 
financial service companies from the sample is applied in this study as their increased 
leverage and sensitivity to market developments makes financial service firms 
incomparable with companies from other industries (Fama & French, 1992; Foerster 
& Sapp, 2005; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). On average, 358 non-financial EU index 
constituents formed part of the FTSE AWI in the years 2005 to 2009, which 
represented on average 22% of the FTSE AWI global market capitalisation in the 
years 2005 to 2009. 
 
After the exclusion of financial service firms, in total 443 different index constituents 
formed part of the FTSE AWI in the years 2005 to 2009. Seven companies formed 
part of the FTSE AWI with class A and class B shares. To avoid double-weighting 
the performance of these companies, their class A share was excluded from the 
sample. Class A shares were chosen for exclusion for two reasons: Firstly, class A 
shares carry more voting rights and therefore show a lower liquidity. Secondly, the 
class B shares of the respective companies were included in the FTSE AWI for longer 
periods. A further three companies that were part of the index in the year 2005 had to 
be excluded from the sample, as no complete financial data was available. For the 
same reason, two companies had to be excluded in one year and another company in 
three years, but remained in the sample and were included in this study in the 
remaining years. In the end, 433 different companies from 17 European Union 
                                            
15    The FTSE Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) was only introduced in the 
year 2006. For the year 2005 industry affiliation in this study was constructed by 
matching companies’ industry affiliations in the years 2006 to 2009 with the year 
2005. When a company was not part of the FTS AWI after the year 2005, ICB 
industry affiliation was derived from the most common transformation of former 
industry code to ICB from 2005 to 2006. 
- 72 - 
countries and eight industries form part of the sample and were included in data 
collection activities for this study. 
 
These 433 different companies constitute sample A. Sample A includes companies 
that report absolute levels of GHG-emissions to the public as well as companies that 
do not disclose this information. On average 351 companies form part of sample A in 
each of the years 2005 to 2009 resulting in a total of 1756 firm year observations. 
Sample A is used to test the hypotheses concerning the EU ETS (cf. chapter 3.1 
European Emissions Trading Scheme), the existence of disclose on GHG-emissions 
(cf. chapter 3.2 Existence of Disclosure of GHG-Emissions) and the affiliation with 
high carbon industries (cf. chapter 3.6 High Carbon Industries).  
 
A second sample used for this research – sample B – contains only those companies 
of sample A that report GHG-emissions on at least the majority of corporate 
activities16 in the year preceding index inclusion, i.e. year t-1. In total 297 different 
companies form part of sample B. On average 206 companies reported GHG-
emissions on at least the majority of corporate activities at t-1 in each of the years 
2005 to 2009, resulting in a total of 1028 firm year observations. Sample B is used to 
test the hypotheses concerning absolute levels of GHG-emissions (cf. chapter 3.4 
Absolute Levels of Emissions), GHG-efficiency (cf. chapter 3.5 GHG-efficiency) and 
disclosure completeness (cf. chapter 3.3 Disclosure Completeness). A third sample 
used for this research – sample C – contains only those companies of sample A that 
report GHG-emissions on at least the majority of corporate activities in the year of 
index inclusion, i.e. at year t. In total 306 different companies form part of sample C. 
On average 222 companies form part of sample C in each of the years 2005 to 2009 
resulting in a total of 1109 firm year observations. This sample is used for an in-depth 
analysis of sample characteristics (cf. chapter 4.4 Understanding Sample 
Characteristics), as it allows for the inclusion of more firm year observations. The 
decision rule for the sample selection of sample A, B and C is depicted in Figure 2. 
                                            
16    Only companies reporting on at the least the majority of corporate activities are 
included in this study based on the argument that this is the minimum level of 
emissions useful for drawing conclusions on a company’s exposure to climate 
change induced systematic risk. 
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Figure 2: Decision rule for sample selection 
 
The time period of the years 2005 to 2009 was chosen, as only from 2005 onwards a 
sufficient number of companies reported absolute levels of GHG-emissions for the 
year t-1 to facility a study of this research design. Time periods of similar or shorter 
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lengths were chosen by various scholars applying similar research designs (cf. 
Gordon & Buchholz, 1978; Ziegler et al., 2011; Ziegler et al., 2007). 
4.2 Data Collection 
All companies in sample A were included in the data collection activities carried out 
for this research. The data collection at company level included the gathering of 
GHG-emissions data, accounting figures, market returns as well as information on a 
company’s affiliation with the EU ETS and high carbon industries. Other information 
gathered for this research includes data on risk free rates of return, the price of oil and 
EU emissions allowances, as well as the implicit energy tax rate of countries in the 
EU. The process of collecting the respective data is presented in the remainder of this 
chapter, starting with the collection of the GHG-emissions data. 
 
4.2.1 Collection of GHG-emissions Data 
The aim of the GHG-emissions data collection activities was to gather publicly 
available GHG-emissions data for the 433 companies in sample A for the years that a 
company formed part of the FTSE AWI, as well as the year preceding inclusion in the 
index. The data collection process can be summarised in three steps. In a first step, 
corporate reports containing environmental information were collected. In a second 
step absolute numbers of GHG-emissions data17 and the date of publication of GHG-
emissions data were extracted from these reports, company websites or the CDP. In a 
third step the data gathered was classified according to its completeness in terms of 
the type, scope and reporting boundary of the reported emissions. The three steps of 
GHG-emissions data collection are summarized in Figure 3.  
 
                                            
17    Companies publishing only relative levels of emissions, such as emissions per 
product, emissions per sales or emissions per square meter, were excluded from 
this study because these ratios do not allow for a standardized assessment of 
climate change induced systematic risk. 
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Figure 3: Three steps of GHG-emissions data collection 
 
In the following paragraphs each step of the GHG-emissions data collection process 
is described. From the classification of reported emissions in terms of their type, 
scope and reporting boundary, a Disclosure Completeness Index is constructed, 
which allows testing the hypothesis concerning disclosure completeness (cf. chapter 
3.3 Disclosure Completeness). 
 
Step one of GHG-emissions data collection: Gathering reports 
In the first step of GHG-emissions data collection, corporate reports, i.e. reports 
published by the respective companies, were gathered from company websites and 
the Corporate Register website (CorporateRegister.com Limited, 2012). Corporate 
reports are costless and readily available to the public and consequently lend 
themselves for testing semi-strong market efficiency. The nature of the collected 
corporate reports included annual reports, integrated company reports, stand-alone 
reports on environmental or sustainability or CSR issues as well as dedicated 
- 76 - 
company websites18. In total, more than 4,000 corporate reports were collected for the 
data collection activities of this study. 
 
Step two of GHG-emissions data collection: Extracting emissions data 
In the second step of GHG-emissions data collection, absolute numbers of 
quantitative GHG-emissions data and the date of publication of the data were 
extracted from the reports or the CDP. As depicted in Figure 3, answers of a company 
to the CDP were consulted as an additional source of information when a company 
did not publish reports containing emissions information or it was found that a 
company did not include absolute levels of quantitative GHG-emissions data in its 
reports. As shown in Figure 3, data was also extracted from the CDP when the date of 
publication of the company report was subsequent to the publication of the CDP data 
base of a specific year. In total, in terms of data sources, GHG-emissions data was 
extracted from corporate reports for 84% of companies who reported GHG-emissions 
to the public, while the for the remaining 16% of companies emissions data was 
extracted from the CDP in at least one year. 
 
The emission data used for this research was collected as originally published by a 
company in a specific year, i.e. data corrected in retrospect was not taken into 
account. This has been done to account for the fact that at a specific point in time the 
semi-strong efficient market would have had access only to the emissions data as 
published at that point in time. When possible, GHG-emissions data was collected for 
the years that a company formed part of the FTSE AWI, as well as the year preceding 
inclusion in the index. 
 
Step three of GHG-emissions data collection: Classifying emissions data 
In the third step of GHG-emissions data collection, the emissions data gathered was 
classified according to its completeness. For example, Spalding (2010, p. 6) pointed 
out that corporate climate change disclosures “while more and more prevalent, are 
                                            
18    Information published exclusively web-based during the years 2005 and 2009 
was only included in the data collection activities if emissions data had not been 
corrected in retrospect and the original date of publication of the data was visible. 
- 77 - 
still voluntary and are by no means consistent or universal”. Some scholars even 
argue that “climate change disclosure is still in a primitive stage of development” 
(Smith, Morreale, & Mariani, 2008, p. 470). To be able to control for the known 
limitations of GHG-emissions disclosure in this analysis of market efficiency and to 
construct the Disclosure Completeness Index, corporate reporting of GHG-emissions 
is classified according to its completeness. 
 
In the following paragraphs, the motivation behind the classification of completeness 
for GHG-emissions is explained and the classification process is detailed. In 
summary, the classification of GHG-emissions reporting completeness builds on the 
three dominant guidelines for GHG-reporting, namely the GHG Protocol (WBCSD, 
2004) the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) (Carbon Disclosure Project, 2011) and 
the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) (Global Reporting Initiative, 2000-2006). The 
emissions data gathered was classified according to its completeness in terms of the 
scope and type of the emissions reported, as well as the reporting boundary applied. 
Table 3 summarizes the position of the three dominant reporting guidelines with view 
to scope, type, accounting approach 19  and the reporting boundaries of corporate 
GHG-emissions reporting. 
 
Classification of the scope of emissions reported. The standard most generally 
applied and mutually recommended by the CDP and the GRI to define the scope of an 
emission is the GHG Protocol. The GHG Protocol stipulates that scope 1 GHG-
emissions arise from “sources that are owned or controlled by the company” and 
scope 2 emissions “from the generation of purchased electricity consumed by the 
company” (WBCSD, 2004, p. 25). Scope 1 and 2 emissions thus give a fair summary 
of emissions arising as a direct result of a company’s activity, which would be 
relevant to determine its climate change induced systematic risk.  
  
                                            
19    Accounting approaches applied to emissions reporting are not taken into account 
for the measure of completeness of GHG-emissions reporting applied in this 
study, as there is no consensus among the dominant reporting guidelines (cf. 
Table 3) and arguing for the validity of one accounting approach over the other 
goes beyond the scope of this research. 
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Table 3: Summary of predominant reporting guidelines 
 
GHG Protocol CDP GRI 
Measure of 
reporting 
completeness in 
this study 
     
Scope of 
emission 
Scopes 1 and 2 
separately, 
scope 3 
optional 
Scopes 1 and 
scope 2 and 
scope 3 
separately 
Sum of scopes 1 
and 2, scope 3 
separately 
Scope 1 and scope 
2 
Type of 
emissions 
GHG-emissions GHG-
emissions; 
asking whether 
specific GHGs 
are excluded 
GHG-emissions GHG-emissions 
Accounting 
approach 
applied to 
emissions 
reporting 
2 choices: 
equity share, 
financial 
control and 
operational 
control 
approach. 
5 choices: 
financial 
control, 
operational 
control, equity 
share, Climate 
Change 
Reporting 
Framework, 
other 
At a minimum, 
entities over 
which the 
organization 
exercises control 
(for performance 
indicators) 
 
N/A 
Reporting 
boundary 
applied to 
emissions 
reporting 
All sources and 
activities within 
the chosen 
inventory 
boundary; 
asking to 
mention any 
specific 
exclusions of 
sources, 
facilities and/or 
operations 
All activities 
under the 
respective 
accounting 
approach; 
asking whether 
any facilities, 
activities and 
/or geographies 
are excluded 
Entities with 
significant 
sustainability 
impact  
Classification of 
activities reported 
on within the 
chosen reporting 
boundary 
 
Although all three dominant reporting guidelines require the reporting of scope 1 and 
2 emissions at a minimum, some companies focus their reporting on only one scope 
of emissions, arguing that they do not have noteworthy emissions under the other 
scope. At the same time, other companies from industries that usually emit significant 
levels of both scope 1 and scope 2 emissions only report emissions on one scope and 
thus give an incomplete account of their emissions. To allow for a standardized and 
effortless assessment of climate change induced systematic risk across company 
borders, the scope of the emissions reported by all companies needs to cover scope 1 
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and scope 2 emissions, as suggested by the dominant reporting protocols. For the 
classification of reporting completeness, it is therefore distinguished between 
companies reporting scope 1 and 2 emissions, i.e. reporting completely, and 
companies not reporting scope 1 and 2 emissions, i.e. reporting incompletely. 
 
For the vast majority of the emissions data points classified for this research the scope 
of the emissions reported was obvious from the corporate reports. In some cases 
however the scope of the emissions data is not stated clearly by the reporting 
company. For example, some companies report an indicator in a table labelled 
“Greenhouse gases” that – as explained in later reports – only includes scope 1 
emissions (Total, 2005, p. 8). Other companies report an indicator labelled “CO2 
emissions” in a table without ever explaining the scope in their reports (Tullow Oil 
plc., 2009, 2010). When in doubt about the scope of the emissions reported, the CDP 
was consulted for further information and usually allowed for a clear classification of 
the scope of emissions reported. In few cases a company did not report to the CDP 
and no information could be found that allowed for a clear determination of which 
scope of emissions a company reports on. In these few cases the classification had to 
be derived from key words and key phrases in the report. In these rare cases, the 
terms “total emissions", "Total" or indicators labelled “GHG” or "CO2" were 
classified as reporting scope 1 and scope 2 emissions. 
 
Classification of the type of emission reported. Given the comparatively high global 
warming potential of Greenhouse gases other than carbon dioxide and the fact that 
other gases than carbon dioxide are included in the EU ETS from 2013 onwards, a 
comprehensive analysis of climate change induced systematic risk cannot be limited 
to carbon dioxide emissions, but must include other Greenhouse gases. All three 
dominant reporting guidelines ask for the reporting of not just carbon dioxide but also 
the five other main Greenhouse gases. Nevertheless, many companies focus their 
reporting on carbon dioxide, as they do not emit noteworthy levels of other 
Greenhouse gases. At the same time, some companies from industries that usually 
emit significant levels Greenhouse gases other than CO2 only report on CO2 and thus 
give an incomplete record of their climate change performance. To allow for a 
standardized comparison of a company’s exposure to climate change induced 
systematic risk across industry borders, the reporting of GHG-emissions and not just 
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carbon dioxide is necessary. For the classification of the type of emissions reported in 
this research it is therefore distinguished between companies reporting on 
Greenhouse gases other than carbon dioxide, i.e. reporting completely, and 
companies only reporting CO2-emissions, i.e. reporting incompletely. 
 
For the vast majority of the emissions data points classified for this research the type 
of emissions reported was obvious from corporate reports. Some companies however 
do not state in a sufficiently clear way whether they are reporting on carbon 
emissions or Greenhouse gases. For example, companies refer to “CO2” in the text 
(Ahold N.V., 2009) or label their emissions indicator “carbon emissions” (Delhaize 
Group, 2009), although these companies include other Greenhouse gases than carbon 
dioxide in their emissions reporting. Other companies label an indicator “Greenhouse 
gas emission” although only reporting on carbon dioxide (Assa Abloy AB, 2010). Yet 
other companies seem to use the terms carbon and CO2-equivalents – usually used to 
measure GHG-emissions – interchangeably (Ericsson, 2009). When in doubt about 
the completeness of the emissions reported, the CDP was consulted for further 
information and allowed for a clear classification of the type of emissions reported. In 
few cases a company did not report to the CDP and in these few cases the 
classification had to be derived from key words and key phrases in the corporate 
report. The terms “CO2-equivalents" and “GHG” were classified as reporting on 
Greenhouse gas emissions, while key words such as “Carbon dioxide” and "CO2" 
were classified as reporting only carbon dioxide emissions. 
 
Classification of reporting boundary. Unfortunately, with regard to reporting 
boundaries, GRI, CDP and the GHG Protocol are incoherent with view to the 
activities which are to be included within the boundary of emissions reporting. The 
GRI allows setting the boundaries of a sustainability report to entities that “generate 
significant sustainability impacts” (Global Reporting Initiative, 2000-2006, p. 18). 
GRI specifies that “[g]enerally speaking, significant impacts are those that change a 
performance measured under a quantitative indicator by a noticeable amount” (Global 
Reporting Initiative, 2005, p. 11). In contrast to the GRI, the CDP requires reporting 
on all corporate activities that generate GHG-emissions (Carbon Disclosure Project, 
2010b). Likewise, the GHG Protocol requires users to “[a]ccount for and report on all 
GHG emission sources and activities” (WBCSD, 2004, p. 7). Both, the CDP and 
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GHG Protocol require companies to specify any exclusion made to the reporting 
boundary in terms of sources, facilities and/or operations, which are not included in 
the emissions reported. 
 
While companies do not follow the general requirements of the GHG Protocol and 
the CDP to report GHG emission from all activities, the vast majority of companies 
adhere to the guidelines by specifying which sources and activities are excluded from 
their reporting boundary. For this study, the completeness of reporting boundaries is 
therefore classified on the basis of the activities included in the GHG-emissions 
reporting of a company. Although the thresholds of five categories developed for the 
classification of the completeness of reporting boundaries had to be set subjectively, 
these categories are probably the first of their kind to allow for an objective and 
meaningful comparison of the completeness of reporting boundaries across company 
borders. The five categories for the classification of reporting boundaries defined for 
this research are as follows:  
 
- Group-wide: emissions data covering all or almost all corporate activities; or 
expressed as a percentage figure more than 90% of manufacturing activities 
and more than 90% of all other activities. 
- All manufacturing operations: emissions data covering all manufacturing 
operations; or expressed as a percentage figure more than 95% of 
manufacturing activities but no other activities. 
- Majority of manufacturing operations: emissions data covering at least the 
majority of manufacturing activities; or expressed as a percentage figure more 
than 85% of manufacturing activities. 
- Majority of activities: emissions data covering all activities with significant 
sustainability impact; or expressed as a percentage figure: more than 50% of 
all activities. 
- Insufficient reporting: emissions data not covering all activities with 
significant sustainability impact; or expressed as a percentage figure: less than 
50% of all activities. The company is consequently excluded from sample B 
and C. 
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Of the 1109 firm year observations in sample B, the reporting boundaries of 16% 
were defined with a percentage figure by the reporting company in terms of the 
activities covered, for example as a percentage coverage in terms of turnover, 
corporate activity or manufacturing operations. These emissions were consequently 
classified with regard to the completeness of reporting boundaries based on the 
percentage figure given (cf. Table 4). For the remaining emission data points included 
in this research, the completeness of reporting boundaries had to be classified based 
on the frequently used key words or key phrases utilized by companies to define 
reporting boundaries. Some examples for the classification of reporting boundaries 
used in this research based key words or key phrases are shown in Table 4. For 11% 
of the firm year observations in sample B no information defining the reporting 
boundary could be found in the reports or the CDP. The classification of these data 
points was based exclusively on the information given by a company in previous or 
later years and the company was excluded in case there were major changes in 
company structure from one year to the other. 
 
Table 4 illustrates the fact that reporting boundaries are not standardized across 
company borders. There are consequently limitations with regard to the classification 
of the unstandardized terminology used by companies to explain their reporting 
boundary. For example, the key word "operations" is used by some companies to 
describe all types of activities and by other companies to describe only manufacturing 
activities. In order to minimise subjectivity a reporting boundary that contained only 
this key word was classified as including only manufacturing activities, unless it 
could be asserted that the information given includes other activities than 
manufacturing activities. The finding that reporting boundaries are neither complete 
nor set in a standardized manner is in line with Sullivan (2009) and Archel, 
Fernández, and Larrinaga (2008, p. 115), who also found in their study of triple 
bottom line (TBL) reports that “the voluntary nature of TBL reporting leads to a lack 
of quality in boundary setting and boundary disclosure”.  
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Table 4: Classification of completeness of reporting boundaries 
 
Examples of classification based 
on reporting boundary defined 
with a percentage 
Examples for classification based 
on reporting boundary defined 
with key words or key phrases 
   
Group-wide “98% of group's revenues”, “100% 
of group operations”, “97.3% of 
corporate activity”, “covering 96% 
of employees worldwide”, “94% of 
the consolidated company”, 
“94.7% of corporate activity”, 
“94.4% of corporate activity”, 
“95% of turnover”, “92% of 
turnover”, “94% of sales”, “7 % of 
the Group’s entities did not 
communicate GHG-emissions” 
“group-wide”, “company-wide “, 
“all consolidated subsidiaries”, “our 
global activities”, “all business 
divisions and sites”, “extrapolated to 
cover all employees”, “stores, owned 
vehicle fleet, production and 
transport”, “large offices and all 
factories”, “all sites and major 
offices”, “excluding small 
subsidiaries”, the number of 
reporting companies 
All 
manufacturing 
operations 
“98% of production”, “96% of 
production sites”, “98% of 
emissions from manufacturing 
sites”, “97% of the total production 
activities” 
“all manufacturing activities”, “all 
manufacturing activities over which 
the Group exercises operational 
control”, “global manufacturing 
operations”, “for our total of […] 
production units”, “all sites where 
the Group owns more than a 50% 
stake”, “all manufacturing sites” 
Majority of 
manufacturing 
operations 
“88% of industrial activities”, 
“95% of manufacturing, 80% of 
engineering centers”, “95% of our 
manufacturing operations", “86% 
of sales […] data covers 
production sites” 
 “major manufacturing sites”, “major 
facilities”, “all relevant production 
sites”, “manufacturing of core 
products”, the number of 
manufacturing sites, a list of 
divisions or countries from which 
manufacturing data is reported 
Majority of 
activities 
“81% of global workforce 
covered”, “81% of production”, 
“100% of all activities that have 
impact”, “84% of sales”, “89% of 
group”, “72% of sales covered”, 
“72.5% of total workforce”, “75% 
of UK facilities and UK turnover”, 
“more than 75% of our facilities 
which account for greater than 
75% of our business turnover” 
“companies which meet specified 
threshold criteria in terms of 
environmental impact”, “significant 
activities in terms of environmental 
impact”, “from processes covered 
under the EU ETS”, “all installations 
participating in EU ETS”, a list of 
divisions or countries from which 
data is reported 
Insufficient 
reporting 
“40% of headcount”, “38% of 
sales” 
“from transport fleet”, “from 
business travel”, “our head office”, a 
list of divisions or countries from 
which data is reported 
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Disclosure Completeness Index 
In summary, companies should report scope 1 and 2 GHG-emissions for a group-
wide reporting boundary to allow for a reliable and standardized assessment of its 
exposure to climate change induced systematic risk. To assess the overall 
completeness of corporate GHG-emissions reporting, an equal-weighted Disclosure 
Completeness Index is built based on the measures for completeness of scope, type 
and reporting boundary introduced above. For the construction of this index, a 
company that reports scope 1 and 2 emissions is scored ‘1’ (and ‘0’ otherwise). 
Furthermore, a company that reports GHG-emissions is scored ‘1’ (and ‘0’ 
otherwise). Finally, a company that reports on group-wide activities is scored ‘1’ (and 
‘0’ otherwise). In the equal-weighted index, companies thus can receive a score 
between ‘0’ and ‘3’. A company reporting group-wide scope 1 and 2 GHG-emissions 
scores ‘3’, whereas a company reporting scope 2 CO2-emissions on the majority of 
manufacturing activities would score ‘0’.  
 
Results of the GHG-emissions data collection activities and the construction of the 
Disclosure Completeness Index are detailed in chapter 4.3 Descriptive Sample 
Characteristics. 
 
4.2.2 Collection of Other Data 
Various data other than GHG-emissions has been gathered for this research from 
different sources. The collection of other data is detailed in the following paragraphs. 
 
Datastream 
The necessary monthly and yearly data for accounting figures, market returns and 
carbon prices have been extracted from the Thomson Reuters Datastream 
(Datastream) data base for the years 2003 to 2005. Table 5 summarizes the data 
extracted from Datastream that has been used in this test of market efficiency, the in-
depth analysis of sample characteristics (cf. chapter 4.4 Understanding Sample 
Characteristics) and/or the tests of robustness (cf. chapter 5.4 Tests of Robustness) 
carried out in this research. 
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Table 5: Overview on data gathered from Datastram 
Indicator  Mnemonic Datastream Description (shortened) 
   
Market 
capitalization 
MV Share price multiplied by the number of ordinary 
shares in issue. 
Net income WC01651 Income after all operating and non-operating income 
and expenses, reserves, income taxes, minority interest 
and extraordinary items. 
Total assets WC02999 Sum of total current assets, long term receivables, 
investment in unconsolidated subsidiaries, net property 
plant and equipment and other assets. 
Common equity WC03501 Common shareholders' investment in a company. 
Debt to common 
equity ratio 
WC08231 Total debt to common equity. 
Debt to assets WC08236 Total debt to assets. 
Return on total 
assets ratio 
WC08326 (Net income + ((Interest expense on debt-interest 
capitalized) * (1-tax rate))) / average of last year's and 
current year’s total assets * 100. 
Return on equity WC08301 (Net income before preferred dividends - preferred 
dividend requirement) / last year's common equity * 
100. 
Return index RI A theoretical growth in value of a share holding over a 
specified period, assuming that dividends are re-
invested to purchase additional units of an equity.  
 
Where: RIt = return index on day t, RIt-1= return index 
on previous day, PIt = price index, DYt= dividend 
yield %, N = number of working days in the year. 
Carbon price EEXEUAS European Union CO2 Emissions Allowance (European 
Energy Exchange). 
 
For a total of nine companies it was not possible to extract information from 
Datastream on the return on total assets (Datastream mnemonic WC08326). This 
information was consequently approximated via the ratio of net income (WC01651) 
and total assets (WC02999), while accounting for differences in the reported return 
on total assets ratio (WC08326) and the ratio of return to total assets calculated for 
preceding and/or following years. For a total of thirteen companies no information 
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was available on the return on equity, which was consequently estimated via the ratio 
of net income (WC01651) and common equity (WC03501), while accounting for 
differences in the reported return on equity ratio (WC08301) and the ratio of return 
on equity calculated for preceding and/or following years. A price for carbon was 
only available from end of May 2005 onwards. The time period of the regression that 
includes the price of carbon as a test of robustness is consequently shortened by five 
months (cf. chapter 5.4.3 Carbon Price). 
 
Risk free rate of return 
To define the return of a risk free asset in the CAPM and the C4FM (cf. chapter 5 
Methodology), monthly data on Euro Interbank Offered Rate, the so called Euribor, 
for the years 2005 to 2009 has been obtained from www.euribor-rates.eu (Triami 
Media, 2011). The three months Euribor rate has been transformed into the logarithm 
of the continuously compounded monthly risk free rate of return as described in 
chapter 5.1 CAPM. 
 
Affiliation with EU ETS 
To determine which companies owned installations that were part of the EU ETS in 
the years 2005 to 2009, the respective publicly available data base of Carbon Market 
Data (Carbon Market Data, 2011) was used. This indicator is used in in this research 
in two ways. Affiliation with the EU ETS is used in chapter 4.4 Understanding 
Sample Characteristics to determine whether companies that have installations in the 
EU ETS are more likely to report (complete) GHG-emissions to the public in their 
voluntary reporting. Furthermore, affiliation with the EU ETS is used in the 
construction of portfolios that allow testing hypothesis 1a and 1b (cf. chapter 5.3 
Portfolio Construction).  
 
Implicit tax rate on energy 
The implicit tax rate on energy of a country was extracted from the publications of 
the European Commission (Eurostat, 2011b) to determine whether companies 
headquartered in countries with comparatively high ambitions to reduce global 
warming through national fiscal policy are more likely to report GHG-emissions (cf. 
chapter 4.4 Understanding Sample Characteristics). The implicit tax rate on energy is 
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calculated as energy tax revenues of a country in relation to its final energy 
consumption in Euro per ton oil equivalent (Eurostat, 2011b). For two countries the 
data for the year 2008 was not yet available on the date of data collection and was 
consequently set to the level of the preceding year.  
 
Oil price 
Price data for Brent crude oil in Euro per Barrel has been extracted from Index Mundi 
(Index Mundi, 2012). Brent crude is an oil refined in Europe and used to price two 
thirds of internationally traded crude oil. The natural logarithm of the change in the 
monthly oil price as of the first of each month at t-1 from January 2005 to December 
2009 is included in this study as a test of robustness of results (cf. chapter 5.4 Tests of 
Robustness). 
 
High Carbon Industries 
A classification of high and low carbon industries has been adopted from Stanny and 
Ely (2008). Stanny and Ely classify the Utilities industry, Basic Materials industry, 
Industrials and Oil & Gas industry as high carbon industries. The classification of 
Stanny and Ely is based on carbon intensity. Based on their classification, high 
carbon industries represent the four industries with the highest average reported 
GHG-emissions per company in this research. The indicator of affiliation with high 
carbon industries is used in chapter 4.4 Understanding Sample Characteristics to 
determine whether companies from high carbon industries are more likely to report, 
and also in the creation of the portfolios used to test hypotheses 6a and 6b (cf. chapter 
5.3 Portfolio Construction). 
4.3 Descriptive Sample Characteristics 
In the following, the outcome of the data collection activities described and the 
descriptive statistics of companies in samples A and B and C are briefly summarized. 
Due to the nature of this study, special emphasis is placed on descriptive statistics 
concerning the existence and completeness of GHG-emissions disclosure. 
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4.3.1 Existence of Disclosure of GHG-emissions 
Table 6 summarizes the outcome of the data collection efforts concerning the 
existence of disclosure of absolute levels of GHG-emissions. In total, absolute 
numbers of GHG-emissions data covering at least the majority of company activities 
were collected for a total of 306 different companies (sample C). On average over 
five years 59% of the companies from sample A, i.e. companies that were part of the 
FTSE AWI between 2005 and 2009 and for which the necessary financial data is 
available, reported GHG-emissions in the year preceding index inclusion (sample B). 
Table 6 illustrates that over time, the number of companies reporting GHG-emissions 
on at least the majority of corporate activities increased. While only 52% of 
companies that were part of the FTSE AWI reported GHG-emissions for the year 
2005 (sample C), this share increased to 71% in the year 2009.  
 
Table 6: Results of data collection activities 
 
 
4.3.2 Disclosure Completeness 
Table 7 summarizes the completeness of the GHG-emissions data reported by 
companies in sample B and C in terms of the scope and type of the emissions 
reported, as well as the reporting boundaries applied. Results of the constructed 
Disclosure Completeness Index are also presented.  
 
In summary, most of the companies included in sample B and C were classified to 
report scope 1 and 2 emissions. In fact, on average over five years 80% of the 
Total Mean 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Mean 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Sample A: All companies 433 351 348 352 353 360 343
Sample B: Reporting emissions at t-1 300 206 148 185 204 242 249 59% 43% 53% 58% 67% 73%
Sample C: Reporting emissions at t 306 222 181 199 229 255 245 63% 52% 57% 65% 71% 71%
Notes: This table shows the outcome of the GHG-emissions data collection process. The first row shows the 
number of non-financial EU companies that were part of the FTSE AWI between 2005 and 2009 and for which 
the necessary financial data was available (sample A). The second row shows sample B, i.e. companies from 
Sample A reporting GHG-emissions covering at least 50% of company activities in the year preceding index 
inclusion (year t-1). The third row shows sample C, i.e. companies from Sample A reporting GHG-emissions 
covering at least 50% of company activities in the years of index inclusion (year t). The first column shows the 
number of different companies in each sample, followed by the number of companies on average and in each of 
the specific years 2005 to 2009. The following columns show the percentage share of companies in sample B and 
sample C.
Number of companies % Share of reporting companies
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emissions reported for the year preceding index inclusion (sample B) were classified 
to be complete in terms of the scope of emissions reported. In general, a positive 
trend can be observed in the reporting of scope 1 and 2 emissions: While in 2005 only 
74% of the companies reported GHG-emission for the preceding year (sample B) that 
were classified to cover scope 1 and 2 emissions, this percentage was up to 87% in 
2008 and 2009. 
 
In contrast to the encouraging results in terms of reporting completeness of scope 1 
and 2 emissions, the majority of companies included in this analysis were classified 
to report incomplete with regard to the type of emissions disclosed, i.e. to report only 
CO2-emissions as compared to GHG-emissions. In fact, on average over five years 
only 37% of companies reported emissions that were classified to cover other 
Greenhouse gases than CO2 for the year preceding index inclusion (sample B). This is 
a surprising finding in the light of the fact that the GHG Protocol, the CDP and the 
GRI all ask for reporting of Greenhouse gas emissions and not just of carbon dioxide. 
Nevertheless, in general, a slow but positive trend can be observed with regard to the 
type of emissions reported by the companies included in this analysis. While in 2005 
only 36% of the companies were classified to reporting on other emissions than 
carbon dioxide in the year of inclusion in the index (sample C), this percentage is up 
to 52% in 2009. Only in 2009 the majority of companies included in this analysis 
followed the requirements of dominant reporting guidelines to report on Greenhouse 
gas emissions and not just carbon dioxide. 
 
The results of the classification of completeness of GHG-emissions in terms of the 
reporting boundaries applied by companies are similarly discouraging. On average 
over five years only 34% of companies reported emissions for group-wide activities 
for the year preceding inclusion in the index (sample B). Nevertheless, it is possible 
to derive a slow but positive trend towards a more complete reporting in terms of 
reporting boundaries. In 2005, equal shares of roughly 25% of companies reported 
emissions for a group-wide reporting boundary, for all manufacturing operations, for 
the majority of manufacturing operations and the majority of activities respectively 
for the year preceding inclusion in the index (sample B).  
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Table 7: Descriptive statistics on disclosure completeness 
 
 
In 2009, already 50% of companies reported emissions for group-wide activities for 
the year of inclusion in the index (sample C). Despite this positive trend towards 
more complete reporting of GHG-emissions in terms of reporting boundaries, this 
fact also illustrates that in the year 2009 only half of the companies that reported 
emissions did so for the whole company. 
Mean 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Mean 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Sample B: Reporting GHG-emissions at t-1
Scope of emission reported
Scope 1 and 2 167 110 142 166 199 216 80% 74% 77% 81% 82% 87%
Not scope 1 and 2 39 38 43 38 43 33 20% 26% 23% 19% 18% 13%
Type of emission reported
GHG-emissions 78 51 65 61 99 114 37% 34% 35% 30% 41% 46%
Only CO2-emissions 128 97 120 143 143 135 63% 66% 65% 70% 59% 54%
Reporting boundary 
Group-wide activities 73 39 55 69 92 111 34% 26% 30% 34% 38% 45%
All manufacturing 46 35 40 46 57 53 23% 24% 22% 23% 24% 21%
Majority of manufacturing operations 48 34 52 48 53 51 23% 23% 28% 24% 22% 20%
Majority of activities 39 40 38 41 40 34 20% 27% 21% 20% 17% 14%
Disclosure Completeness Index
0 scores 17 23 22 14 16 12 9% 16% 12% 7% 7% 5%
1 scores 81 63 81 89 94 76 40% 43% 44% 44% 39% 31%
2 scores 82 49 65 78 100 118 39% 33% 35% 38% 41% 47%
3 scores 26 13 17 23 32 43 12% 9% 9% 11% 13% 17%
Sample C: Reporting GHG-emissions at t
Scope of emission reported
Scope 1 and 2 185 139 164 188 222 215 83% 77% 82% 82% 87% 88%
Not scope 1 and 2 36 42 35 41 33 30 17% 23% 18% 18% 13% 12%
Type of emission reported
GHG-emissions 95 65 77 96 112 126 42% 36% 39% 42% 44% 52%
Only CO2-emissions 126 116 122 133 143 119 58% 64% 61% 58% 56% 48%
Reporting boundary 
Group-wide activities 88 54 64 89 112 122 39% 30% 32% 39% 44% 50%
All manufacturing 49 40 46 51 55 53 22% 22% 23% 22% 22% 22%
Majority of manufacturing operations 48 48 48 50 52 44 22% 27% 24% 22% 20% 18%
Majority of activities 36 39 41 39 36 26 17% 22% 21% 17% 14% 11%
Disclosure Completeness Index
0 scores 14 21 14 14 12 9 7% 12% 7% 6% 5% 4%
1 scores 80 79 87 88 79 66 37% 44% 44% 38% 31% 27%
2 scores 95 64 76 96 125 113 42% 35% 38% 42% 49% 46%
3 scores 33 17 22 31 39 57 15% 9% 11% 14% 15% 23%
Notes: This table summarizes the characteristics of both sample B and sample C. Rows show the scope, type and 
reporting boundaries of the emissions reported, as well as the Disclosure Completeness Index built from these 
classifications. The first columns show the number of companies each sample on average and in each of the years 
2005 and 2009.  The following columns represent the percentage share of companies in each classification of the 
scope, type, reporting boundary, as well as the Disclosure Completeness Index.
Number of companies % Share
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The three measures of reporting completeness discussed are merged in the 
constructed Disclosure Completeness Index. Results of the Disclosure Completeness 
Index are also summarized in Table 7 and illustrate that for the year preceding index 
inclusion (sample B), on average over five years only 12% of companies that reported 
emissions followed the requirements of the established reporting guidelines to report 
scope 1 and 2 GHG-emissions for a group-wide reporting boundary. The percentage 
of companies reporting completely for the year t-1 (sample B) is up from 9% in 2005 
to 17% in 2009, i.e. in 2009 only roughly every fifth company that reports emissions 
followed the established reporting guidelines. These descriptive results on the 
incompleteness of reported absolute levels of GHG-emission suggest that the 
estimation and information risk resulting from incomplete information concerning 
this proxy for climate change induced systematic risk affects large shares of the 
economy (cf. chapter 3.3 Disclosure Completeness).  
 
Furthermore, these descriptive results show that the incompleteness of GHG-
emissions data must be controlled for when relating financial performance to climate 
change performance. Especially when accounting measures of financial performance 
are applied, studies relating group-wide financial performance to emissions reported 
only for a selective share of the company would suffer from distorted results. In the 
context of EMH and tests of semi-strong market efficiency, it is noticeable that the 
semi-strong efficient market would incorporate the publicly available information on 
incomplete GHG-emissions and the resulting estimation risk. Information on 
complete GHG-emissions for all companies is – if at all – only privately available and 
would thus be only of interest in tests of strong market efficiency.20 Nevertheless, in a 
test of semi-strong market efficiency toward climate change induced systematic risk, 
the incompleteness of GHG-emissions data may be controlled for to ensure that the 
generated results are not distorted by the different levels of completeness of reported 
emissions data. This is done in this research as a test of robustness of results (cf. 
chapter 5.4.1 Incompleteness of GHG-emissions Data). 
 
                                            
20    Complete emissions for all companies require an informed extrapolation for all 
companies that report incomplete emissions to emissions data that covers scope 1 
and 2 GHG-emissions for group-wide activities. 
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4.3.3 Timeliness of GHG-emissions Reporting 
Unlike with financial data, where annual reports are legally required to be published 
on an annual basis, there are still substantial discrepancies regarding the time 
companies take to voluntarily publish their emissions data. For example, in 2006 one 
company took the maximum of 38 months to publish its emissions data for the 
respective year. In the year 2009 the earliest company published its emissions data 
one month after the end of the financial year, while eleven companies took the 
maximum time of ten months to publish their emissions. On average over five years, 
in total 73% of all companies in sample C reported emissions within six month from 
the end of the financial year.  
 
The discrepancies in the timeliness of GHG-emissions data are accounted for in a test 
of robustness of results, where a two year time-lag for emissions data is applied (cf. 
chapter 5.4 Tests of Robustness). The date of publication of absolute levels of 
emissions data is however not expected to have a significant impact on creation of 
portfolios used for this research, as emissions levels, in contrast to financial 
performance data, are rather constant over time. Furthermore, absolute levels of 
emissions in this research are only used to allocate companies to portfolios of high, 
medium and low levels of absolute emissions and GHG-efficiency (cf. chapter 3.4 
Absolute Levels of Emissions and chapter 3.5 GHG-efficiency). During the five year 
period studied for this research only 37 companies, i.e. 12% of the reporting 
companies, migrate from one portfolio of absolute levels of emissions to another one. 
The remaining 88% of companies do not change from one portfolio to another in any 
of the years under analysis, illustrating that the timeliness of GHG-emissions data 
cannot be expected to have a strong impact on the creation of portfolios used for this 
research. 
 
4.3.4 Industry Affiliation and Affiliation with the EU ETS 
Table 8 illustrates the descriptive statistics of samples A, B and C in terms of industry 
affiliation, affiliation with the EU ETS as well as affiliation with high carbon 
industries. Every sample contains companies that are (not) part of the EU ETS and 
(not) affiliated with high carbon industries, as well as companies from the following 
industries: Oil & Gas (ICB 0001), Basic Materials (ICB 1000), Industrials (ICB 
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2000), Consumer Goods (ICB 3000), Health Care (ICB 4000), Consumer Services 
(ICB 5000), Telecommunications (ICB 6000), Utilities (ICB 7000) and Technology 
(ICB 9000).  
 
As it can be seen from Table 8, sample A, B and C show a different composition of 
the respective industries and the respective industries show different levels of GHG-
emissions reporting. For example, while sample A has an average share of companies 
from the Consumer Service industry of 22%, the share of companies from the 
Consumer Service industry reporting GHG-emissions at t-1 (sample B) only 
corresponds to 14%. Furthermore, while on average over five years 83% of 
companies in the Oil & Gas industry and 75% of Basic Materials companies report 
absolute levels of GHG-emissions on at least the majority of corporate activities for 
the year t-1 (sample C), only 41% of companies from the Technology sector report 
emissions. These descriptive findings suggest that the samples of reporting companies 
(sample B and C) might be concentrated in heavy industries. This notion is confirmed 
when comparing the share of reporting companies affiliated with high carbon 
industries (71% on average over five years at t-1) to the share of companies reporting 
that are affiliated low carbon industries (48% on average over five years at t-1). With 
regard to affiliation with the EU ETS Table 8 shows that the samples of reporting 
companies (sample B and C) show a higher share of companies affiliated with the EU 
ETS. On average over five years, 81% of companies that have installations in the EU 
ETS report absolute levels of GHG-emissions on at least the majority of corporate 
activities for the year t-1 (sample B). In contrast, only 48% of companies that are not 
affiliated with the EU ETS reported.  
 
To better understand the sample characteristics and to examine whether, for example, 
the dissimilarities in reporting practices between companies from differing industries 
are statistically significant an in-depth analysis of determinants of the existence and 
completeness of reporting is carried out in chapter 4.4 Understanding Sample 
Characteristics. Furthermore, to avoid that results obtained with sample B are driven 
by the specific industry affiliations of reporting companies, potentially inefficiently 
priced industry effects are controlled for in the testing of the hypotheses as described 
in chapter 5.2.1 Controlling for Industry Effects.  
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Table 8: Descriptive statistics on affiliation wiht industries and EU ETS 
 
  
Mean 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Mean 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Mean 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Sample A 351 348 352 353 360 343
Industry affiliation
Oil & Gas 19 15 16 18 21 24 5% 5% 4% 5% 5% 6%
Basic Materials 34 30 31 35 36 37 9% 10% 9% 9% 10% 10%
Industrials 76 72 74 75 79 80 21% 22% 21% 21% 21% 22%
Consumer Goods 57 56 58 60 57 53 16% 16% 16% 16% 17% 16%
Health Care 22 23 23 21 20 21 6% 6% 7% 7% 6% 6%
Consumer Services 76 82 79 77 79 65 22% 22% 24% 22% 22% 22%
Telecommunications 21 22 23 20 20 19 6% 6% 6% 7% 6% 6%
Utilities 31 30 32 32 32 31 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9%
Technology 16 18 16 15 16 13 5% 4% 5% 5% 4% 4%
Affiliation with
High carbon industries 160 147 153 160 168 172 45% 46% 42% 43% 45% 47%
Low carbon industries 191 201 199 193 192 171 55% 54% 58% 57% 55% 53%
EU ETS 109 102 105 111 114 113 31% 31% 29% 30% 31% 32%
Not EU ETS 242 246 247 242 246 230 69% 69% 71% 70% 69% 68%
Sample B 206 148 185 204 242 249 59% 43% 53% 58% 67% 73%
Industry affiliation
Oil & Gas 16 11 14 14 19 21 7% 8% 7% 8% 7% 8% 83% 73% 88% 78% 90% 88%
Basic Materials 26 19 24 25 29 31 13% 12% 13% 13% 12% 12% 75% 63% 77% 71% 81% 84%
Industrials 47 28 37 46 62 62 22% 23% 19% 20% 23% 26% 61% 39% 50% 61% 78% 78%
Consumer Goods 33 29 35 35 36 32 17% 16% 20% 19% 17% 15% 59% 52% 60% 58% 63% 60%
Health Care 10 9 9 11 11 11 5% 5% 6% 5% 5% 5% 48% 39% 39% 52% 55% 52%
Consumer Services 29 20 26 28 34 38 14% 14% 14% 14% 14% 14% 39% 24% 33% 36% 43% 58%
Telecommunications 13 9 13 14 14 15 6% 6% 6% 7% 7% 6% 63% 41% 57% 70% 70% 79%
Utilities 25 18 23 27 29 29 12% 12% 12% 12% 13% 12% 80% 60% 72% 84% 91% 94%
Technology 6 5 4 4 8 10 3% 3% 3% 2% 2% 3% 41% 28% 25% 27% 50% 77%
Affiliation with
High carbon industries 114 76 98 112 139 143 54% 55% 51% 53% 55% 57% 71% 52% 64% 70% 83% 83%
Low carbon industries 92 72 87 92 103 106 46% 45% 49% 47% 45% 43% 48% 36% 44% 48% 54% 62%
EU ETS 89 75 85 88 98 97 45% 43% 51% 46% 43% 40% 81% 74% 81% 79% 86% 86%
Not EU ETS 117 73 100 116 144 152 55% 57% 49% 54% 57% 60% 48% 30% 40% 48% 59% 66%
Sample C 222 181 199 229 255 245 63% 52% 57% 65% 71% 71%
Industry affiliation
Oil & Gas 17 13 14 17 19 20 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 88% 87% 88% 94% 90% 83%
Basic Materials 26 24 21 26 31 28 12% 12% 13% 11% 11% 12% 76% 80% 68% 74% 86% 76%
Industrials 53 37 46 56 65 62 24% 24% 20% 23% 24% 25% 69% 50% 62% 74% 81% 78%
Consumer Goods 35 34 36 36 35 34 16% 16% 19% 18% 16% 14% 61% 60% 62% 59% 60% 63%
Health Care 10 9 10 10 10 12 5% 5% 5% 5% 4% 4% 51% 41% 43% 53% 56% 63%
Consumer Services 33 26 26 34 41 36 15% 15% 14% 13% 15% 16% 43% 32% 33% 44% 52% 55%
Telecommunications 15 12 16 15 15 15 7% 7% 7% 8% 7% 6% 71% 55% 70% 75% 75% 79%
Utilities 26 22 26 27 29 28 12% 12% 12% 13% 12% 11% 84% 73% 81% 84% 91% 90%
Technology 7 4 4 8 10 10 3% 3% 2% 2% 3% 4% 51% 24% 25% 57% 67% 83%
Affiliation with
High carbon industries 122 96 107 126 144 138 55% 55% 53% 54% 55% 56% 76% 65% 70% 79% 86% 80%
Low carbon industries 100 85 92 103 111 107 45% 45% 47% 46% 45% 44% 52% 42% 46% 53% 58% 63%
EU ETS 91 84 84 94 97 96 42% 41% 46% 42% 41% 38% 83% 82% 80% 85% 85% 85%
Not EU ETS 131 97 115 135 158 149 58% 59% 54% 58% 59% 62% 54% 39% 47% 56% 64% 65%
Notes: This table summarizes the characteristics of sample A, B and sample C in terms of industry affiliation, affiliation with high and 
low carbon industries, as well as affiliation with the EU ETS. Absolute numbers of companies, as well as the share of companies and 
the share of reporting companies within the respective affiliations is presented on average and in each of the years 2005 and 2009.
Number of companies % Share of reporting companies% Share of companies
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4.3.5 Other Indicators 
For the remaining indicators as used in the respective samples of this study, a 
summarizing Table 9 shows their mean and standard deviation (SD). Market 
capitalization in million €, book to market ratio (calculated by dividing common 
equity (Datastream mnemonic WC03501) in December at year t-2 by market 
capitalisation (Datastream mnemonic MV) in December at year t-1 (cf. 5.2 C4FM), 
reported GHG-emissions in million t, GHG-efficiency in €/t (calculated by dividing 
the net income (Datastream mnemonic WC01651) by the amount of reported GHG-
emissions), debt to common equity ratio (Datastream mnemonic WC08231) and the 
return on total assets ratio (Datastream mnemonic WC08326) are presented. 
 
Table 9 illustrates that the average market capitalization of reporting companies 
(sample B and C) is comparatively higher than the average market capitalization of 
companies in sample A. To find out if the difference in size between reporting and 
non-reporting companies is statistically significant, size, as measured by market 
capitalization, is included in the in-depth analysis of sample characteristics in chapter 
4.4 Understanding Sample Characteristics. Company size is also controlled for in the 
subsequent testing of market efficiency, as it has been found to determine risk and 
stock performance (cf. chapter 2.1.4 Methodologies and Findings). 
 
With regard to the average book to market ratio, Table 9 shows almost no difference 
between the companies in sample A and sample B. It is noticeable that the average 
book to market ratio of companies in both samples approaches 1.00 in 2008, i.e. 
during the financial crisis the average book value of companies in sample A and 
sample B almost entirely explained the market value of its equity. With regard to the 
debt to common equity ratio (“financial leverage”), which in in Datastream is inflated 
by 100% (cf. chapter 4.2.2 Collection of Other Data), companies in sample A show a 
slightly higher financial leverage than companies in sample C in the majority of 
years. With regard to the average return on total assets ratio (“profitability), Table 9 
shows that it is slightly higher for all companies (sample A) than reporting companies 
(sample C) in the majority of years. Interestingly, the return on assets ratio reduces 
more significantly in times of crisis for reporting companies.   
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Table 9: Descriptive statistics of samples 
 
 
These descriptive results thus suggest that (1) there might be differences in the 
profitability and financial leverage between companies that report GHG-emissions 
and companies that do not and (2) that the impact of financial market crisis might be 
different on reporting as compared to non-reporting firms. To control for the latter 
possibility, the impact of financial market crisis is included in the tests of robustness 
of the results obtained from testing the hypotheses developed (cf. chapter 5.4.4 
Financial Market Crisis). To examine whether there is a statistically significant 
difference in the profitability and financial leverage of reporting and non-reporting 
companies the return on total assets ratio and the debt to common equity ratio are 
included in the in-depth examination of sample characteristics in chapter 4.4 
Understanding Sample Characteristics.  
 
Interestingly, as also displayed in Table 9, the average GHG-emissions of companies 
in sample B have significantly reduced from 2004 to 2005 and kept relatively 
constant from 2005 to 2008. At the same time, the average GHG-efficiency of 
companies in sample B has steadily increased from 2005 to 2007, showing that 
companies in the sample increased their average net income generated with a rather 
steady amount of GHG-emissions. As a result of the fact that the depicted increase in 
GHG-efficiency is mainly due to an increase in net income, the average GHG-
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Sample A: All companies
Market cap in million € 10,683 17,589 13,034 20,275 14,721 20,644 15,710 23,456 9,531  15,305 
Book to market ratio 0.49    0.39    0.43    0.47    0.39    0.36    0.45    0.38    0.98    1.08    
Debt to common equity ratio 124     524     108     293     127     249     125     504     59       1,297  
Return on total assets ratio 7.39    7.10    8.85    7.99    9.87    9.07    9.93    9.45    7.42    8.00    
Sample B: Reporting GHG-emissions at t-1
Market cap in million € 17,097 24,224 18,619 25,472 20,210 24,918 20,431 27,187 11,750 17,282 
Book to market ratio 0.53    0.37    0.47    0.57    0.41    0.38    0.46    0.40    0.96    0.96    
GHG-emissions in million t 12.13  26.09  10.70  23.91  10.37  22.76  10.57  26.07  10.53  26.20  
GHG-efficiency in €/t 1,497  4,870  2,742  6,510  3,524  9,143  5,733  37,642 1,726  6,822  
Sample C: Reporting GHG-emissions at t
Market cap in million € 15,248 22,225 18,143 24,974 19,472 24,181 19,337 26,594 11,928 17,407 
Debt to common equity ratio 116     303     101     329     117     182     136     345     10       1,479  
Return on total assets 6.66    5.43    8.09    5.66    9.80    9.06    10.22  9.44    6.94    7.12    
2004
Notes: This table summarizes descriptive characteristics of sample A, B and C. Average and standard deviation (SD) for 
all companies in the respective samples in each of the specific years from 2005 to 2009 are shown. Where applicable, 
market capitalization (Market cap) in million €, book to market ratio, debt to common equity ratio, return on total assets 
ratio, GHG-emissions in million t and GHG-efficiency in €/t are presented.
2005 2006 2007 2008
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efficiency of companies in sample B almost reduces to the level observed in 2004 in 
the year 2008, probably as a result of the financial market crisis.  
 
Descriptive statistics on the monthly changes in prices of oil and carbon, which are 
used in the tests of robustness of this research (cf. chapter 5.4 Tests of Robustness) are 
displayed in Table 10. It is noticeable that during the financial crisis in 2008, the 
natural logarithm of mean monthly changes in oil prices shows a significant reduction 
and an elevated standard deviation. The price of carbon reduces on average in 2006 
and 2007, halts on average in 2008 and increases again in 2009. In 2009, the standard 
deviation of mean monthly changes in carbon prices is particularly high, suggesting 
that carbon prices fluctuated significantly in 2009. The mean annualised risk free rate 
of return shows almost no standard deviation, as to be expected. The mean annualised 
risk free rate of return increases between 2005 and 2008 and then significantly 
reduces in 2009.  
 
Table 10: Descriptive statistics of other indicators 
 
 
Table 11 shows the implicit tax rate on energy of the 17 countries of origin of 
companies included in this study. While some countries have reduced the implicit tax 
rate on energy in the years under analysis, other countries have increased this 
measure between 2005 and 2009. The indicator is included in the in-depth analysis of 
sample characteristics to determine if companies coming from countries with a 
comparatively higher level of ambition to reduce global warming are more likely to 
report GHG-emissions to the public (cf. chapter 4.4 Understanding Sample 
Characteristics). 
 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Ln change in Oil price 0.040 0.071 -0.001 0.070 0.024 0.061 -0.059 0.136 0.042 0.066
Ln change in carbon price 0.010 0.117 -0.098 0.234 -0.483 0.413 0.000 0.246 0.536 1.757
Annualised risk free rate 2.17% 0.000 3.03% 0.001 4.21% 0.001 4.69% 0.001 1.32% 0.002
Notes: This table summarizes descriptive statistics of the natural logarithm of the monthly change in oil prices and 
carbon prices, as well as the annualised risk free rate (EURIBOR) in %. Average and standard deviation (SD) in each 
of the specific years from 2005 to 2009 are presented.
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
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Table 11: Descriptive statistics on implicit tax rate on energy 
 
 
Finally, it should be noted that the sample used for the test of market efficiency 
shows a survivorship bias. This is due to the fact that companies can only be included 
in the analysis until the months of a merger or bankruptcy. However, as the sample 
used for this research does not includes micro-caps (cf. chapter 4.1 Sample Selection), 
the effect of a survivorship bias is estimated to be comparatively small in this study 
(Elton, Gruber, & Blake, 1996). Furthermore, as some of the hypotheses developed 
can only be tested with the sample of reporting companies, it must be determined that 
the results obtained from testing these hypotheses are not driven by a green bias, i.e. 
determined by the specific characteristics of companies that report emissions. To that 
end, an in-depth analysis of the important characteristics of reporting versus non-
reporting companies is carried out in the following chapter. 
4.4 Understanding Sample Characteristics 
As discussed in chapter 3 Hypotheses Development, six proxies for climate change 
induced systematic risk are used to build portfolios to test market efficiency towards 
the hypotheses developed (cf. chapter 5 Methodology). Several of these hypotheses 
can only be tested with portfolios constructed from companies that report GHG-
BELG 104 €/t 107 €/t 103 €/t 112 €/t 97 €/t
CZE 79 €/t 94 €/t 99 €/t 109 €/t 127 €/t
DEN 307 €/t 290 €/t 280 €/t 273 €/t 268 €/t
GER 213 €/t 207 €/t 202 €/t 204 €/t 194 €/t
IRE 159 €/t 155 €/t 151 €/t 153 €/t 153 €/t
GRC 103 €/t 100 €/t 96 €/t 102 €/t 102 €/t
SP 125 €/t 119 €/t 120 €/t 118 €/t 115 €/t
FRA 169 €/t 163 €/t 163 €/t 161 €/t 161 €/t
ITA 214 €/t 208 €/t 210 €/t 200 €/t 187 €/t
HUN 84 €/t 87 €/t 86 €/t 98 €/t 98 €/t
NETH 170 €/t 182 €/t 193 €/t 178 €/t 190 €/t
OEST 156 €/t 150 €/t 141 €/t 150 €/t 150 €/t
POL 67 €/t 84 €/t 88 €/t 101 €/t 108 €/t
PTL 142 €/t 149 €/t 148 €/t 149 €/t 143 €/t
FIN 111 €/t 112 €/t 105 €/t 103 €/t 115 €/t
SWED 199 €/t 197 €/t 200 €/t 197 €/t 190 €/t
UK 221 €/t 213 €/t 211 €/t 218 €/t 180 €/t
Notes: This table summarizes the implicit energy tax per country, which is 
calculated by Eurostat as energy tax revenues of a country in relation to its final 
energy consumption in Euro per ton of oil equivalent.
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
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emissions (cf. chapter 3.3 Disclosure Completeness, chapter 3.4 Absolute Levels of 
Emissions and chapter 3.5 GHG-efficiency). At the same time, descriptive statistics 
(cf. chapter 4.3 Descriptive Sample Characteristics) showed differences in important 
characteristics between all companies (sample A) and the sub-samples of reporting 
companies (sample B and C). 
 
The following in-depth analysis of sample characteristics makes two contributions: 
First, it serves to better understand whether companies that disclose GHG-emissions 
show exposure to other proxies of climate change induced systematic risk. For 
example, for the analysis of results obtained with the sample of reporting companies, 
it is important to know if affiliation with the EU ETS affects (1) the decision of a 
company to disclose GHG-emissions and (2) the completeness of the reported 
emissions. The second contribution of this analysis is to allow determining that 
results obtained from testing hypotheses are not driven by statistically significant 
difference in important company characteristics between reporting and non-reporting 
companies. For example, if companies that report their GHG-emissions showed a 
statistically significant higher or lower financial leverage, this could impact their 
stock performance (Fama & French, 1992; Foerster & Sapp, 2005; Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997) and the level of financial leverage would have to be controlled for in the 
subsequent analysis of market efficiency. Otherwise, financial leverage might be a 
distorting factor in the results obtained from testing the hypotheses introduced 
concerning the existence of disclosures of GHG-emissions. The same is valid for 
financial leverage and the hypotheses introduced concerning the completeness of 
reported emissions.  
 
Two in-depth analyses are consequently carried out in this chapter with regard to the 
following research questions: First, do companies that report GHG-emissions differ in 
important characteristics from companies that do not report GHG-emissions? And 
second: Do companies that report complete GHG-emissions differ in important 
characteristics from companies that report incomplete GHG-emissions? The aim of 
the following in-depth analysis of sample characteristics is thus not to fully explain 
determinants of the existence and completeness of corporate GHG-emissions 
disclosure, but to better understand the characteristics and potentially important 
- 100 - 
differences in the characteristics of companies that report GHG-emissions as opposed 
to companies that do not.  
 
In this context it is worth noting that the idea that corporate non-financial reporting 
practices are determined by variables such as size, country or industry affiliation has 
been researched for decades (Belkaoui & Karpik, 1989; Gray, Kouhy, & Lavers, 
1995; Hackston & Milne, 1996; Patten, 2002). The following analyses however 
represent the first comprehensive investigation of the existence and completeness of 
quantitative GHG-emissions disclosure by companies in Europe. An overview over 
dominant studies from the field and studies that informed the indicator selection of 
this analysis is displayed in Table 12. The characteristics of companies that are 
analysed for in research are affiliation with the EU ETS, the implicit energy tax level 
of the originating country, financial leverage, size, industry affiliation and 
profitability. In the following paragraphs each of the indicators is briefly introduced 
and motivated. 
 
EU ETS 
Regulatory influences were found to be a determinant of environmental disclosure in 
various studies (Holland & Foo, 2003; Luo, Lan, & Tang, 2010; Patten, 2000; Reid & 
Toffel, 2009). In fact, with regard to the EU ETS, descriptive results suggested that 
companies having installation in the EU ETS, who are legally required to build up the 
systems necessary for carbon accounting (Engels, 2009), are also more frequently 
reporting their GHG-emissions to the public compared to companies that are not 
affiliated with the EU ETS (cf. chapter 4.3.4 Industry Affiliation and Affiliation with 
the EU ETS). The EU ETS is consequently included in this analysis to determine 
whether the a portfolio constructed from reporting companies is significantly biased 
towards companies that have installations in the EU ETS and consequently is more 
exposed to the financial risk induced by climate change (cf. chapter 3.1 European 
Emissions Trading Scheme). 
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Furthermore, as currently under the EU ETS companies are only expected to report 
CO2-emissions from specific processes and installations, it must be detected for this 
study whether companies in the EU ETS are more likely to report incomplete GHG-
emissions. If incompletely reporting companies tend to be those that have 
installations in the EU ETS, this would further increase the climate change induced 
systematic risk of incompletely reporting companies, as well as that of companies 
with installations in the EU ETS, as market participants would not be able to infer 
future liabilities stemming from the climate change induced systematic risk proxied 
by the EU ETS (cf. chapter 3.3 Disclosure Completeness). 
 
Implicit Energy Tax Level 
As a second indicator for regulatory influences, the implicit energy tax of the 
originating country is included in this in-depth analysis of sample characteristics. In 
this context it is noteworthy that emissions arising from energy use account for a total 
of 79% of GHG-emissions in the EU (Eurostat, 2011a). The implicit energy tax level 
can thus be taken as an indicator of a country’s level of implicit ambition to reduce 
GHG-emissions through national fiscal policies. The implicit energy tax level of a 
country is calculated as energy tax revenues of a country divided by its final energy 
consumption (Eurostat, 2011b) (cf. chapter 4.2.2 Collection of Other Data). 
Companies that are under more fiscal pressure for the reduction of GHG-emissions 
and consequently the improvement of climate change performance in their home 
country, but do not respond to this stakeholder request by communicating their 
climate change performance, might increase their risk in relations with the 
government as an important stakeholder (cf. chapter 3.2 Existence of disclosure of 
GHG-emissions). On the other hand, companies that report their GHG-emissions to 
the public can be expected to be in a position to actually manage their climate change 
performance, and, as a consequence, are also in a better position to respond to 
increases in national fiscal pressure for the reduction of GHG-emissions.  
 
With regard to the completeness of the reported emissions, it can be argued that 
companies that report complete GHG-emissions i.e. make an effort to accurately 
disclose and be in a position to manage its climate change performance, have 
responded to stakeholder interests to reduce GHG-emissions and are better equipped 
to respond to possible future regulation with regard to climate change. Companies 
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that report (complete) GHG-emissions consequently have reduced the risk associated 
with relations with the government as an important stakeholder (Ambec & Lanoie, 
2008). 
 
Financial Leverage 
Descriptive results (cf. chapter 4.3.5 Other Indicators) suggested that non-reporting 
companies show a slightly higher debt to common equity ratio on average than 
companies in sample A. In fact, financial leverage was found to be a determinant of 
environmental and sustainability disclosure by some scholars (Clarkson et al., 2008; 
Peters & Romi, 2011; Simnett, Vanstraelen, & Wai Fong, 2009) but not by others 
(Cormier & Magnan, 2005; Freedman & Jaggi, 2005). Financial leverage, as 
measured by the ratio of debt to common equity, is generally accepted to impact stock 
performance (Fama & French, 1992; Foerster & Sapp, 2005; Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997) and included in this analysis to ensure that companies that report GHG-
emissions do not have a significant differently capital structure as non-reporting 
companies, which might impact their beta (Beaver, Kettler, & Scholes, 1970; Gahlon 
& Gentry, 1982) and consequently might also influence the results obtained from 
testing the hypotheses in this research. Furthermore, it must be established whether 
completely reporting companies differ in their capital structure from incompletely 
reporting companies, which would impact stock performance and consequently the 
results obtained from testing hypotheses concerning disclosure completeness (cf. 
chapter 3.3 Disclosure Completeness). 
 
Size 
Company size is generally accepted to influence financial market performance (Banz, 
1981; Fama & French, 1992). At the same time, descriptive statistics suggested that 
reporting and non-reporting companies might differ in size (cf. chapter 4.3.5 Other 
Indicators). In fact, different scholars have shown that the extent and quality of 
environmental disclosure depends on company size (Brammer & Pavelin, 2006; Gray 
et al., 1995; Luo et al., 2010; Patten, 2002) and among others Prado-Lorenzo et al. 
confirmed this relation for GHG-emissions (Freedman & Jaggi, 2005; Prado-Lorenzo, 
Rodriguez-Dominguez, Gallego-Alvarez, & Garcia-Sanchez, 2009). Size in terms of 
market capitalization is included in this in-depth analysis of sample characteristics to 
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determine whether reporting companies are statistically significantly bigger in terms 
of size than non-reporting companies, which would impact financial market 
performance. Furthermore, it must be established whether larger companies are more 
or less likely to report complete GHG-emissions for the testing of hypothesis 
concerning the disclosure completeness (cf. chapter 3.3 Disclosure Completeness). 
 
Profitability 
The fact that the reporting of GHG-emissions is a complex and expensive 
undertaking for companies invites the assumption that predominantly companies that 
have above-average financial resources tend to report GHG-emissions. Interestingly, 
descriptive results suggested that in the majority of years companies that invest the 
necessary financial resources to build up the systems to report GHG-emissions are 
slightly less profitable than companies in sample A (cf. chapter 4.3.5 Other 
Indicators). To detect whether there is a statistically significant difference in the 
profitability of reporting as compared to non-reporting firms, which could impact the 
results obtained from testing the hypotheses in this research, a measure of 
profitability is included in this in-depth analysis of sample characteristics. Different 
measures of profitability have been found to determine environmental disclosure in 
some studies (Cormier & Magnan, 1999; Stanny & Ely, 2008) but not in others 
(Archel et al., 2008; Brammer & Pavelin, 2006; Cormier & Magnan, 2005; Prado-
Lorenzo, Rodríguez-Domínguez, Gallego-Álvarez, & García-Sánchez, 2009). With 
regard to the completeness of the reported emissions, it will be determined if 
completely reporting companies are primarily those that have the financial resources 
necessary to report scope 1 and 2 GHG-emissions for a group-wide reporting 
boundary. Therefore, a potential relation between profitability and the completeness 
of GHG-emissions reporting is examined to make sure results obtained from the 
testing of hypotheses concerning disclosure completeness are not driven by important 
company characteristics not controlled for (cf. chapter 3.3 Disclosure completeness). 
 
Industry Affiliation 
Descriptive results further suggested that different industries show different levels of 
GHG-emissions disclosure (cf. chapter 4.3.4 Industry Affiliation and Affiliation with 
the EU ETS). Industry affiliation is generally accepted to influence stock market 
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performance (Campbell et al., 2001; Fama & French, 1997) as well as environmental 
disclosure practices. Industry affiliation was for example found to be a determinant of 
environmental disclosure in Dawkins and Fraas (2010), Brammer and Pavelin (2006) 
and Prado-Lorenzo et al. (2009). Stanny and Ely however found that affiliation with a 
“high carbon industry is not positively associated with disclosure” (Stanny & Ely, 
2008, p. 344). Industry affiliation, as classified by the FTSE Industry Classification 
Benchmark (ICB), as well as affiliation with high carbon industries, is included in 
this research to find out whether a portfolio constructed from reporting companies is 
statistically different in terms of industry composition to a portfolio constructed from 
companies that do not report GHG-emissions. If this was the case, industry affiliation 
would have to be controlled for in the subsequent tests of the hypotheses developed 
concerning market efficiency.  
 
In the following, two sets of logistic regressions are carried out. The first investigates 
if companies that report GHG-emissions differ in important characteristics from 
companies that do not report GHG-emission. A second set of logistic regressions 
examines if companies that report complete GHG-emissions differ in important 
characteristics from companies that report incomplete GHG-emissions. 
 
4.4.1 Existence of Corporate GHG-disclosure 
In order to determine if companies that report GHG-emissions differ in important 
characteristics from companies that do not report, a binary logistic regression analysis 
is carried out with all companies in sample A. A binary response variable is coded 
one for companies reporting GHG-emissions on at least the majority of corporate 
activities and zero otherwise. Logistic regression applies maximum likelihood 
estimation, as the more commonly known ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
cannot resolve the problems of nonlinearity and non-additivity that arise when the 
dependent variable can only take the values one or zero (Pampel, 2000). Maximum 
likelihood estimation “aims to find those coefficients that have the greatest likelihood 
of producing the observed data” (Pampel, 2000, p. 44). The full model specification 
for examining the characteristics of reporting versus non-reporting companies is: 
 
 
- 108 - 
EXIST =  β0 + β1 (EU_ETS) + β2 (EN_TAX) + β3 (LEV) + β4 (PROF)       + β5 (MA_CAP) + β6 (OIL_GAS) + β7 (BASIC_MAT)       + β8 (INDUST) + β9 (CONS_GOODS) + β10 (HEALTH)       + β11 (CONS_SERV) + β12 (TELECOMM) + β13 (UTIL)      + β14 (TECH)                                                                                             (1) 
 
Where: 
 
β0 is the intercept.  
β1… β14 are the logistic regression coefficients referred to as logged 
odds. A positive logged odd means that independent variable 
increases the probability of the outcome. EXIST is a binary dummy variable coded 1 for companies disclosing 
GHG-emissions on at least the majority of activities, 0 
otherwise. EU_ETS is a binary dummy variable coded 1 for companies that have 
installations in the EU ETS, 0 otherwise. EN_TAX is a continuous variable representing the logarithm of the 
implicit energy tax level of a country at year t-1. LEV is a continuous variable representing the ratio of total debt to 
common equity at year t-1. PROF is a continuous variable representing the ratio of return to total 
assets at year t-1. MA_CAP  is a continuous variable representing the logarithm of market 
capitalization in million € at year t-1. OIL_GAS is a binary dummy variable coded 1 for companies from the Oil 
& Gas industry (ICB 0001), 0 otherwise BASIC_MAT is a binary dummy variable coded 1 for companies from the 
Basic Materials industry (ICB 1000), 0 otherwise INDUST is a binary dummy variable coded 1 for companies from the 
Industrials industry (ICB 2000), 0 otherwise. 
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CONS_GOODS is a binary dummy variable coded 1 for companies from the 
Consumer Goods industry (ICB 3000), 0 otherwise HEALTH is a binary dummy variable coded 1 for companies from the 
Health Care industry (ICB 4000), 0 otherwise. CONS_SERV is a binary dummy variable coded 1 for companies from the 
Consumer Services industry (ICB 5000), 0 otherwise. TELECOMM  is a binary dummy variable coded 1 for companies from the 
Telecommunications industry (ICB 6000), 0 otherwise. UTIL is a binary dummy variable coded 1 for companies from the 
Utilities industry (ICB 7000), 0 otherwise. TECH is a binary dummy variable coded 1 for companies from the 
Technology industry (ICB 9000), 0 otherwise. 
 
For the sake of brevity, the 468 Pearson pair-wise correlation coefficients for the 
years 2005 to 2009 and the pooled regression are not presented here. In summary, no 
correlation between independent variables surpassed the 0.50 level in any of the five 
years of the study. In order to detect potential problems with multicollinearity, 
Variance inflation factor (VIF) analyses for the 10 correlations of independent 
variables with Pearson correlation coefficients above 0.30 were performed. These 10 
correlations concerned companies with installations under the EU ETS and specific 
industry affiliation. In general terms, VIF measures the impact of collinearity on the 
variance of an estimated regression coefficient. At a maximum VIF of 1.73 no serious 
problems of multicollinearity have been detected (Marquardt, 1970). Factors are 
below the cut-off level for logistic regressions of 2.00 (Neter, Wasserman, 
Nachtsheim, & Kutner, 1996; Peters & Romi, 2011). 
 
Table 13 displays the results of the year-specific and pooled logistic regressions 
taking the existence of GHG-emissions disclosure as a dependent variable. Results 
show that companies with installations in the EU ETS (EU_ETS) were more likely to 
report emission to the public in the years 2005 to 2007 and 2009, but not in the year 
2008. In fact, having installations in the EU ETS multiplied the odds of a company to 
- 110 - 
report GHG-emissions by 3.22 (p<0.01) in 2005.21 It can be deduced that a portfolio 
constructed from reporting companies shows a statistically significant bias towards 
companies that carry an additional financial risk induced by climate change as 
proxied by the EU ETS (cf. chapter 3.1 European Emissions Trading Scheme). This 
climate change induced systematic risk as proxied by the EU ETS is however 
contrasted by the reduced information and estimation risk of companies that report 
GHG-emissions (cf. chapter 3.2 Existence of Disclosure of GHG-Emissions). 
 
Results further show that in the years 2005 to 2008, companies coming from 
countries with high implicit energy tax levels (EN_TAX) were more likely to report 
GHG-emissions. For example, an increase in the logarithm of the implicit energy tax 
level of a country by 1 multiplied the odds of a company to report GHG-emissions by 
3.98 (p<0.01) in the year 2008. These significant results are confirmed by the pooled 
regression. It can therefore be deduced that reporting companies have responded to 
increased national fiscal pressure in their home countries for the reduction of GHG-
emissions by disclosing their emissions. In the context of stakeholder theory this 
measure can be interpreted as reducing the risk relating to relations with the 
government as an important stakeholder (cf. chapter 3.2 Existence of Disclosure of 
GHG-Emissions).  
 
Leverage (LEV) is only found to be a determining characteristic of the existence of 
corporate GHG-emissions reporting in the year 2009. The negative coefficient 
implies that higher leverage reduces the likelihood of a company to report GHG-
emissions. The pooled regression confirms that leverage is not a significant 
determinant of the existence of GHG-emissions disclosure by companies for the 
overall sample period. It is consequently deduced that, generally speaking, there is no 
statistically significant difference between reporting and non-reporting companies in 
                                            
21     Logistic regression coefficients are logged odds and have little intuitive meaning 
(Pampel, 2000). To allow for a more intuitive interpretation the exponent (or 
antilogarithm) of the logistic regression coefficients is discussed in the text, i.e. 
EXP(1.169) = 3.218. 
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terms of the ratio of total debt to common equity and leverage does not have to be 
controlled for in the subsequent testing of the developed hypotheses.22 
 
Profitability (PROF) is only found to be a determining characteristic of the existence 
of corporate GHG-emissions reporting in the years 2005 and 2009. The negative 
coefficient implies that higher profitability reduces the likelihood of a company to 
report GHG-emissions. The pooled regression shows that profitability is generally not 
a significant determinant of the existence of GHG-emissions disclosure by companies 
for the overall sample period. It is consequently deduced that, generally speaking, 
there is no difference between reporting and non-reporting companies in terms of the 
ratio of return to total assets. Consequently profitability does not have to be 
controlled for in the testing of the developed hypotheses.23 
 
A strong determinant for the existence of GHG-emissions reporting is company size 
(MA_CAP). In all years under analysis, companies that are bigger in terms of their 
market capitalization are more likely to report GHG-emissions (p<0.01). In other 
words, the bigger the company, the higher the likelihood of it reporting GHG-
emissions that cover at least 50% of corporate activity.24 In fact, in the year 2007, an 
increase in the logarithm of market capitalisation by 1 increases the odds of a 
company to report GHG-emissions by 3.45 (p<0.01). These results indicate that there 
is a statistically significant difference in the size of reporting and non-reporting 
companies, which must be controlled for in the subsequent testing of the developed 
hypothesis.  
                                            
22    As a test of robustness of these results, the ratio of debt to assets has been used as 
an indicator. Results remain the same, except in year 2009, where the total debt 
to assets ratio is not a significant determinant. 
23    As a test of robustness of these results the ratio of return to equity as well as net 
income have been used as an indicator. Results remain the same, except in year 
2009, where the ratio of return to equity as well as net income are not a 
significant indicator. 
24    As a test of robustness of these results the logarithm of total assets has been used 
as an indicator for company size. Results remain the same. 
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Table 13: Results of logistic regression on existence of disclosure 
 
 
Industry affiliation is also a statistically significant determinant of the existence of 
corporate GHG-disclosure. For example, compared to the reference group, which in 
these regressions is the industry with the lowest ratio of reporting firms, the odds that 
a company from the basic materials industry (BASIC_MAT) reports its GHG-
emissions for the year 2005 are multiplied by 21.41 (p<0.01). Overall, the likelihood 
of a company to report GHG-emissions is significantly higher when it comes from 
high carbon industries, such as the Oil & Gas (OIL_GAS) industry, Basic Materials 
(BASIC_MAT), Industrials (INDUST) or Utilities (UTIL) industry. In one year under  
C -14.791 *** -14.976 *** -16.877 *** -14.139 *** -11.266 *** -12.640 ***
EU_ETS 1.169 *** 0.709 * 0.940 ** 0.386 0.711 * 0.812 ***
EN_TAX 0.929 * 0.904 * 1.101 ** 1.382 *** 0.944 1.015 ***
LEV 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 * 0.000
PROF -0.049 ** -0.023 0.010 0.011 -0.030 * -0.009
MA_CAP 1.023 *** 1.027 *** 1.237 *** 0.807 *** 0.863 *** 0.939 ***
OIL_GAS 2.599 ** 2.749 ** 2.556 ** 1.655 * 0.830 1.599 ***
BASIC_MAT 3.064 *** 2.083 ** 0.726 1.448 ** 0.400 1.081 ***
INDUST 1.445 ** 2.025 *** 1.228 *** 1.321 *** 1.040 ** 1.034 ***
CONS_GOOD 1.362 * 1.616 ** -0.090 -0.290 -0.341 0.109
HEALTH 1.088 1.404 * 0.141 -0.387 -0.213 0.026
CONS_SERV 0.738 0.884 Note 1 Note 1 Note 1 Note 1
TELECOMM 1.077 1.951 ** 0.992 0.640 0.730 0.689 **
UTIL 1.458 * 2.522 *** 1.155 * 1.515 * 1.060 1.165 ***
TECH Note 1 Note 1 0.353 0.807 1.050 0.047
Year 2005 - - - - - -1.296 ***
Year 2006 - - - - - -1.245 ***
Year 2007 - - - - - -0.940 ***
Year 2008 - - - - - -0.557 ***
Observations 348    352       353       360       343       1,756    
Pseudo R-squared 0.25 0.23 0.25 0.18 0.19 0.21
Chi Square 121 *** 112 *** 114 *** 80 *** 77 *** 493 ***
% Correctly predicted 72% 71% 74% 77% 74% 72%
Notes: This table reports results of year-specific and pooled binary logistic regressions carried out with 
sample A. The binary dependent variable EXIST refers to the existence of GHG-emissions disclosure and 
is coded 1 for companies reporting GHG-emissions on at least the majority of corporate activities in the 
year of index inclusion. Logistic regression coefficients are represented. Independent variables are lagged 
one year to t-1, except those which are constant over time (EU ETS, Industry). ***, ** and * indicate the 
1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively. Note 1:  Industry serves as a reference group as it 
shows the lowest ratio of reporting firms. Year 2009 serves as a reference year for the pooled regression. 
At the bottom of the table, the number of observations, McFadden R-squared, Log likelihood Chi Square 
and the % of correctly predicted dependent variable are presented. The cut-off value is 0.50.
Pooled2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
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analysis, companies from the Consumer Goods industry (CONS_GOODS) and in two 
years from the Health Care (HEALTH) and the Telecommunications (TELECOMM) 
industry were also more likely to report GHG-emissions. In the latter years of the 
analysis, industry affiliation is not as strong as a determining factor of the existence 
of GHG-emissions disclosure by companies as it is in the early years. Nevertheless, 
results show that a portfolio constructed from reporting companies would show a 
statistically significant different composition with regard to specific industries than a 
portfolio constructed from non-reporting companies, which impacts its exposure to 
climate change induced systematic risk. As industry affiliation is known to influence 
stock performance, industry effects are controlled for when testing the hypotheses 
developed. 
 
Concerning the model fit, the Log Likelihood chi-square presented at the bottom of 
Table 13 confirms that the model as a whole is statistically significant in all years 
under analysis. At a McFadden Pseudo R-squared of between 0.18 and 0.25 the 
model correctly predicts more than 71% of dependent variables in any given year 
under analysis.25 The pooled regression shows a McFadden R-squared of 0.21 and, at 
a cut-off level of 0.50 in line with Neter et al (1996) and Pampel (2000), correctly 
predicts 72% of dependent variables. While the model thus does not – and did not 
aim to – entirely explain the determinants of corporate disclosure of GHG-emissions, 
it gives sufficient reliability for a meaningful interpretation of the important 
characteristics of companies reporting or not reporting GHG-emissions. In 2008 the 
McFadden R-squared drops to 0.18, which is still superior to Pseudo R-squares of 
other similar studies from the field of environmental reporting (cf. Reid & Toffel, 
2009).  
  
                                            
25    A Pseudo R-squared cannot be analogously interpreted to an OLS R-squared, as 
logistic regression does not aim to minimize variance. A McFadden Pseudo R-
squared of 0.02 to 0.04 is considered highly satisfactory and illustrates the 
improvement in the log likelihood relative to the baseline log likelihood. 
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In summary, the analysis showed that companies that report GHG-emissions on at 
least 50% of corporate activities are bigger in terms of market capitalization. In terms 
of stock market performance, a portfolio built from reporting companies would thus 
be expected to underperform a portfolio from non-reporting companies due to the 
size-effect. This fact supports the necessity to control for size effects in the later 
analysis. Also, reporting companies are more likely to come from high carbon 
industries and tend to be affiliated with the EU ETS. A portfolio constructed from 
reporting companies thus carries increased climate change induced systematic risk. 
This increased risk is however contrasted by the reduced information and estimation 
risk of reporting companies (cf. chapter 3.2 Existence of disclosure of GHG-
emissions) and the fact that reporting companies have responded to high implicit 
energy tax levels and thus reduced the risk related to stakeholder relations. These 
findings concerning important characteristics of reporting as compared to non-
reporting firms are taken into account when analysing results of the hypotheses 
tested.  
 
4.4.2 Completeness of Corporate GHG-disclosure 
In order to determine if companies that report complete GHG-emissions differ in 
terms of important company characteristics from companies that report incomplete 
GHG-emissions, an ordered logistic regression analysis is carried out with all 
companies in sample C. For this analysis, the Disclosure Completeness Index 
developed in chapter 4.2.1 Collection of GHG-emissions data is taken as an ordinal 
dependent variable. Industry dummy variables are not included in this model due to 
the low number of companies from a specific industry in each category of the ordinal 
dependent variable (“frequency of events”). To rule out the methodological problems 
that can arise from low frequencies of events in ordered logistic regression (Peduzzi, 
Concato, Kemper, Holford, & Feinstein, 1996), industries are merged into a binary 
dummy variable for affiliation with high carbon industries. 
 
The full model specification for examining the characteristics of complete as 
compared to incomplete reporting companies is: 
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COMP = β1 (EU_ETS) + β2 (EN_TAX) + β3 (LEV) + β4 (PROF)                   + β5 (MA_CAP) + β6 (IND_HC)                                                            (2) 
 
Where: 
 COMP is an ordinal variable that can take values from 0 to 3 based on 
the score of a company on the Disclosure Completeness Index. IND_HC  is a binary dummy variable coded 1 for companies belonging 
to high carbon industries, 0 otherwise. 
 
Other variables as defined earlier. 
 
Table 14 displays the results of the year-specific and the pooled logistic regressions 
taking the score of a company on the Disclosure Completeness Index (COMP) as a 
dependent variable. It is noticeable that the model fit is extremely low, with a 
McFadden R-squared of as low as 0.02 in the year 2009. Nevertheless, the Log 
Likelihood chi-square presented at the bottom of the table confirms that the model as 
a whole is statistically significant in all years under analysis, i.e. not all indicators in 
the model are insignificant. However, only in the year 2008 the model correctly 
predicts the majority of dependent variable scores. While the indicators chosen for 
this analysis thus do not serve to entirely explain the levels of completeness of GHG-
emissions disclosure by companies, the model allows for an interpretation of results 
with regard to important characteristics of complete versus incomplete reporting 
companies. 
 
For example, results show that companies with installations in the EU ETS 
(EU_ETS) were significantly less likely to report complete GHG-emissions in the 
years 2006 to 2009. The odds for those companies that have installations in the EU 
ETS to have been classified in a higher category of the Disclosure Completeness 
Index versus a lower one are about 0.30 (p<= 0.01) as high as for those who did not 
have installations in the EU ETS. This is not a surprising finding in light of the fact 
that he EU ETS currently only requires reporting of carbon dioxide on specific 
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processes and installations, and not the reporting of group-wide scope 1 and 2 GHG-
emissions. From these results, it can be deduced that companies that report 
incomplete GHG-emissions are more likely to carry climate change induced 
systematic risk not only proxied by the EU ETS, but also with regard to higher 
information and estimation risk. 
 
Furthermore, in the years 2005 to 2008, companies coming from countries with high 
implicit energy tax levels (EN_TAX) were more likely to be classified in a higher 
category of the Disclosure Completeness Index. For example, in 2006 the odds of 
being classified in a higher category of the Disclosure Completeness Index versus a 
lower one were 3.27 times higher (p<0.05) with a one-unit increase in the logarithm 
of the implicit energy tax level of the respective home country. For the years 2005 to 
2008, it can be deduced that companies that report complete GHG-emissions have 
responded to the increased national fiscal pressure by reporting GHG-emissions and 
thus reduced their risk related to relations with the government as an important 
stakeholder, while also reducing their estimation risk, as market participants can 
make an informed estimate based on completely reported GHG-emissions data (cf. 
chapter 3.3 Disclosure completeness).  
 
Leverage (LEV) and profitability (PROF) are only found to be a determining 
characteristic of the completeness of corporate GHG-emissions reporting in one out 
of five years under analysis. The pooled regression confirms that leverage and 
profitability are not significant determinants of the completeness of GHG-emissions 
disclosure by companies for the overall sample period. It is consequently deduced 
that, generally speaking, there is no difference between companies that report 
complete GHG-emissions and companies that report incomplete levels of GHG-
emissions in terms of the ratio of total debt to common equity or the ratio of return to 
total assets.26 Leverage and profitability can consequently be neglected when testing 
the hypotheses concerning disclosure completeness.  
                                            
26    As a test of robustness of these results the ratio of return to equity, net income 
and the ratio of debt to assets have been used as indicators. Results remain the 
same, except in year 2008, where net income is not a significant indicator, and 
year 2006, where the total debt to assets ratio is not a significant indicator. 
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Table 14: Results of logistic regression on disclosure completeness 
 
 
A small yet consistently significant determinant for the completeness of GHG-
emissions reporting is company size (MA_CAP). In the years 2005 to 2008, larger 
companies are slightly more likely to report complete GHG-emissions.27 In contrast 
to that, affiliation with high carbon industries (IND_HC) generally does not influence 
the completeness of corporate GHG-disclosure. Only in the year 2008, the likelihood 
of a company to report complete GHG-emissions is higher when it belongs to a high 
carbon industry. These companies are consequently not only exposed to climate 
                                                                                                                            
 
27    As a test of robustness of these results the logarithm of total assets has been used 
as an indicator for company size. Total assets is not a significant indicator in year 
2005, 2006, 2007, prompting the conclusion that market based measures of size 
are a better determinant for the completeness of GHG-emissions reporting than 
book values. 
 
EU_ETS -0.334 -0.820 *** -0.700 ** -1.137 *** -0.944 *** -0.812 ***
EN_TAX 0.926 * 1.184 ** 1.318 ** 0.836 * 0.492 0.966 ***
LEV 0.000 -0.001 * 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
PROF -0.033 -0.028 -0.001 0.027 ** 0.007 0.005
MA_CAP 0.382 *** 0.337 ** 0.212 * 0.239 ** 0.070 0.217 ***
IND_HC 0.019 0.364 0.279 0.502 * 0.342 0.326 ***
Year 2005 - - - - - -1.256 ***
Year 2006 - - - - - -1.075 ***
Year 2007 - - - - - -0.850 ***
Year 2008 - - - - - -0.560 ***
Observations 181    199   229    255   245    1,109 
Pseudo R-squared 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.04
Chi-Square 13.89 ** 19.16 *** 16.12 ** 28.52 *** 14.28 ** 113.95 ***
% Correctly predicted 48% 49% 46% 52% 46% 48%
Notes: This table reports results of year-specific and pooled ordinal logistic regressions carried 
out with sample C. The ordinal dependent variable COMP refers to the Disclosure 
Completeness Index for GHG-emissions. Logistic regression coefficients are represented for 
each of the years 2005 to 2009 and the pooled regression. All independent variables are lagged 
one year to t-1, except those which are constant over time (EU ETS, Industry). The Year 2009 
serves as a reference year for the pooled regression. ***, ** and * indicate the 1%, 5% and 
10% significance level respectively. At the bottom of the table the number of observations, 
McFadden R-squared, the Log Likelihood Chi Square as well as the % of correctly predicted 
depentend variables are presented.
20062005 2007 2008 2009 Pool
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change induced systematic risk as proxied by affiliation with high carbon industries 
(cf. chapter 3.6 High Carbon Industries) but also as proxied by the information and 
estimation risk resulting from incomplete disclosures of GHG-emissions (cf. chapter 
3.3 Disclosure Completeness). 
 
With regard to differences in specific important characteristics of companies that 
report complete levels of GHG-emissions as compared to companies that tend to 
report incomplete levels of GHG-emissions, it can be summarized that larger 
companies in terms of market capitalization are more likely to report complete GHG-
emissions. Company size consequently has to be controlled for when testing the 
hypotheses concerning disclosure completeness (cf. chapter 3.3 Disclosure 
Completeness). The finding that comparatively larger companies tend to report 
complete GHG-emissions also implies that larger companies, which tend to show 
higher levels of emissions due to their size, report comparatively higher – since 
complete – emissions. As a result, disclosure completeness has to be controlled for 
when testing hypotheses concerning absolute levels of emissions and GHG-
efficiency, as otherwise lower absolute levels of emissions and higher levels of GHG-
efficiency may stem from incomplete emissions reporting by medium and small-cap 
companies. Reporting incompleteness is consequently controlled for in a test of 
robustness when testing the hypotheses developed (cf. chapter 5.4.1 Incompleteness 
of GHG-emissions Data).  
 
Furthermore, companies affiliated with EU ETS are found to be more likely to report 
incomplete GHG-emissions and thus further increase their climate change induced 
systematic risk, as their estimation risk is rises (cf. chapter 3.3 Disclosure 
Completeness). In contrast to that, companies from countries with relatively high 
implicit energy tax levels are found to be more likely to report complete GHG-
emissions. Completely reporting companies thus reduce their climate change induced 
systematic risk by responding to national fiscal pressure and their estimation risk by 
allowing market participants to correctly assess the climate change induced 
systematic risk through the complete disclosure of absolute levels of GHG-emissions.  
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The results obtained from his in-depth analysis of sample characteristics are taken 
into account when analysing the results of the hypotheses tested in the remainder of 
this thesis. They are also reflected in the methodology applied to test the hypotheses, 
which is introduced in detail in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 5 
Methodology 
In this chapter, the methodology applied to test the hypotheses developed in chapter 3 
Hypotheses Development is motivated and explained. As discussed in chapter 2.1.4 
Methodologies and Findings, test of market efficiency suffer from a Joint Hypothesis 
Problem, as market efficiency cannot be tested without simultaneously testing the 
underlying model used for the estimation of expected returns. While this 
circumstance cannot be removed, its effect is minimised through the use of two of the 
most established asset pricing models for test of market efficiency, the CAPM and the 
C4FM, in this research.  
 
The CAPM is the traditional model applied in tests of market efficiency, as it 
stipulates that portfolio returns can be explained exclusively by systematic risk. It 
thus relates to the basic notion of the EMH, in which investors are rewarded only for 
taking systematic risk (cf. chapter 2.1.2 Definitions and Important Notions of EMH). 
After the emergence of different risk premiums over time (cf. chapter 2.1.4 
Methodologies and Findings), the C4FM has become a standard model for testing 
market efficiency (Fama & French, 2010). Applying the C4FM ensures that any 
potential market inefficiency found is not in fact driven by factors other than beta, 
which are however already known to determine abnormal stock performance. 
 
After the two models are introduced in chapter 5.1 CAPM and chapter 5.2 C4FM 
respectively, additional control variables are motivated and added to the C4FM in 
chapter 5.2.1 Controlling for Industry Effects and chapter 5.4 Tests of Robustness. 
These control variables represent industry effects, changes in the price of carbon and 
oil, as well as a control variable for the impact of financial market crisis. Further tests 
of robustness include portfolio creation in June of each respective year, as well as the 
construction of portfolios with GHG-emissions data from year t-2.  
 
In chapter 5.3 Portfolio Construction, portfolios are formed based on the six proxies 
for climate change induced systematic risk introduced in chapter 3 Hypotheses 
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Development, which will allow testing market efficiency towards the respective 
proxies. Portfolios, rather than individual stocks, are used in this research as the 
precision of their estimated betas is known to be higher (Fama & French, 2004). 
CAPM and C4FM are estimated using OLS regression and the software Eviews. 
Coefficient covariances and standard errors in all following regressions are made 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent based on the approach of Newey & 
West (1987).  
5.1 CAPM 
The first model applied in this study is the CAPM, which was created by Sharpe 
(1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966). CAPM conceptually implies that portfolio 
returns can be explained by systematic risk, which is represented by the coefficient 
beta. The alpha coefficient in the CAPM describes the return of a portfolio in excess 
of the compensation for the systematic risk borne. As discussed, in an efficient 
market investors would not be able to persistently achieve returns in excess of the 
return rewarded for the systematic risk borne, i.e. alpha would correspond to zero. 
CAPM thus lends itself very well to testing market efficiency and is defined as 
(Brooks, 2008):  
 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖�𝑅𝑚𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓𝑡� + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                 (3) 
 
Where:  
𝑅𝑖𝑡  is the logarithm of the continuously compounded return of portfolio i 
at month t. 
𝑅𝑓𝑡 is the logarithm of the continuously compounded risk-free return rate. 
𝛼𝑖  is the alpha coefficient.  
𝛽𝑖   is the beta coefficient.  
𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the logarithm of the continuously compounded return of the market. 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term that captures the return variation that cannot be 
explained by the model.  
 
Each variable of the model is briefly explained in the following paragraphs.  
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As described above, Rit is the logarithm of the continuously compounded return of a 
portfolio i. Portfolio i is the respective portfolio formed based on one of the six 
proxies for climate change induced systematic risk (cf. chapter 5.3 Portfolio 
Construction). Ri is calculated for each month t in the study based on the Return 
Index extracted from Datastream (cf. chapter 4.3.5 Other Indicators), which 
stipulates that dividends are reinvested to purchase additional units of stocks.28 Rit in 
this research is calculated for equal- and value-weighted portfolios. To calculate Rit 
for an equal-weighted portfolio, the Return Index at month t of each share in the 
portfolio is divided by the Return Index at month t-1 of each share in the portfolio. 
The continuously compounded monthly return of an equal-weighted portfolio is then 
generated by computing the natural logarithm of the average equal-weighted return of 
all shares in the portfolio. To calculate Rit for value-weighted portfolios, the market 
capitalizations of all shares in the portfolio at month t are summed and the market 
capitalization of a share is divided by the total market capitalization of the portfolio. 
The resulting market weight is multiplied with the return of each share, which again 
is calculated by dividing the Return Index at month t by the Return Index at month t-
1. The continuously compounded monthly return of a value-weighted portfolio is then 
generated by computing the natural logarithm of the sum of all value-weighted 
returns of all shares in the portfolio.  
 Rft is the logarithm of the continuously compounded risk-free return rate. As 
described in chapter 4.2.2 Collection of Other Data, the three months Euribor-rate is 
used as risk-free rate of return. In order to convert the three months Euribor-rate into 
the monthly continuously compounded risk free return an investor would receive, 
each per annum stated return is transformed into a 91 days return by multiplying it 
with 91/365.25. Subsequently, one is added to the result and the sum is taken to the 
power of 30.4375/91, whereby 30.4375 is one twelfth of 365.25 days, i.e. one month. 
The continuously compounded monthly risk free return is then obtained by 
computing the natural logarithm of the result (cf. Hoepner, Rezec, & Siegl, 2011b). In 
                                            
2828Ignoring dividend payments would result in underestimating the total returns that 
arise to investors (Brooks, 2008) and can lead to an overestimation of growth 
stocks, which usually have large capital gains, compared to income stocks, which 
pay high dividends. 
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this study, the annualised average risk free return corresponds to 3.08% at a mean 
standard deviation of 0.004. 
 
αi in the CAPM is the alpha coefficient, which represents the portfolio’s return in 
excess of the compensation for the systematic risk borne. As described, in an efficient 
market, the alpha of a portfolio equals zero as investors are not able to persistently 
generate abnormal returns in excess of the return rewarded for the systematic risk 
borne. Systematic risk is represented in the CAPM by the coefficient βi. As discussed 
before, beta represents the non-diversifiable risk of a portfolio and measures the 
sensitivity of portfolio returns to market returns.  
 Rmt is the logarithm of the continuously compounded return of the market at month t. 
In this study, the return of the market is depicted by the return of all non-financial 
European constituents of the FTSE AWI, i.e. all companies in sample A. The equal-
and value-weighted Rmt is obtained by putting all shares of sample A in a market 
portfolio and following the calculation of the equal- and value-weighted returns of 
portfolio Rit described above. The mean annualised equal-weighted return of the 
market portfolio in excess of the risk free return (Rm - Rf) over the period studied 
corresponds to 3.10% at a mean SD of 0.19 (see Table 15).  
 
Finally, εit corresponds to the error term, which captures the variation in portfolio 
returns that is not explained by the model. As no model can fully represent the 
relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable, the error 
term captures the remaining inaccuracy of a model. 
5.2 C4FM 
Almost 30 years after the emergence of the CAPM and as a response to the emerging 
evidences of patterns in stock returns based on size and book to market ratios (cf. 
chapter 2.1.4 Methodologies and Findings), the model was extended by Fama and 
French (1993). They introduced a control factor into the CAPM for the size effect, i.e. 
the continuously observed excess returns of small-cap over large-cap stocks (SMB 
factor). Furthermore, Fama and French (1993) added a control factor for the excess 
returns of value stocks over growth stocks into the model (HML factor). The 
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inclusion of these two factors in the CAPM reduced the significance and importance 
of the beta coefficient and created the so called Fama and French Three Factor 
Model. Shortly afterwards, Carhart (1997) added the momentum factor (UMD factor) 
(cf chapter 2.1.4 Methodologies and Findings) to the Fama and French Three Factor 
Model. The momentum factor controls for the effect that past winners (losers) 
continue to perform well (poorly), which was evidenced by Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993). The resulting Carhart 4 Factor Model (C4FM)f is the dominant asset pricing 
model currently applied in tests of market efficiency (Fama & French, 2010) and one 
of the prevailing models in studies examining the performance of SRI portfolios (cf. 
Derwall et al., 2005; Kempf & Osthoff, 2007; Ziegler et al., 2011).  
 
The controversy over the correct explanation of factors such as size or momentum is 
discussed in chapter 2.1.4 Methodologies and Findings and is not further elaborated 
in the remainder of this research. The factors included in the C4FM have been proven 
to persistently determine returns in many markets and are consequently controlled for 
in the methodology applied in this research to ensure that any potential market 
inefficiency identified cannot be explained by factors generally known to explain 
stock performance.  
 
The C4FM is defined as:   
 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖�𝑅𝑚𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓𝑡� + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 +  ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 +  𝑝𝑖𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡  +  𝜀𝑖𝑡  
                (4) 
Where:  si  is the coefficient that measures the sensitivity of the portfolio's return 
to the SMB factor.  SMBt  is the measure for the historic excess returns of small-cap over large-
cap stocks.  hi  is the coefficient that measures the sensitivity of the portfolio's return 
to the HML factor.  HMLt  is the measure for the historic excess returns of value stocks over 
growth stocks.  
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pi  is the coefficient that measures the sensitivity of the portfolio's return 
to the UMD factor.  UMDt  is the measure for the historic excess returns of winner-stocks over 
loser-stock.  
 
Other variables as defined earlier. 
 
Explanations of those variables in the C4FM that are identical to the CAPM are not 
repeated here. The calculation of SMBt (small-minus-big factor), HMLt (high-minus-
low factor) and UMDt (up-minus-down factor) in line with Fama and French (1992) 
and Carhart (1997) respectively is explained in the following.  
 
First, the stocks included in this study are ranked in descending order based on their 
market capitalisation in December of year t-1. The stocks are then divided into two 
portfolios, which are re-formed on a yearly basis: The small-cap portfolio (S) 
contains the stocks with a market capitalisation below the median market 
capitalisation of the companies included in this research. The large-cap portfolio (B) 
contains the stocks with a market capitalisation above the median market 
capitalisation of the companies included in this research.  
 
Subsequently, the stocks included in this research are divided into three portfolios 
depending on their book to market ratio. As described in chapter 4.3.5 Other 
Indicators, the book to market ratio is calculated by dividing common equity in 
December at year t-2 by market capitalisation in December of year t-1.29 Stocks with 
a book to market ratio below the 30th percentile of book to market ratios of firms in 
this sample are placed in the “low” portfolio (L). Stocks with a book to market ratio 
that is in the middle 40 % of book to market ratios of firms in this research are put in 
the “medium” portfolio (M). Stocks with a book to market ratio in the top 30 % of 
                                            
29    As portfolios are created in January, book values from t-2 are taken to make sure 
the information used is known to the market. As a test of robustness, portfolios 
are created in June and for this test of robustness book values are taken from year 
t-1 (cf. chapter 5.4.5 Portfolio Creation in June). 
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book to market ratios of firms in this sample are placed in the “high” portfolio (H). 
The resulting L, M and H portfolios are re-formed on a yearly basis. In line with 
Fama and French (1995), firms with a negative book to market ratio are excluded 
when calculating the percentage breakpoints for the L/M/H portfolio construction or 
when forming the respective portfolios. Firm with negative book to market ratio 
correspond to less than 2.5% of the yearly observations in sample A. 
 
Next, six cross sectional portfolios (SL, SM, SH, BL, BM, and BH) are formed, 
where for example the SL portfolio contains stocks categorized as small-cap (S) and 
having a low book to market ratio (L). The monthly returns on the six portfolios are 
calculated for the 12 months following portfolio formation analogously to the 
calculation of return of Rit described in chapter 5.1 CAPM. This process is repeated 
for all years and carried out for equal and value-weighted portfolio returns. 
Subsequently the SMB factor can be calculated. SMBt is the difference between the 
returns on the three small stock portfolios and the three big stock portfolios at month 
t, while adjusting for the difference in returns of stock with differing book to market 
ratios. SMB factors are calculated for every month t in this study with equal- and 
value-weighted portfolios. The formula used to calculate SMBt is defined as: 
 
𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 = ln � 1 +  𝑆𝐻𝑡+ 𝑆𝑀𝑡 +  𝑆𝐿𝑡3  −  𝐵𝐻𝑡+ 𝐵𝑀𝑡 +  𝐵𝐿𝑡3 �                  (5) 
 
Following the same procedure, the HMLt factor can be calculated by deducting the 
returns of a portfolio constructed from stocks with a high book to market ratio at 
month t from the returns of a portfolio constructed from stocks with a low book to 
market ratio, while adjusting for the difference in returns of stock with differing size. HML factors are calculated for every month t in this study with equal- and value-
weighted portfolios. The formula used to calculate HML is defined as: 
 
𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 = ln � 1 +  𝐵𝐻𝑡+ 𝑆𝐻𝑡2  −  𝐵𝐿𝑡+ 𝑆𝐿𝑡2 �                     (6) 
 
The UMD factor, which is also referred to as MOM or PR1YR (Carhart, 1997), is 
constructed by allocating those 30% of the stocks with the highest average return in 
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the 12 months period preceding portfolio construction in to “winner” or “up” 
portfolio (U). The “loser” or “down” portfolio (D) contains those 30% of the stocks 
with the lowest average prior performance in the 12 months period preceding 
portfolio construction. The UMDt factor is updated monthly and calculated as the 
returns on the U portfolio at month t minus the returns on the D portfolio at month t: 
 
𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 =  ln  (1 + 𝑈𝑡 −  𝐷𝑡)                  (7) 
 
The market capitalisation at the end of each year and the number of companies in 
each of the respective portfolios is depicted in Table 15. Furthermore, the mean 
annualised returns in excess of the risk free rate of return of the portfolios used to 
construct the respective SMB, HML and UMD factors are detailed in Table 15. It is 
noticeable that over the five year period of this study, two of the portfolios 
constructed from small-cap companies (SH, SM) underperform portfolios constructed 
from large-cap companies (BH, BM) on the basis of equal-weighted mean annualised 
returns. The performance of these two portfolios is against the prediction of the size 
premium, which would stipulate that portfolios constructed from small-cap 
companies outperform portfolios constructed from large-cap companies. The 
extraordinary performance is probably attributable to the effect of the crisis of the 
financial market in the second half of the period under analysis, which had a stronger 
negative impact on smaller firms (Campello, Graham, & Harvey, 2010).  
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Table 15: Annualised excess returns of cross-sectional portfolios 
 
 
The remaining variables in the C4FM, si, hi and pi, are coefficients that measure the 
sensitivity of a portfolio concerning the respective factors SMB, HML and UMD. si 
is the coefficient that measures the sensitivity of the portfolio's return to the SMB 
factor. Large-cap portfolios load negatively on SMB, i.e. si is statistically significant 
and negative. Small-cap portfolios have a statistically significant and positive value 
for si. hi is the coefficient that measures the sensitivity of the portfolio's return to the 
HML factor. Portfolios of value stocks have a statistically significant and positive 
value for hi. pi is the coefficient that measures the sensitivity of the portfolio's return 
to the UMD factor. Portfolios constructed from winner-stocks have a statistically 
significant and positive value for pi. 
 
C4FM forms one of the base models for this research. However, the in-depth analysis 
of sample characteristics in chapter 4.4 Understanding Sample Characteristics 
evidenced that additional control variables are necessary to ensure that results are not 
driven by, for example, industry effects. Additional control variables are 
consequently included in the C4FM in chapter 5.2.1 Controlling for Industry Effects 
and chapter 5.4 Tests of Robustness. 
 
Portfolio
Mean SD Mean SD 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Rm-Rf 3.10% 0.19 2.50% 0.16 348 351 353 360 342 4.19 4.94 5.61 3.39 3.83 
SH-Rf 4.65% 0.26 5.62% 0.23 58 59 53 68 67 0.20 0.25 0.23 0.12 0.18 
SM-Rf 3.11% 0.21 3.92% 0.20 60 60 66 66 61 0.21 0.28 0.27 0.15 0.20 
SL-Rf 0.83% 0.19 1.22% 0.18 48 54 52 42 39 0.16 0.23 0.22 0.10 0.11 
BH-Rf 5.48% 0.19 6.06% 0.17 44 45 52 40 36 0.75 0.96 1.39 0.60 0.64 
BM-Rf 5.14% 0.18 4.24% 0.17 75 77 71 75 73 1.61 1.96 2.13 1.39 1.51 
BL-Rf 0.18% 0.15 -1.64% 0.14 53 50 52 65 62 1.22 1.24 1.34 1.03 1.18 
U-Rf 1.78% 0.17 2.22% 0.14 104 105 106 108 103 1.78 2.06 2.29 1.58 1.69 
D-Rf 2.60% 0.21 2.42% 0.18 104 106 106 108 103 0.82 0.97 1.26 0.72 0.85 
Notes: This table reports the annualised returns of the SL, SM, SH, BL, BM, BH, U and D portfolios, as 
well as the market portfolio, in excess of the risk free rate of return Rf. The first column depicts the 
mean and standard deviation (SD) of the equal-weighted (EW) and value-weighted (VW) annualised 
excess returns respectively. The following columns show the number of stocks, as well as the market 
value (MV) in trillion € of each portfolio at the end of each respective year.
No. of stocks in portfolio MV of portfolio in trillion €
EW VW
Annualised excess returns
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5.2.1 Controlling for Industry Effects 
Among others, Fama and French showed that different industries display significant 
differences in risk exposure (Campbell et al., 2001; Fama & French, 1997). If this 
risk is not efficiently priced by financial markets, the different industry composition 
of the various portfolios i would distort results. In fact, industry composition is 
generally thought to impact portfolio returns and not controlling for these effects can 
result in a misleading interpretation of results (Dess, Ireland, & Hitt, 1990). 
DiBartolomeo and Kurtz (1999) showed that SRI portfolio returns posit no exception 
in this context. For example Lewellen, Nagel, and Shanken (2010) suggest that 
therefore portfolios sorted by industry must be included in asset pricing models. 
Furthermore, Hsu, Kalesnik, and Wermers (2011) argue that investment practitioners 
tend to focus more heavily on industry factors than academia traditionally has in 
models of asset pricing. Industry effects are consequently controlled for in this 
research, to make sure the results obtained with the C4FM are not driven by 
differences in industry composition of the respective portfolios i and possibly 
incorrectly priced industry performance.30 At the same time, controlling for industry 
effects potentially raises the interest for results of this study from investment 
practitioners. 
 
To illustrate the potentially distorting effect of industry composition on portfolio 
returns, returns of industry-specific portfolios in the C4FM are shown in Table 16. 
Industries are sorted according to their ICB codes (cf. chapter 4.1 Sample Selection). 
Table 16 shows that for example a portfolio constructed from all Utilities (ICB 7000) 
in sample A generates a significant annualised alpha of 5.5%, i.e. according to the 
C4FM the market was inefficient in pricing Utilities companies from 2005 to 2009. 
As evidenced in chapter 4.4.1 Existence of Corporate GHG-disclosure, companies 
from the Utility industry are more likely to report GHG-emissions. Consequently, the 
performance of a portfolio constructed from GHG-reporting companies could be 
                                            
30    Industry effects are not controlled for when portfolio formation is based or 
loosely based on industry affiliation, as it is the case for portfolios formed based 
on the affiliation of companies with high carbon industries or the EU ETS. 
Controlling for industry effects in the respective regressions would cancel out the 
climate change induced systematic risk at industry level, which is of interest in 
the context of these two portfolios. 
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driven by its higher share of companies from the Utility industry. At the same time, as 
shown in chapter 4.3.4 Industry Affiliation and Affiliation with the EU ETS, 
companies from the Health Care (ICB 4000), Consumer Services (ICB 5000) and 
Technology (ICB 9000) industries show a low share of reporting companies. To 
eliminate the possibility that a portfolio constructed from companies that do not 
report GHG-emissions is driven by the performance of these inefficiently priced 
industries, industry effects are controlled for. 
 
Table 16: Regression results: Industry portfolios 
 
 
To be able to control the returns of portfolio i in the C4FM for industry-effects, 
orthogonalised industry performance variables are added to the model (cf. Derwall et 
al., 2005; Geczy et al., 2005; Hoepner et al., 2011a). Othogonalisation is “[a] 
statistical technique that makes two or several factors […] independent of each other” 
(Drummen & Zimmermann, 1992, p. 16). Orthogonalised industry returns in this 
study represent the share of the return of an industry that cannot be explained by 
market developments and constitute purely industry-specific return characteristics. 
Variables representing industry performance that were made orthogonal to the market 
thus allow controlling for industry effects in the model, while avoiding the problems 
of multicollinearity that may arise from including market and industry returns in the 
Portfolio ICB α (Rm-Rf) SMB HML UMD Adj. R2
Oil & Gas 0001 5.99% 1.090 *** -0.343 -0.563 ** -0.572 ** 0.713
Basic Materials 1000 9.10% 1.249 *** 0.235 -0.267 -0.696 *** 0.837
Industrials 2000 -0.10% 1.139 *** 0.221 0.014 0.099 0.962
Consumer Goods 3000 1.74% 0.910 *** 0.014 0.237 * 0.094 0.904
Health Care 4000 7.59% ** 0.733 *** -0.299 -0.277 0.208 0.676
Consumer Services 5000 -9.88% *** 0.942 *** 0.309 ** 0.220 * 0.423 *** 0.941
Telecommunications 6000 -1.73% 0.733 *** -1.071 *** 0.115 -0.207 0.670
Utilities 7000 5.50% * 0.926 *** -0.597 *** -0.343 ** -0.173 0.793
Technology 9000 -10.90% ** 1.129 *** 0.155 0.273 -0.275 0.846
Notes: This table reports C4FM regression results for industry-specific portfolios from January 
2005 to December 2009 using monthly equal-weighted returns and equal-weighted SMB, HML 
and UMD factors. Columns show the annualised alpha in per cent, beta estimations (Rm - Rf), 
coefficient exposure on the SMB, HML and UMD factors, as well as the adjusted R-squared. 
***, ** and * indicate the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively. Coefficient 
covariances and standard errors are made heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent 
based on Newey and West (1987). 
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same model. The definition of the C4FM that has been extended with orthogonalised 
industry returns is: 
 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓𝑡 =   𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖�𝑅𝑚𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓𝑡� + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 +  ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 +  𝑝𝑖𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡  +  𝑚𝑖0001𝑡+  𝑛𝑖1000𝑡 +  𝑜𝑖2000𝑡 +  𝑟𝑖3000𝑡 +  𝑢𝑖4000𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖5000𝑡+  𝑤𝑖6000𝑡 +  𝑥𝑖6000𝑡 +  𝑦𝑖7000𝑡 + 𝑧𝑖9000𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡  
    (8) 
 
Where: 0001t is the orthogonalised return of a portfolio constructed from 
companies from the Oil & Gas industry (ICB 0001).  1000t is the orthogonalised return of a portfolio constructed from 
companies from the Basic Materials industry (ICB 1000). 2000t is the orthogonalised return of a portfolio constructed from 
companies from the Industrials industry (ICB 2000). 3000t is the orthogonalised return of a portfolio constructed from 
companies from the Consumer Goods industry (ICB 3000). 4000t is the orthogonalised return of a portfolio constructed from 
companies from the Health Care industry (ICB 4000). 5000t is the orthogonalised return of a portfolio constructed from the 
Consumer Services industry (ICB 5000). 6000t is the orthogonalised return of a portfolio constructed from 
companies from the Telecommunication industry (ICB 6000). 7000t is the orthogonalised return of a portfolio constructed from 
companies from the Utilities industry (ICB 7000). 9000t is the orthogonalised return of a portfolio constructed from 
companies from the Technology industry (ICB 9000). mi, ni, oi, ri, ui,  are the coefficients that measure the sensitivity of the               vi, wi, xi, yi, zi portfolio's return to the respective orthogonalised industry returns.  
 
Other variables as defined earlier. 
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The orthogonalised industry returns 0001 to 9000 for month t are obtained by 
forming portfolios with all companies from a respective industry and regressing the 
returns of the respective industry portfolio in month t on the returns of the market in 
the CAPM. Subsequently, the intercept and the residuals of that regression are 
summed up to obtain the orthogonalised industry return for month t (Elton, Gruber, 
Das, & Hlavka, 1993). As a result, there is zero correlation between industry and 
market returns and no problem of multicollinearity exists in a model that includes 
market returns and controls for industry performance. 
 
The Pearson correlation matrix for equal-weighted orthogonalised industry returns is 
shown in Table 17 below. Interestingly, orthogonalised returns of the Consumer 
Services industry (ICB 5000) show a medium negative correlation of -0.55 with the 
Oil & Gas (ICB 0001) and Basic Materials sector (ICB 1000) respectively. In order to 
detect potential problems with multicollinearity between the orthogonalised industry 
returns, a VIF analysis was performed. At a maximum VIF of 1.74 no serious 
problems of multicollinearity have been detected (Marquardt 1970).  
 
Table 17: Pearson correlation matrix for orthogonalised industry returns 
 
 
5.3 Portfolio Construction 
In the following paragraphs, the construction of portfolios i is detailed, which allow 
testing the level of market efficiency toward climate change induced systematic risk 
based on the six proxies introduced in chapter 3 Hypotheses Development. For every 
ICB 0001 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 9000
0001 1
1000 0.43 1
2000 -0.39 -0.31 1
3000 -0.36 -0.26 -0.03 1
4000 0.22 -0.11 -0.19 -0.23 1
5000 -0.55 -0.55 0.10 0.02 -0.22 1
6000 0.03 -0.21 -0.15 -0.17 0.03 -0.06 1
7000 0.30 -0.11 -0.18 -0.30 0.32 -0.31 0.10 1
9000 -0.07 -0.05 -0.20 -0.05 -0.04 0.05 0.01 -0.26 1
Notes: This table reports Pearson correlation coefficients for 
orthogonalised equal-weighted industry returns. 
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hypothesis a set of mutually exclusive portfolios for two trading strategies is formed. 
First, a simple buy-and-hold strategy is pursued, i.e. mutually exclusive portfolios are 
constructed and updated once per year. Second, a long-short trading strategy is 
pursued, which allows determining whether active investors can generate 
economically significant abnormal returns by taking advantage of performance 
differences between the mutually exclusive portfolios. The construction of portfolios 
for both trading strategies is detailed in the remainder of this chapter.  
 
5.3.1 Buy and Hold Strategy 
To test the hypothesis concerning affiliation with the European Emissions Trading 
Scheme as a proxy for climate change induced systematic risk (cf. chapter 3.1 
European Emissions Trading Scheme) with a buy-and-hold trading strategy, two 
portfolios are constructed. The first portfolio (EU ETS) contains all companies in 
sample A that are affiliated with the trading scheme. The second portfolio (Not in EU 
ETS) contains all companies in sample A that are not affiliated with the scheme. The 
composition of both portfolios is detailed in Table 18. Table 18 shows that in terms of 
market capitalisation at the end of the year, the EU ETS portfolio is very similar to 
the Not EU ETS portfolio, although the latter includes twice the number of 
companies, i.e. on average companies in the EU ETS are much bigger in terms of 
market capitalization. This fact again underlines the need to control portfolio 
performance for company size. 
 
Table 18 also shows the mean annualised returns in excess of the risk free rate of the 
respective portfolios. On the basis of these excess returns the EU ETS portfolio 
strongly outperforms the portfolio constructed from companies that are not affiliated 
with the EU ETS. However, as these returns are not adjusted for risk, and factors 
generally known to explain stock market performance are not controlled for, no 
preliminary conclusion should be drawn with regard to market efficiency or the 
hypotheses developed. To adjust returns for risk and control for factors generally 
accepted to explain stock market performance, portfolio returns are regressed on the 
CAPM and C4FM, as described in chapter 5.1 CAPM and chapter 5.2 C4FM. 
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To be able to test the hypothesis concerning the existence of GHG-emissions 
disclosure as a proxy for climate change induced systematic risk (cf. chapter 3.2 
Existence of Disclosure of GHG-Emissions), two mutually exclusive portfolios are 
constructed. The first portfolio (Reporting GHG) contains all companies of sample A 
that disclose GHG-emissions on at least the majority of corporate activities. The 
second portfolio (Not reporting GHG) is constructed from all companies in sample A 
that do not report their GHG-emissions to the public. Table 18 illustrates that on the 
basis of mere mean annualised equal-weighted returns in excess of the risk free rate 
of return, the portfolio constructed from reporting companies significantly 
outperforms the portfolio of non-reporting companies. 
 
To test the hypothesis concerning the completeness of GHG-emissions disclosure as a 
proxy for climate change induced systematic risk (cf. chapter 3.3 Disclosure 
completeness), four mutually exclusive portfolios are constructed from companies in 
sample B. Companies are allocated to these four portfolios based on their respective 
score on the Disclosure Completeness Index (cf. chapter 4.2.1 Collection of GHG-
emissions data), where a score of 0 corresponds to incomplete GHG-emissions 
reporting and a score of 3 corresponds to complete reporting of scope 1 and 2 GHG-
emissions for a group-wide reporting boundary. The mean annualised returns in 
excess of the risk-free rate of return of each of the four portfolios (0 Score, 1 Score, 2 
Score, 3 Score) are illustrated in Table 18. It is noticeable that these basic return 
statistics suggest that the portfolio of completely reporting companies (Score 3) 
strongly outperforms the portfolio constructed from incomplete reporting companies 
(Score 0). As can be seen from Table 18, the number of companies in these two 
portfolios is low, yet still sufficiently high to ensure that equal-weighted portfolio 
results are not driven by individual companies’ performance. 
 
As described in chapter 3.4 Absolute Levels of Emissions, portfolios constructed to 
test the hypothesis concerning absolute levels of GHG-emissions as a proxy for 
climate change induced systematic risk follow the portfolio categorization rules of 
Fama and French (1995). Based on their absolute emission levels, companies in 
sample B are arranged in three portfolios: The first portfolio consists of companies 
with the highest 30% of reported absolute levels of GHG-emissions in sample B 
(High GHG). Companies reporting absolute levels of reported GHG-emissions that 
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fall within the medium 40% of GHG-emissions reported are classified as medium 
emitters and allotted to the second portfolio (Medium GHG). The final portfolio (Low 
GHG) consists of those companies in sample B with the lowest 30% of absolute 
levels of reported emissions. It is noticeable form Table 18 that based on mean 
annualised returns in excess of the risk-free rate of return, the High GHG-portfolio 
strongly outperforms the Low GHG-portfolio, with regard to both equal- and value-
weighted returns. It is of further interest to note that with an equal amount of 
companies, the market capitalisation of the High GHG portfolio is more than twice as 
big, thus underlining the need to control portfolio performance for company size. 
 
Following the same rule for portfolio formation, three portfolios based on GHG-
efficiency, expressed as the ratio of net income to absolute amounts of reported 
emissions (cf. chapter 4.3.5 Other Indicators), are created to test the respective 
hypothesis (cf. chapter 3.5 GHG-efficiency). The first portfolio (High GHG-
efficiency) consists of companies with a GHG-efficiency that falls within the highest 
30% of reported levels of GHG-efficiency in sample B. A second portfolio (Medium 
GHG-efficiency) consists of those companies with a reported GHG-efficiency that is 
in the medium 40% of reported levels of GHG-efficiency, while a third portfolio is 
formed with those companies that reported a GHG-efficiency that falls within the 
lowest 30% of GHG-efficiency in sample B (Low GHG-efficiency). Table 18 
indicates that based on mean annualised returns in excess of the risk-free rate of 
return, the High GHG-efficiency portfolio strongly outperforms the Low GHG-
efficiency portfolio, in terms of both equal- and value-weighted returns. 
 
The final proxy for climate change induced systematic risk is affiliation with high 
carbon industries (cf. chapter 3.6 High Carbon Industries). To test the hypothesis 
concerning affiliation with high carbon industries, again, two mutually exclusive 
portfolios are constructed. Companies in sample A that are affiliated with a high 
carbon industry are allocated to one portfolio (High carbon industry) and companies 
that are not affiliated with a high carbon industry to another one (Low carbon 
industry). Based on mean annualised excess returns the High carbon industry 
portfolio strongly outperforms the Low carbon industry portfolio, in terms of both 
equal- and value-weighted returns (see Table 18). However as discussed, no 
preliminary conclusion should be drawn with regard to market efficiency or the 
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hypotheses developed, as these portfolio returns are not adjusted for risk and factors 
generally accepted to explain stock market performance are not controlled for. 
 
5.3.2 Long-short Trading Strategy 
A supplementary trading strategy is applied in the testing of all hypotheses. This 
trading strategy consists of buying the stocks in one of the mutually exclusive 
portfolios (going long) while selling the stocks in the other portfolio (going short). 
These so called long-short portfolios are constructed by subtracting the monthly 
returns (cf. chapter 5.1 CAPM) of the portfolio that is bought, e.g. Reporting GHG, 
from the excess return of the portfolio which is sold, e.g. Not reporting GHG (John & 
Miller, 1996). The result of this subtraction is regressed on the C4FM extended with 
industry effects. As a result, it is possible to obtain the performance of portfolios 
based on a long-short trading strategy while controlling for factors generally known 
to explain stock performance and industry effects.  
 
Long-short trading allows illustrating whether an active investor taking advantage of 
performance differences between the mutually exclusive portfolios can generate 
abnormal returns. As hypothesised for the buy-and-hold strategy discussed above, in 
an efficient market, long-short trading should not result in economically significant 
risk-adjusted abnormal returns. 
5.4 Tests of Robustness 
Different tests of robustness are carried out to verify the validity of results obtained. 
First, additional portfolios are formed that allow excluding the possibility that results 
obtained with absolute levels of GHG-emissions are driven by incompletely reported 
GHG-emissions data. Second, the C4FM extended with industry variables is 
complemented with factors that allow controlling for changes in the price of oil and 
carbon, as well as the impact of the financial crisis. These additional control variables 
(ACV) are included in the analysis to determine whether results are driven by 
exposure to these variables rather than climate change induced systematic risk. 
Furthermore, to eliminate the possibility that the timeliness of reported data 
significantly impacts results, portfolios are created in June of each year and, in a final 
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test of robustness, with GHG-emissions data from year t-2. Each of the tests of 
robustness is briefly described in the following paragraphs. 
 
5.4.1 Incompleteness of GHG-emissions Data 
As described in chapter 4.4.2 Completeness of Corporate GHG-disclosure, 
controlling for the incompleteness of reported emissions data is important to ensure 
that results obtained from testing the hypotheses concerning absolute levels of GHG-
emissions and GHG-efficiency are not driven by incompletely reporting companies. 
To that end, the score of a company on the Disclosure Completeness Index (cf. 
chapter 4.2.1 Collection of GHG-emissions Data) is divided by the sum of all scores 
of companies on the Disclosure Completeness Index in a respective portfolio at 
month t. The resulting disclosure completeness weight is multiplied with the returns 
of the respective stocks in the portfolio. The continuously compounded monthly 
return of an equal-weighted portfolio is then generated by computing the natural 
logarithm of the sum of the disclosure-weighted returns of all stocks in the portfolio.  
 
As a result, the returns of stocks in the respective portfolio are weighted according to 
the completeness of their GHG-emissions reporting. The higher the score of a 
company on the Disclosure Completeness Index, the more weight its returns are given 
in the construction of the respective portfolio returns. Consequently, the returns of a 
portfolio constructed from absolute levels of GHG-emissions and weighted by 
disclosure completeness in the C4FM, as well as the returns of portfolios constructed 
from different levels of GHG-efficiency and weighted by disclosure completeness, 
cannot be primarily driven by companies that report GHG-emissions in an incomplete 
manner. The mean annualised excess returns of the portfolios constructed with 
absolute levels of GHG-emissions and GHG-efficiency shown in Table 18 and the 
corresponding portfolios that have been weighted according to disclosure 
completeness respectively (see Table 19) show few differences. Mean annualised 
excess returns thus suggest that incompletely reporting companies do not primarily 
drive the returns of the respective portfolios. 
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Table 19: Annualised excess portfolio returns weighted by completeness 
 
 
5.4.2 Oil Price 
As discussed in chapter 4.4 Understanding Sample Characteristics, GHG-emissions 
mainly stem from energy use. Consequently, an additional control variable 
representing changes in the price of oil is introduced in the extended C4FM to 
determine if results are driven by a portfolios exposure to changes in oil prices, rather 
than climate change induced systematic risk. As a test of robustness, the natural 
logarithm of the change in the monthly crude oil price (cf. chapter 4.2.2 Collection of 
other data) in Euro per barrel as of the first of each month at t-1 from January 2005 to 
December 2009 is included in the C4FM that has been extended with industry effects. 
If the exposure on the resulting factor (Oil) is insignificant in the regression, portfolio 
results are not significantly affected by oil price changes. If the exposure on the 
resulting factor is significant and positive (negative), portfolio returns are positively 
(negatively) correlated with changes in the price of oil. 
 
5.4.3 Carbon Price 
As discussed in chapter 3.1 European Emissions Trading Scheme, changes in the 
price of carbon have been found to impact the stock performance of specific 
companies. Consequently, to ensure results are driven by proxies of climate change 
induced systematic risk rather than changes in the price of carbon, a corresponding 
additional control variable is introduced in the extended C4FM. More specifically, the 
Portfolio
Mean SD Mean SD
Absolute levels of GHG-emissions
High GHG / weighted -Rf 9.53% 0.20   7.51% 0.19   
Medium GHG / weighted -Rf 2.59% 0.19   1.74% 0.17   
Low GHG / weighted -Rf 1.76% 0.19   2.37% 0.18   
Level of GHG-efficiency
High GHG-efficiency / weighted -Rf 2.46% 0.17   1.92% 0.15   
Medium GHG-efficiency / weighted -Rf 5.81% 0.18   4.95% 0.17   
Low GHG-efficiency / weighted -Rf 7.25% 0.23   5.69% 0.21   
Annualised excess returns
EW VW
Notes: This table reports the annualised returns of the respective portfolios 
weighted by disclosure completeness and in excess of the risk free rate of return 
Rf. The first column depicts the mean and standard deviation (SD) of the equal 
weighted (EW) and value-weighted (VW) annualised average excess returns 
respectively. 
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natural logarithm of the change in the monthly price of EU ETS emissions allowances 
as of the end of each month at t-1 is included in the C4FM that has been extended 
with industry effects. If the exposure on the resulting factor (Carbon) is insignificant 
in the regression, portfolio results are not significantly affected by changes in the 
price of carbon. If the exposure on the resulting factor is significant and positive 
(negative), portfolio returns are positively (negatively) correlated with changes in the 
price of carbon. Due to data availability (cf. chapter 4.2.2 Collection of Other Data) 
the respective regressions only cover the time period from June 2005 to December 
2009, which reduces the statistical power of the regressions and shifts the period of 
analysis into comparatively more months of financial market crisis. 
 
5.4.4 Financial Market Crisis 
In an additional test of robustness, the effect of financial market crisis is controlled 
for. Following Hoepner and Zeum (2009) an additional control variable for financial 
market crisis is included in the extended C4FM, which corresponds to the 
accumulated drawdown of the stock market at month t. This control variable is coded 
zero in each month in which the market return Rmt is above the risk free return Rft. If 
the market return Rmt is below the risk free return Rft, the respective month is defined 
as a month of financial market crisis and the control variable corresponds to the 
absolute value of accumulated continuously compounded stock market excess return 
since the last month coded zero. The resulting factor is multiplied by -1 for ease of 
interpretation and introduced in the C4FM that has been extended with industry 
effects. If the exposure on the resulting factor (Crisis) is insignificant in the 
regression, portfolio results are not significantly affected by months of financial 
market crisis. If the exposure on the resulting factor is significant and positive 
(negative), the portfolio outperforms (underperforms) the market in months of 
financial market crisis.  
 
5.4.5 Portfolio Creation in June 
In this study, portfolios are formed in January of each respective year. Fama and 
French built portfolios in June of year t with the motivation to be sure that all 
accounting data for the year ending in December of year t-1 has been published in 
June of year t. While this rule of thumb applies to American companies, it does not 
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apply accordingly to European companies. For example, the financial year of almost 
half of the TOP 500 UK companies does not correspond to the calendar year (FTSE 
Group, 2011a). Nevertheless, to eliminate the possibility that the timeliness of 
reported data strongly impacts results of this study, portfolios are created in June of 
each year t and regressed on the extended C4FM. For the construction of the HML 
factor in the C4FM for this test of robustness, book values are taken from year t-1 
instead of year t-2. Unfortunately, results of these regressions are consequently also 
likely to be influenced by this change in the calculation of HML and the fact that the 
time period under investigation is shortened to 55 months (June 2005 – December 
2009), i.e. is consequently proportionally more prone to the months of financial 
market crisis. Furthermore, results are likely to be impacted by changes in the 
composition of the portfolios, as some of the FTSE AWI constituents, as gathered 
according to the constituents list of January of each year, are no longer in existence in 
June of the respective year.  
 
5.4.6 Portfolio Creation with GHG-emissions from t-2 
The final test of robustness relates to the timeliness of GHG-emissions data. As this 
research has shown, there are huge discrepancies among companies with regard to the 
time they take to publish GHG-emissions data for a respective year (cf. chapter 4.3.3 
Timeliness of GHG-emissions reporting). To account for this circumstance, portfolios 
constructed on the basis of absolute levels of GHG-emissions and GHG-efficiency 
are formed with GHG-emissions data from year t-2 in this test of robustness. This 
reduces the period under investigation to 48 months from January 2006 to December 
2009. As discussed in chapter 4.3.3 Timeliness of GHG-emissions reporting, the date 
of publication of absolute levels of emissions data is not expected to have a 
significant impact on results, as GHG-emission levels are fairly stable. For example, 
during the five year period studied for this research only 37 companies, i.e. 12% of 
the reporting companies, migrated from one portfolio of absolute levels of emissions 
to another one. Unfortunately, results of this test of robustness are also likely to be 
influenced by the accompanying changes in portfolio composition and the shortened 
period of analysis, which shifts the period under investigation to longer periods of 
financial market crisis. 
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Chapter 6 
Regression Results 
In this chapter, regression results are presented for the portfolios constructed in 
chapter 5.3 Portfolio construction using the methodology and the corresponding tests 
of robustness introduced in chapter 5 Methodology. Regression result are presented 
and discussed with regard to the respective portfolios constructed based on proxies of 
climate change induced risk, i.e. affiliation with the EU ETS (chapter 6.1 European 
Emissions Trading Scheme), the existence of disclosure of GHG-emissions (chapter 
6.2 Existence of Disclosure of GHG-emissions), the completeness of such disclosures 
(chapter 6.3 Disclosure Completeness), the absolute level GHG-emissions of 
companies (chapter 6.4 Absolute Levels of GHG-emissions) and their GHG-efficiency 
(6.5 GHG-efficiency), as well as affiliation with high carbon industries (chapter 6.6 
High Carbon Industries). The aim of this chapter is to accept or reject the hypotheses 
developed in chapter 3 Hypotheses Development based on the results of the 
regressions performed. 
 
The discussion of results in the remainder of this chapter focusses on regression 
results obtained with equal-weighted portfolio returns, which have been regressed on 
equal-weighted market returns and control variables, as well as equal-weighted SMB, 
HML and UMD factors. The focus is laid on results obtained with equal-weighted 
portfolio returns for several reasons: For example, equal-weighted portfolio returns 
are not tilted toward the larger companies in the sample, whose performance is 
considered as more relevant when portfolio returns are value-weighted. Thus, using 
equal-weighted returns ensures that portfolio returns are not driven by the 
performance and specific risk-characteristics of a few large companies in the 
portfolio. When investigating market efficiency, it appears reasonable to attribute the 
same relevance to every company in the portfolio irrespective of company size.  
 
A common argument for using value-weighted returns is that any abnormal return 
found with equal-weighted returns may be driven by micro-caps and model problems 
relating to micro-caps (Fama, 1998). This argument does however not apply in the 
context of this study, as the sample used only includes mid-size and large-cap 
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companies (cf. chapter 4.1 Sample Selection). Consequently, this common argument, 
together with the notion that micro-caps hamper market efficiency as they suffer from 
information shortage and reduced analyst following, do not apply for this research. 
Furthermore, Loughran and Ritter (2000) evidenced that in some cases multifactor 
models, such as the C4FM, may actually underestimate abnormal returns when value-
weighted returns are used. Finally, the arguments that value-weighted returns are 
more commonly used by investors (Derwall et al., 2005) and better reflect the “total 
wealth effects experienced by investors” (Fama, 1998, p. 296) can be neglected in the 
context of this study, as it is not primarily focussed on investor habits or wealth 
effects, but the level of market efficiency towards the climate change induced 
systematic risk of companies. Nevertheless, in order to be transparent with regard to 
the effect of alternative weighting procedures, all regressions have also been 
performed with value-weighted returns (cf. Appendix A Regression Results: Value-
weighted Returns). Furthermore, equal-weighted portfolio returns have been 
regressed on value-weighted market returns and industry control variables, as well as 
value-weighted SMB, HML and UMD factors (cf. Appendix B Regression Results: 
Equal-weighted Returns on Value-weighted Factors). Reference is made in the text to 
these alternative weighting procedures to illustrate their effect on results.  
 
In the remainder of this chapter, regression result are presented and discussed with 
respect to each of the hypotheses developed. To allow for an effortless 
comprehensibility of results, all regression models and tests of robustness for a 
respective portfolio are summarized in one table and the consolidated presentation of 
these results follows Kempf and Osthoff (2007).  
6.1 European Emissions Trading Scheme 
With regard to the EU ETS as a proxy for climate change induced systematic risk, it 
was hypothesised in chapter 3.1 European Emissions Trading Scheme that in an 
efficient market there is no difference in risk-adjusted returns between portfolios 
constructed from companies that are affiliated and those that are not affiliated with 
the EU ETS (Hypothesis 1a). 
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6.1.1 Regression Results 
In the CAPM, as illustrated in Table 20, a portfolio constructed from companies that 
are part of the EU ETS generates an abnormal annualised risk-adjusted alpha of 
3.92% (at a significance level of 10%, i.e. p<0.10). At the same time, the Not in 
EU ETS portfolio generates an annualised risk-adjusted loss of -1.77% (p<0.10). At 
an adjusted R-squared of 96% and 99% respectively, these results are deemed highly 
reliable. As there is a difference in risk-adjusted returns, these initial results suggest 
that the market might be inefficient in pricing climate change induced systematic risk 
as proxied by the EU ETS. Interestingly, the systematic risk of both portfolios, 
depicted in the table by the caption (Rm – Rf), is essentially identical. This fact 
supports the notion that the market does not incorporate an increased level of 
systematic risk of companies affiliated with the EU ETS into the traditional beta 
coefficient. At the same time, however, as the EU ETS portfolio outperforms the 
market on a risk-adjusted basis, these initial results also hint at the fact that market 
participants take note of the value-relevance of information on a company’s 
affiliation with the EU ETS. Nevertheless, before making any conclusion on the level 
of market efficiency, factors generally known to explain abnormal financial market 
performance must be controlled for by means of the C4FM.  
 
Table 20 shows that results obtained in the C4FM are very similar to results obtained 
in the CAPM. In the C4FM the EU ETS portfolio generates a slightly reduced 
annualised alpha of 3.53% (p<0.10, adjusted R-squared of 96%).31 At the same time, 
the loss of the Not in EU ETS portfolio slightly reduces to -1.59% (p<0.10, adjusted 
R-squared of 99%). The EU ETS shows a significant negative exposure on the SMB 
factor, suggesting that it contains companies with large market capitalization (as 
evidenced in chapter 5.3 Portfolio Construction). The exposure on the SMB factor of 
the Not in EU ETS portfolio is significant and positive, suggesting that it contains  
  
                                            
31    When returns are value-weighted the EU ETS portfolio also generates an 
annualised alpha of 2.92% (p<0.10, adjusted R-squared of 97%). See Appendix 
A.1 European Emission Trading Scheme. When equal-weighted portfolio returns 
are regressed on value-weighted factors the EU ETS portfolio generates an 
annualised alpha of 3.62% (p<0.10, adjusted R-squared of 97%). See Appendix 
B.1 European Emission Trading Scheme. 
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Table 20: Regression results: European Emissions Trading Scheme 
 
 
companies with a smaller market capitalization. These significant exposures on the 
SMB factor illustrate that the performance of both portfolios was corrected for the 
historical return differences between small-cap and large-cap companies (cf. chapter 
5.2 C4FM). The HML factor is insignificant for both portfolios, i.e. none of the 
portfolios shows significant exposure to the difference in returns between companies 
with a high book to market ratio and those with a low book to market ratio. The EU 
ETS portfolio shows a significant negative loading on the UMD factor. Companies 
affiliated with the EU ETS thus performed poorly with regard to their historical stock 
performance. The coefficient on the UMD factor is significant and positive for the 
Not in EU ETS portfolio, suggesting that these companies performed well 
historically. The significant exposures to the UMD factor illustrate that the returns of 
both portfolios were corrected for the known return differences between winner and 
loser stocks (cf. chapter 5.2 C4FM). 
 
Portfolio α (Rm-Rf) SMB HML UMD ACV Adj. R2
EU ETS
CAPM 3.916% * 1.004 *** 0.957
C4FM 3.529% * 1.046 *** -0.304 ** -0.017 -0.181 ** 0.964
C4FM / June 1.103% 0.988 *** -0.430 *** 0.198 *** -0.139 *** 0.973
C4FM + Carbon 1.536% 1.001 *** -0.402 *** 0.201 * -0.151 ** -0.000 0.965
C4FM + Oil 3.026% * 1.025 *** -0.320 ** 0.025 -0.153 ** 0.036 *** 0.967
C4FM + Crisis 6.401% *** 0.986 *** -0.193 * -0.056 -0.195 *** -0.034 ** 0.967
Not in EU ETS
CAPM -1.768% * 0.999 *** 0.991
C4FM -1.590% * 0.979 *** 0.143 ** 0.008 0.082 ** 0.992
C4FM / June -0.348% 0.974 *** 0.312 *** -0.038 -0.011 0.992
C4FM + Carbon -0.667% 0.975 *** 0.309 *** -0.042 -0.014 0.000 0.987
C4FM + Oil -1.360% 0.989 *** 0.150 ** -0.011 0.069 ** -0.017 *** 0.993
C4FM + Crisis -2.929% *** 1.007 *** 0.091 ** 0.026 0.089 *** 0.016 ** 0.993
Long EU ETS -
Short Not in EU ETS 5.119% * 0.067 -0.447 ** -0.025 -0.264 0.155
Notes: This table reports regression results for EU ETS and Not in EU ETS portfolios using monthly equal-
weighted returns and equal-weighted SMB, HML and UMD factors. Rows represent the different models 
used, i.e. CAPM, C4FM, as well as the tests of robustness of results. Tests of robustness include portfolio 
creation in June (/ June) and the inclusion of additional control variables (ACV) for changes in the price of 
carbon (Carbon) and oil (Oil), as well as financial market crisis (Crisis). Columns show the annualised alpha 
in per cent, beta estimations (Rm - Rf), coefficient exposure on the SMB, HML and UMD factors and ACV, 
as well as the adjusted R-squared. ***, ** and * indicate the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level 
respectively. Coefficient covariances and standard errors are made heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
consistent based on Newey and West (1987). 
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The persistent outperformance of the EU ETS portfolio in a buy-and-hold strategy of 
3.53%, on the basis of risk-adjusted returns after controlling for factors generally 
known to explain stock performance, confirms that the market is not efficiently 
pricing this proxy for climate change induced systematic risk. If an investor applies a 
long-short trading strategy (cf. chapter 5.3.1 Long-short trading strategy), the 
inefficiency established becomes even more obvious. As shown at the bottom of 
Table 20, a trading strategy that goes long in (i.e. buys) companies affiliated with the 
EU ETS and short in (i.e. sells) companies not affiliated with the EU ETS generates 
an annualised alpha of 5.12% (p<0.10).32 In these long-short portfolio regressions, the 
coefficients on beta, SMB, HML and UMD show the differences of exposure of the 
long versus the short portfolio. For example, the Long EU ETS – Short Not in EU 
ETS portfolio shows significant positive exposure on the SMB factor, as the Not in 
EU ETS portfolio contains smaller companies. Furthermore, the adjusted R-squared 
of long-short portfolio regressions cannot be interpreted analogously to those of the 
previous models. All long-short portfolios presented in this study show an F-test 
probability of under 0.05, i.e. the models are statistically significant as a whole. 
 
As discussed in chapter 4.2 Data Collection, the information used in this research was 
obtained costlessly from publicly available sources. Nevertheless, analogously to Ball 
(1994) it is argued that there are costs involved in the gathering of information for 
this proxy for climate change induced systematic risk, which relate to the time 
invested in producing the information for each of the companies in the sample of this 
study. These information costs, as well as hypothetical transaction costs, are 
accounted for in this test of market efficiency by assuming a rather high annual total 
expense ratio of 1.50% for carrying out the investment strategy (cf. Geczy et al., 
2005; Renneboog et al., 2008b; Statman, 2000). As described in chapter 2.2.7 Review 
of Studies, to that end the annual total expense ratio is split into monthly expenses and 
deducted from the monthly portfolio returns of the EU ETS portfolio and the Not in 
EU ETS portfolio. Subsequently an updated long-short portfolio is constructed (cf. 
                                            
32    Annualised returns of 5.52% (p<0.01) for the Long EU ETS – Short Not in EU 
ETS portfolio are found when portfolio returns are value-weighted (see Appendix 
A.1 European Emission Trading Scheme) and 6.75% (p<0.05) when equal-
weighted portfolio returns are regressed on value-weighed factors (see Appendix 
B.1 European Emission Trading Scheme) respectively. 
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chapter 5.3.2 Long-short Trading Strategy) and the regression is repeated. As 
expenses are deducted from both portfolios used to construct the updated long-short 
portfolio, the effect of the expense ratio on long-short portfolios is irrelevant in 
economic terms, but might impact the statistical significance of the results obtained. 
 
The annualised alpha of the long-short portfolio of 5.12% found is statistically 
significant even when an annual total expense ratio of 1.50% is accounted for. The 
persistent risk-adjusted abnormal returns identified thus not only cover transaction 
and information costs and consequently represent a market inefficiency not only in 
the original version of EMH of Fama (1970), but also in Jensen’s less strong but 
economically more reasonable definition of EMH. As discussed in chapter 2.1.3 
Three Conditions for an Efficient Market, the market is argued to be efficient in 
Jensen’s version of EMH when the expected risk-adjusted returns of an investment 
strategy for individuals are consumed by its transaction and information costs (Fama, 
1991; Jensen, 1978). In summary, it is consequently deduced that between January 
2005 and December 2009 the financial market was inefficient in pricing climate 
change induced systematic risk of European companies as proxied by a company’s 
affiliation with the EU ETS. This result is obtained at a rather low yet conventional 
confidence level of 10%, but confirmed at higher statistical significance levels in 
regressions with alternative weighting procedures of portfolio returns (see 
Appendices A.1 European Emission Trading Scheme and B.1 European Emission 
Trading Scheme). Hypothesis 1a is consequently rejected, as the regression evidenced 
differences in risk-adjusted returns between portfolios constructed from companies 
that are affiliated and those that are not affiliated with the EU ETS. At a statistical 
power level of 0.96 at all relevant significance levels and a medium effect size of 0.30 
(Cohen, 1988) the possibility that wrong conclusions are derived for the interpretation 
of results with regard to any of the hypotheses under examination in this study is 
regarded as small. A post-hoc analysis of statistical power was carried out using Faul, 
Erdfelder, Buchner, and Lang (2009). 
 
It was argued in chapter 3.1 European Emissions Trading Scheme that companies that 
are affiliated with the EU ETS show higher climate change induced systematic risk. 
Consequently, there is a risk-based explanation for the outperformance of the EU 
ETS portfolio evidenced here. As discussed in chapter 2.1.4 Methodologies and 
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Findings, opponents of the EMH tend to interpret any abnormal risk-adjusted returns 
as evidence for market inefficiencies, while advocates of the EMH are inclined to 
point towards the Joint Hypothesis Problem and search for a risk-based explanation 
of the abnormal returns identified. If there is a risk-based explanation, and the 
abnormal returns exist in different markets and periods, the abnormal returns can be 
attributed to shortcomings in the underlying asset pricing model to price the 
respective risk correctly and may therefore be consistent with the basic notion of the 
EMH according to which returns compensate for risk (Bodie et al., 2008). 
Consequently, if the abnormal risk-adjusted returns found here were to continue to 
exist outside of this sample and the period studied in this research, the increased 
systematic risk related to the EU ETS might qualify as an additional risk premium at 
some point in the future. Results found in this research could then be aligned with the 
EMH, according to which investors are rewarded for taking risk. However, as 
discussed in chapter 2.1.4 Methodologies and findings, further research is needed 
before any conclusion of this magnitude can be made and consequently any abnormal 
risk-adjusted return found in this study is interpreted as market inefficiency (cf. 
chapter 2.1.6 Application of EMH in this Research). In fact, based on the following 
test of robustness, the possibility that the abnormal risk-adjusted returns found may 
not occur outside of the period analysed in this study cannot be excluded. 
 
6.1.2 Tests of Robustness 
The first test of robustness refers to the creation of the respective portfolios in June 
instead of January of each respective year. When the EU ETS and Not in EU ETS 
portfolios are formed in June, no significant abnormal returns are identified (see 
Table 20).
33
 This finding may be due to the timeliness of financial data, the different 
composition of the portfolio or the shortened period of analysis to 55 month (cf. 
chapter 5.4.5 Portfolio Creation in June). The shortened period shifts the period 
under investigation into a comparatively longer period of financial market crisis. The 
significant negative loading on the control variable for financial crisis suggest that the 
                                            
33    Note that when this regression is performed with equal-weighted returns on 
value-weighted factors (see Appendix B.1 European Emission Trading Scheme), 
alpha is almost significant at p = 0.104 (unreported) and an adjusted R-squared of 
97%. 
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EU ETS portfolio underperforms the market in months of financial market crisis (cf. 
chapter 5.4.4 Financial Market Crisis). Consequently, it is not surprising that the EU 
ETS portfolio loses its outperformance when months of financial market crisis 
represent a larger share of the period analysed. The Not in EU ETS portfolio shows a 
significant positive loading on the crisis factor, i.e. it outperforms in months of 
financial market crisis. Consequently, the underperformance of the Not in EU ETS 
portfolio is reduced when the period of analysis is shifted towards more months of 
financial crisis. In conclusion, while the crisis factor gives some explanation for the 
disappearance of the out- and underperformance when portfolios are constructed in 
June, the possibility that the timeliness of financial data and the period under analysis 
impacts results cannot be excluded.  
 
The additional control variable of changes in the price of carbon is not significant for 
the EU ETS or the Not in EU ETS portfolio, i.e. there is no significant exposure of 
portfolio returns to the changes in the price of carbon. As this regression is also 
shortened to a period of 55 months (cf. chapter 5.4.3 Carbon Price), the 
disappearance of the significance of alpha can probably be attributed to the shift of 
the period under analysis towards more months of financial market crisis. The fact 
that the adjusted R-squared of this regression is lower compared to that of the 
regression when both portfolios are created in June confirms that the change in 
carbon prices does not help explaining the performance of the portfolios. When the 
change in monthly oil prices is included in the regression, it shows that the exposure 
on this additional control variable is significant and positive (negative) for the EU 
ETS (Not in EU ETS) portfolio. Controlling for the effect of changes in oil prices 
does however not significantly affect the out- or underperformance of the respective 
portfolios.34 In summary, with regard to the additional control variables of changes in 
the price of carbon and oil, results are consequently argued to be robust. 
 
                                            
34    Note that the alpha coefficient of the Not in EU ETS portfolio in the respective 
regression is almost significant at p = 0.1047 (unreported), i.e. the addition of the 
control factor does not significantly influence portfolio performance. 
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6.2 Existence of Disclosure of GHG-emissions 
The second proxy of climate change induced systematic risk applied in this study is 
the existence of disclosure of GHG-emissions on at least the majority of corporate 
activities. With regard to this proxy, it was hypothesised in chapter 3.2 Existence of 
Disclosure of GHG-Emissions that in an efficient market there is no difference in 
risk-adjusted returns between portfolios constructed from companies that disclose 
GHG-emissions and those that do not disclose GHG-emissions (Hypothesis 2a). 
 
6.2.1 Regression Results 
As shown in Table 21, in the CAPM a portfolio constructed from companies that 
report GHG-emissions (Reporting GHG) outperforms the portfolio constructed from 
companies that do not report GHG-emissions (Not reporting GHG). The Reporting 
GHG portfolio generates an annualised equal-weighted return of 2.15%, while the 
Not reporting GHG portfolio generates a loss of -2.89%. Both results are deemed 
highly reliable at a statistically significance level of 1% (p<0.01) and an adjusted R-
squared of over 99%. The beta coefficient of the Not reporting GHG portfolio is 
higher, i.e. companies that do not report GHG-emissions to the public show an 
elevated level of systematic risk, in line with the arguments presented earlier (cf. 
chapter 3.2 Existence of Disclosure of GHG-Emissions). However, given the fact that 
there is a difference in risk-adjusted returns, these initial results hint at the fact that 
the market may not be pricing the existence of disclosure of GHG-emissions as a 
proxy for climate change induced systematic risk efficiently. Nevertheless, before any 
conclusion can be drawn, factors generally accepted to impact returns, as well as the 
impact of the industry compositions of the respective portfolios, have to be controlled 
for. 
 
In the C4FM, the results of the GHG reporting portfolio are very similar to those in 
the CAPM. The Reporting GHG portfolio generates an annualised alpha of 2.15% 
(p<0.01, adjusted R-squared of over 99%). The significant exposure to the SMB 
factor is slightly negative for this portfolio, suggesting that the Reporting GHG 
portfolio contains companies with a larger market capitalization (as also evidenced in 
chapter 4.4.1 Existence of Corporate GHG-disclosure). In the C4FM the loss of the 
Not reporting GHG portfolio increases to -3.08% (p<0.01, adjusted R-squared of over 
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99%).35 The Not reporting GHG portfolio shows a significant positive exposure to the 
SMB factor, i.e. returns of this portfolio were also corrected for the historical return 
differences between small-cap and large-cap companies (cf. chapter 5.2 C4FM). The 
portfolio also shows a small significant and positive exposure on the UMD factor, 
which implies that companies that did not report GHG-emissions performed slightly 
better historically and portfolio returns were corrected for the return differences 
between winner and loser stocks. 
 
As the two portfolios show differences in industry composition (cf. chapter 5.2.1 
Controlling for Industry Effects) and reporting companies are more likely to be 
affiliated with high carbon industries (cf. chapter 4.4.1 Existence of corporate GHG-
disclosure), industry effects are controlled for by means of the C4FM extended for 
industry effects. As it can be seen in Table 21, the abnormal annualised return of the 
Reporting GHG portfolio reduces to 1.72% (p<0.01) when industry effects are 
controlled for. For example, as to be expected (cf. chapter 5.2.1 Controlling for 
industry effects), the returns of Reporting GHG portfolio are corrected for its 
significant positive exposure to the outperforming Utilities industry (ICB 7000), 
which is a high carbon industry with 76% of companies being affiliated with the EU 
ETS. When controlled for industry effects, the Not reporting GHG portfolio generates 
a slightly reduced annualised loss of -2.62% (p<0.01). The adjusted R-squared of 
both models remains stable when industry variable are added. This fact supports the 
notion that the industry variables have explanatory power for the regression, as the 
adjusted R-squared is a measure of model fit that punishes for the inclusion of 
additional variables in a model, i.e. it would reduce if the additional eight industry 
variables would not have significant explanatory power. 
 
                                            
35    Note that an investment strategy that goes long in reporting companies and short 
in companies that do not disclosure GHG-emissions generates an annualised 
alpha of 5.23% (p<0.01) in the traditional C4FM when portfolio returns are 
equal-weighted (unreported).  
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0.016
 
-0.001 
 
0.997
N
ot reporting G
H
G
C
A
PM
-2.887%
***
1.044
***
0.992
C
4FM
-3.078%
***
0.977
***
0.178
***
0.078
0.005
***
0.995
C
4FM
 + Industry
-2.615%
***
0.995
***
0.101
**
0.064
**
-0.021 
 
-0.079 
*
-0.098 
 
-0.226 
 
-0.191 
 
-0.063 
 
-0.183 
 
-0.103 
*
-0.094 
 
-0.021 
 
0.995
C
4FM
 + Industry / G
H
G
 t-2
-2.119%
**
1.072
***
0.034
 
-0.072 
 
-0.057 
 
-0.131 
***-0.149 
*
-0.309 
*
-0.320 
**
-0.165 
***-0.314 
**
-0.134 
**
-0.201 
**
-0.042 
 
0.995
C
4FM
 + Industry / June
-0.983%
 
1.082
***
-0.069 
 
-0.043 
 
-0.074 
 
0.057
*
0.198
***
0.381
***
0.293
***
0.058
 
0.454
***
0.028
 
0.104
*
0.141
***
0.992
C
4FM
 + Industry + C
arbon 
-0.526%
 
1.119
***
-0.131 
 
-0.059 
 
-0.144 
 
0.010
 
0.129
*
0.257
**
0.102
 
-0.061 
 
0.317
***-0.012 
 
0.024
 
0.121
**
0.001
 
0.989
C
4FM
 + Industry + O
il 
-2.596%
***
0.990
***
0.085
*
0.070
**
-0.029 
 
-0.090 
*
-0.110 
 
-0.230 
 
-0.213 
 
-0.062 
 
-0.187 
 
-0.107 
*
-0.111 
 
-0.028 
 
0.012
 
0.995
C
4FM
 + Industry + C
risis
-2.615%
***
0.995
***
0.101
**
0.064
**
-0.021 
 
-0.079 
*
-0.098 
 
-0.226 
 
-0.191 
 
-0.063 
 
-0.183 
 
-0.103 
 
-0.094 
 
-0.021 
 
-0.000 
 
0.995
Long Reporting G
H
G
 -
Short N
ot Reporting G
H
G
4.338%
***
-0.000 
 
-0.151 
**
-0.073 
*
0.022
 
0.140
**
0.183
 
0.401
 
0.340
 
0.107
 
0.334
 
0.171
**
0.187
 
0.037
 
0.461
N
otes: This table reports regression results for R
eporting G
H
G
 and N
ot reporting G
H
G
 portfolios, as w
ell as the respective long-short portfolio, using m
onthly equal-w
eighted returns and equal-w
eighted SM
B
, 
H
M
L and U
M
D
 factors. R
ow
s represent the different m
odels used, i.e. C
A
PM
, C
4FM
, C
4FM
 controlled for industry effects, as w
ell as the tests of robustness of results. Tests of robustness include portfolio 
creation w
ith G
H
G
-data from
 t-2 (/ G
H
G
 t-2) and in June (/ June) and the introduction of additional control variables (A
C
V
) for changes in the price of carbon (C
arbon) and oil (O
il), as w
ell as financial m
arket 
crisis (C
risis). C
olum
ns show
 the annualised alpha in per cent, beta estim
ations (R
m
 - R
f), coefficient exposure on the SM
B
, H
M
L and U
M
D
 factors, as w
ell as on orthogonalised industry returns represented by 
their respective IC
B
 code. The rem
aining colum
ns show
 coefficient exposure on A
C
V
 and the adjusted R
-squared. ***, ** and * indicate the 1%
, 5%
 and 10%
 significance level respectively. C
oefficient 
covariances and standard errors are m
ade heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent based on N
ew
ey and W
est (1987). 
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The persistent difference in risk adjusted returns of the Reporting GHG portfolio and 
Not reporting GHG portfolio in the C4FM extended for industry effects suggests that 
the market is not efficiently pricing this proxy for climate change induced systematic 
risk. In fact, as depicted in Table 21, an investor that goes long in companies 
reporting GHG-emissions and short in companies not reporting GHG-emissions (cf. 
chapter 5.3.1 Long-short trading strategy) generates an annualised alpha of 4.34% 
(p<0.01).36 The annualised alpha of 4.34% is statistically significant even when a 
total expense ratio of 1.50% for carrying out the investment strategy is accounted for 
(cf. Geczy et al., 2005; Renneboog et al., 2008b).37 The total expense ratio accounts 
for hypothetical information and transaction costs (Ball, 1994). It is consequently 
deduced that between January 2005 and December 2009 the financial market did not 
price the climate change induced systematic risk of European companies as proxied 
by the existence of GHG-emissions disclosure by companies in an efficient way. This 
conclusion is valid for Fama’s original version, as well as Jensen’s less strong but 
economically more reasonable version of EMH, as risk-adjusted abnormal returns in 
excess of transaction and information costs can be obtained (cf. chapter 2.1.3 Three 
Conditions for an Efficient Market). Hypothesis 2a is consequently rejected. 
 
It was argued in chapter 3.2 Existence of disclosure of GHG-emissions that 
companies that do not report GHG-emissions show higher estimation and information 
risk. Consequently, there is no risk-based explanation for the outperformance of the 
Reporting GHG portfolio evidenced here. Since companies that report GHG-
                                            
36    These results are also found when equal-weighted returns are regressed on value-
weighted factors (see Appendix B.2 Existence of Disclosure of GHG-emissions), 
but not when both returns and factors are value-weighted (see Appendix A.2 
Existence of Disclosure of GHG-emissions). 
37    To that end, as explained above in chapter 6.1.1 Regression Results, the annual 
total expense ratio is split into monthly expenses and deducted from the monthly 
portfolio returns of the Reporting GHG and the Not reporting GHG portfolio. 
Subsequently an updated long-short portfolio is constructed and the regression is 
repeated. As expenses are deducted from both portfolios used to construct the 
long-short portfolio, the effect on long-short portfolios is economically 
irrelevant, but might have impacted the statistical significance of the results 
obtained. 
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emissions show positive abnormal returns, the market seems to value the positive 
effects of GHG-emissions in an inefficient way while disregarding the additional risk 
that non-reporting companies are exposed to. Investors in companies not reporting 
GHG-emissions are consequently not only not rewarded for taking on additional risk, 
but in fact penalised with a persistent financial loss.  
 
6.2.2 Tests of Robustness 
Tests of robustness largely confirm the results found in the main regressions. Results 
of the Reporting GHG portfolio are robust with regard to both the construction of the 
portfolio with GHG-emissions from year t-2 (cf. chapter 5.4.6 Portfolio creation with 
GHG-emissions from t-2) and in June of respective years. In both regressions, the 
Reporting GHG portfolio shows a significant positive outperformance in the range of 
the original results. Of the additional control variables none are significant, i.e. results 
of none of the portfolios are significantly exposed to changes in the price of carbon or 
oil, or the impact of the financial market crisis. However, when the Not reporting 
GHG portfolio is constructed in June of each of the respective years, no abnormal 
performance is identified. This effect is attributable to the timeliness of financial data 
and/or changes in portfolio composition (cf. chapter 5.4.5 Portfolio Creation in June). 
6.3 Disclosure Completeness 
With regard to the completeness of disclosures of GHG-emissions as a proxy for 
climate change induced systematic risk, it was hypothesised in chapter 3.3 Disclosure 
Completeness that in an efficient market there is no difference in risk-adjusted returns 
between portfolios constructed from companies that report complete and those that 
report incomplete GHG-emissions (Hypothesis 3a).  
 
As illustrated in chapter 4.2.2 Collection of Other Data, the completeness of GHG-
emissions reporting was classified according the score of a company on the 
Disclosure Completeness Index developed. Companies were allocated to four 
mutually exclusive portfolios (cf. chapter 5.3 Portfolio Construction) based on their 
respective score on the Disclosure Completeness Index. The 0 Score portfolio 
consequently contains companies with incomplete GHG-emissions reporting, for 
example a company reporting only scope 1 CO2-emissions for parts of manufacturing 
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activities. The 3 Score portfolio is constructed with companies that report complete 
GHG-emissions, i.e. scope 1 and 2 GHG-emissions for a group-wide reporting 
boundary. 
 
6.3.1 Regression Results 
As illustrated in Table 22, in the CAPM the 0 Score and the 2 Score portfolios do not 
show any significant outperformance. The 1 Score and 3 Score portfolios show a risk-
adjusted annualised alpha of 2.34% (p<0.05, adjusted R-squared of 98%) and 4.70% 
(p<0.05, adjusted R-squared of 92%) respectively. These initial results thus suggest 
that companies with higher reporting completeness tend to generate positive 
abnormal returns, i.e. the market does not price this information efficiently. 
 
Results obtained with the C4FM confirm these results. Again, the 0 Score and 2 
Score portfolios do not show any out- or underperformance at conventional 
significance levels, whereas 1 Score portfolio shows a minimally reduced risk-
adjusted annualised return of 2.29% (p<0.05, adjusted R-squared of 98%). The 
annualised alpha of the 3 Score portfolio increases to 5.37% (p<0.05, adjusted R-
squared of 93%) in the C4FM. The 3 Score portfolio shows a large significant 
negative exposure on the HML factor, suggesting that it contains growth stocks and 
that its performance was corrected for the historical performance differences between 
growth and value stocks. Interestingly, other portfolios show very little exposure to 
the size, value and momentum effect, suggesting that companies within the respective 
portfolios show little similarity in terms of size, book to market ratio and historical 
performance. 
 
When industry effects are controlled for, the 1 Score portfolio no longer generates 
abnormal returns (see Table 22). The initial results that companies with higher 
reporting completeness tend to generate positive abnormal returns are however 
reinforced. The 3 Score portfolio still shows a slightly reduced significant annualised 
return of 4.90% (p<0.05, adjusted R-squared of 94%). The outperformance of the 3 
Score portfolio is reduced, as this portfolio shows significant positive exposure to the 
Health Care industry (ICB 4000), an industry that performed exceptionally well in the   
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0 Score
C
A
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-1.097%
1.005
***
0.913
C
4FM
-1.336%
1.067
***
-0.262 
0.011
0.018
0.912
C
4FM
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-8.148%
***
1.035
***
-0.160 
0.200
**
0.287
*
0.021
0.231
0.396
0.375
0.072
-0.202 
-0.108 
0.494
**
0.135
0.955
C
4FM
 + Industry / G
H
G
 t-2
-11.312%
***
0.725
***
0.553
**
0.693
***
0.221
**
-0.623 
***-1.174 
***-2.424 
***-1.655 
***-0.538 
***-3.163 
***-0.656 
***-0.456 
 
-0.500 
**
0.944
C
4FM
 + Industry / June
-6.404%
***
1.104
***
-0.020 
 
0.119
 
0.228
 
0.253
**
0.862
***
1.547
***
1.364
***
0.485
***
1.098
***
0.293
***
1.101
***
0.369
***
0.950
C
4FM
 + Industry + C
arbon 
-5.930%
*
1.062
***
-0.039 
 
0.085
 
0.029
 
0.181
 
0.757
**
1.353
***
1.307
**
0.435
*
1.030
**
0.234
 
1.062
***
0.340
**
0.000
 
0.929
C
4FM
 + Industry + O
il 
-8.108%
***
1.024
***
-0.191 
 
0.213
**
0.271
 
-0.001 
 
0.206
 
0.390
 
0.333
 
0.074
 
-0.209 
 
-0.114 
 
0.460
*
0.120
 
0.023
 
0.955
C
4FM
 + Industry + C
risis
-5.172%
0.991
***
-0.113 
 
0.159
 
0.249
 
0.004
 
0.159
 
0.293
 
0.253
 
0.034
 
-0.295 
 
-0.159 
 
0.403
 
0.106
 
-0.030 
*
0.956
1 Score
C
A
PM
2.352%
**
0.970
***
0.984
C
4FM
2.285%
**
0.965
***
-0.015 
0.003
-0.035 
0.984
C
4FM
 + Industry
2.033%
 
0.964
***
-0.014 
 
0.005
 
-0.038 
 
0.027
 
-0.022 
 
0.009
 
0.114
 
-0.019 
 
0.010
 
-0.041 
 
0.076
 
0.014
 
0.984
C
4FM
 + Industry / G
H
G
 t-2
4.640%
***
0.916
***
-0.122 
 
0.094
*
0.132
**
0.259
***
0.332
**
0.659
*
0.674
***
0.266
**
0.811
***
0.165
 
0.391
***
0.148
 
0.981
C
4FM
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2.668%
***
0.919
***
0.147
**
0.024
 
0.058
 
-0.034 
 
-0.106 
*
-0.306 
**
-0.111 
 
-0.069 
 
-0.180 
*
-0.042 
 
-0.022 
 
-0.057 
 
0.989
C
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 + Industry + C
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2.809%
**
0.935
***
0.191
*
-0.037 
 
0.075
 
-0.016 
 
-0.057 
 
-0.193 
 
-0.151 
 
-0.070 
 
-0.170 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.014 
 
-0.059 
 
-0.000 
 
0.981
C
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2.020%
 
0.967
***
-0.004 
 
0.001
 
-0.033 
 
0.034
 
-0.014 
 
0.011
 
0.128
 
-0.019 
 
0.013
 
-0.039 
 
0.087
 
0.019
 
-0.007 
 
0.983
C
4FM
 + Industry + C
risis
3.247%
 
0.946
***
0.005
 
-0.012 
 
-0.054 
 
0.020
 
-0.052 
 
-0.033 
 
0.064
 
-0.034 
 
-0.028 
 
-0.062 
 
0.039
 
0.002
 
-0.012 
 
0.984
2 Score
C
A
PM
1.474%
1.014
***
0.978
C
4FM
1.201%
1.044
***
-0.188 
**
0.015
-0.047 
0.979
C
4FM
 + Industry
1.506%
 
1.020
***
-0.085 
 
0.023
 
-0.034 
 
0.047
 
-0.026 
 
0.120
 
-0.052 
 
-0.031 
 
0.010
 
0.119
 
-0.023 
 
-0.039 
 
0.982
C
4FM
 + Industry / G
H
G
 t-2
0.316%
 
0.934
***
-0.041 
 
0.129
*
-0.095 
 
0.118
 
-0.010 
 
0.207
 
0.018
 
0.063
 
0.137
 
0.132
 
-0.002 
 
-0.039 
 
0.983
C
4FM
 + Industry / June
0.292%
 
1.005
***
-0.009 
 
0.076
 
-0.096 
 
0.097
**
0.069
 
0.359
**
0.132
 
0.081
 
0.259
**
0.186
**
0.105
 
-0.011 
 
0.982
C
4FM
 + Industry + C
arbon 
0.227%
 
0.905
***
-0.010 
 
0.208
*
-0.082 
 
0.128
***
0.037
 
0.322
*
0.320
**
0.219
**
0.411
***
0.169
**
0.140
 
-0.034 
 
-0.000 
 
0.971
C
4FM
 + Industry + O
il 
1.499%
 
1.022
***
-0.079 
 
0.021
 
-0.031 
 
0.050
 
-0.022 
 
0.121
 
-0.045 
 
-0.032 
 
0.011
 
0.120
 
-0.017 
 
-0.036 
 
-0.004 
 
0.981
C
4FM
 + Industry + C
risis
1.123%
 
1.026
***
-0.091 
 
0.028
 
-0.029 
 
0.049
 
-0.017 
 
0.133
 
-0.037 
 
-0.027 
 
0.022
 
0.125
 
-0.011 
 
-0.035 
 
0.004
 
0.981
3 Score
C
A
PM
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**
0.903
***
0.922
C
4FM
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***
0.992
***
-0.118 
-0.172 
**
0.022
0.925
C
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4.902%
**
0.979
***
-0.105 
 
-0.113 
 
0.071
 
0.146
 
0.326
 
0.179
 
0.211
 
0.241
*
0.523
 
0.139
 
0.049
 
0.038
 
0.939
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6.108%
**
1.117
***
-0.102 
 
-0.335 
***-0.045 
 
0.243
 
0.677
 
0.783
 
0.770
 
0.273
 
0.976
 
0.320
 
0.362
 
0.210
 
0.938
C
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3.317%
 
0.974
***
-0.040 
 
-0.022 
 
0.200
 
0.148
 
0.279
 
0.225
 
0.129
 
0.203
 
0.243
 
0.104
 
0.074
 
0.008
 
0.924
C
4FM
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0.718%
 
1.068
***
-0.059 
 
-0.095 
 
0.331
 
0.158
 
0.489
*
0.529
 
0.325
 
0.221
 
0.270
 
0.172
 
0.212
 
0.098
 
0.001
 
0.879
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**
0.983
***
-0.094 
 
-0.118 
 
0.076
 
0.153
 
0.334
*
0.182
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0.240
*
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0.141
 
0.060
 
0.043
 
-0.008 
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0.998
***
-0.126 
 
-0.095 
 
0.087
 
0.154
 
0.357
*
0.224
 
0.264
 
0.257
**
0.563
 
0.161
 
0.088
 
0.051
 
0.013
 
0.938
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-0.055 
 
0.055
 
-0.314 
**
-0.217 
 
0.125
 
0.095
 
-0.217 
 
-0.164 
 
0.169
 
0.725
 
0.247
 
-0.445 
*
-0.097 
 
0.403
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period under investigation (cf. chapter 5.2.1 Controlling for Industry Effects). 
Furthermore, the 0 Score portfolio shows a significant annualised loss of -8.15% 
(p<0.01, adjusted R-squared of 96%), after being corrected for its exposure to the 
outperforming Utility industry (ICB 7000) (cf. chapter 5.2.1 Controlling for Industry 
Effects). 
 
These persistent differences in risk-adjusted returns suggest that the market is 
inefficient in pricing the quality of disclosure, as measured by the Disclosure 
Completeness Index. The long-short portfolio confirms this conclusion. A trading 
strategy that goes long in companies reporting completely (3 Score) and short in 
companies reporting incompletely (0 Score) generates an annualised alpha of 13.05% 
(p<0.01). This is a particularly high outperformance, which confirms the discussed 
finding of market inefficiency. 38 While the information used in this research was 
obtained costlessly from publicly available sources, hypothetical information and 
transaction costs (Ball, 1994) are accounted for in this test of market efficiency by 
assuming a rather high annual total expense ratio of 1.50% for carrying out the 
investment strategy (cf. Geczy et al., 2005; Renneboog et al., 2008b; Statman, 2000). 
The annualised outperformance of 13.05% found is statistically significant even when 
an annual total expense ratio of 1.50% is accounted for.39 The persistent risk-adjusted 
abnormal returns identified thus not only cover transaction and information costs and 
consequently represent a market inefficiency not only in the original version of EMH 
of Fama (1970), but also in Jensen’s less strong but economically more reasonable 
definition of EMH (cf. chapter 2.1.3 Three Conditions for an Efficient Market).  
                                            
38    Similar results are also found when equal-weighted returns are regressed on a 
value-weighted factors (see Appendix B.2 Existence of Disclosure of GHG-
emissions), but not when both returns and factors are value-weighted (see 
Appendix A.2 Existence of Disclosure of GHG-emissions). As the number of 
companies in the respective portfolios is rather low, the possibility that results of 
value-weighted portfolio returns are driven by a few large companies is elevated. 
39    To that end the annual total expense ratio is split into monthly expenses and 
deducted from the monthly portfolio returns of the 0 Score and the 3 Score 
portfolio. Subsequently a renewed long-short portfolio is constructed and the 
regression is repeated. As expenses are deducted from both portfolios used to 
construct the long-short portfolio, the effect on long-short portfolios is 
economically irrelevant, but might impact the statistical significance of the 
results obtained. 
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The annualised alphas of both the Score 0 and the Score 3 portfolio are economically 
significant for a buy-and-hold and a long-short trading strategy. As it was 
hypothesised that incomplete reporting increases the information and estimation risk 
of a company, there is no risk-based explanation for the abnormal returns of a 
portfolio constructed from companies that are reporting completely (3 Score). The 
significant abnormal returns show that the market rewards completely reporting 
companies and thus does not price the positive effect of complete reporting of GHG-
emissions correctly. At the same time, the market does not reward investors for the 
additional risk taken on when investing in incompletely reporting companies, which 
not only have higher estimation and information risk, but – as evidenced in chapter 
4.4.2 Completeness of corporate GHG-disclosure – are also more likely to be 
affiliated with the EU ETS and consequently would be even more exposed to climate 
change induced systematic risk. In conclusion, it is consequently deduced that the 
market is not efficiently pricing this proxy for climate change induced systematic risk 
and hypothesis 3a is rejected.  
 
As discussed in chapter 5.3 Portfolio construction, the number of companies in these 
two portfolios is low, yet still sufficiently high to ensure that portfolio results are not 
driven by the individual performance of a few companies. Using equal-weighted 
returns further reduces the possibility that portfolio results are driven by the 
individual performance of a few large companies in the portfolio. 
 
6.3.2 Tests of Robustness 
The performance of the equal-weighted 0 Score portfolio is robust to portfolio 
creation with GHG-emissions data from year t-2, portfolio creation in June, as well as 
changes in the price of oil and carbon. In other words equal-weighted portfolio 
returns are not severely affected by the timeliness of data or changes in the price of 
carbon and oil (see Table 22). The additional control variable for financial market 
crisis is significant and negative, suggesting that the 0 Score portfolio underperforms 
the market in months of financial market crisis. However, at p = 0.102 (unreported) 
the alpha of the corresponding regression is almost significant, i.e. portfolio results 
are interpreted to be robust to the effect of the financial market crisis. Noticeably, the 
0 Score portfolio shows an even stronger underperformance when the portfolio is 
constructed with GHG-emissions from year t-2. This effect can be attributed to the 
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fact that the time period of this regression is shortened to 48 months and thus, among 
other things, shifts the period of analysis into months of financial market crisis. As 
discussed, the significant negative exposure to the crisis factor suggests that the 
portfolio underperformed the market in months of financial market crisis. 
 
The 3 Score portfolio is also robust to the creation of the portfolio with GHG-
emissions data from year t-2. However, when the 3 Score portfolio is created in June 
of each respective year under analysis, the risk-adjusted outperformance disappears. 
This effect is due to the availability of financial data and/or the difference in portfolio 
composition. All additional control variables are insignificant, i.e. there is no 
significant exposure of the returns of the 3 Score portfolio to changes in the price of 
oil or carbon, or the effect of financial market crisis. The same conclusion is valid for 
the 1 Score portfolio, for which all additional control variables are also insignificant. 
Interestingly, the 1 Score portfolio shows an outperformance when the portfolio is 
created with GHG-emissions data from year t-2, when the portfolio is created in June 
and when changes in the price of carbon are controlled for. As there is no significant 
exposure on the crisis factor, these results are attributable to the timeliness of the 
respective data and/or changes in portfolio composition. The results of the 2 Score 
portfolio are robust to every test of robustness performed. 
6.4 Absolute Levels of GHG-emissions 
With regard to absolute levels of GHG-emissions as a proxy for climate change 
induced systematic risk, it was hypothesised in chapter 3.4 Absolute Levels of 
Emissions that in an efficient market there is no difference in risk-adjusted returns 
between portfolios constructed from companies with high absolute levels of GHG-
emissions and those that have low levels of absolute GHG-emissions (Hypothesis 4a). 
Three mutually exclusive portfolios, including companies with high, medium or low 
absolute levels of reported emissions respectively (cf. chapter 5.3 Portfolio 
Construction), were constructed to test this hypothesis. To ensure that results 
obtained from testing this hypothesis are not driven by incompletely reporting 
companies, an additional test of robustness is performed that controls for the 
incompleteness of reported emissions data (cf. chapter 5.4.1 Incompleteness of GHG-
emissions Data). 
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6.4.1 Regression Results 
Table 23 illustrates that in the CAPM an equal-weighted portfolio constructed from 
companies with high absolute levels of GHG-emissions generates an annualised alpha 
of 5.63% (p<0.05, adjusted R-squared of 93%). Portfolios built from companies with 
medium levels of GHG-emissions outperform the market with an annualised return of 
1.84% (p<0.10, adjusted R-squared of 98%), while portfolios built form companies 
with the lowest 30% of emissions levels do not show a significant out- or 
underperformance in the CAPM. It is noticeable that, in line with the argument in 
chapter 3.4 Absolute Levels of Emissions, the High GHG portfolio has a higher beta 
than the Medium GHG portfolio and the Low GHG portfolio. However, given the 
fact that there is a difference in risk-adjusted returns, these initial results hint at the 
fact that the market may not be pricing absolute levels of GHG-emissions as a proxy 
for climate change induced systematic risk efficiently.  
 
The performance of the three portfolios is similar when factors generally known to 
determine stock performance are controlled for in the C4FM: The High GHG 
portfolio generates a slightly reduced annualised alpha of 5.11% (p<0.10, adjusted R-
squared of 94%). The Medium GHG portfolio generates an annualised return of 
1.80% (p<0.10, adjusted R-squared of 98%). As in the case of the CAPM, the Low 
GHG portfolio does not show a significant out- or underperformance. Both, the High 
GHG and the Medium GHG portfolio load significantly and negatively on the SMB 
factor. This large significant negative exposure, especially in the case of the High 
GHG portfolios, suggests that these portfolios contain companies with a larger market 
capitalisation, which in turn confirms the notion that larger companies tend to have 
higher levels of GHG-emissions (cf. chapter 4.4.2 Completeness of Corporate GHG-
disclosure). 
 
Portfolios constructed based on absolute levels of GHG-emissions can be expected to 
show significant differences industry composition. As to be expected, controlling for 
industry effects strongly impacts results. When industry effects are controlled for, the 
High GHG and the Medium GHG portfolios no longer outperform the market. In the 
case of the High GHG portfolio, this effect can be attributed to the significant positive 
exposure of the portfolio to the comparatively well-performing industries Oil & Gas 
(ICB 0001), Basic Materials (ICB 1000), Industrials (ICB 2000) and Utilities (ICB 
- 161 - 
7000) (cf. chapter 5.2.1 Controlling for Industry Effects), which eliminates the 
outperformance identified in the basic C4FM.40 The Medium GHG portfolio shows 
significant exposure to the Utilities (ICB 7000) industry and, when this industry 
effect is controlled for, the Medium GHG portfolio no longer shows a significant 
outperformance. The Low GHG portfolio persistently outperforms the market when 
industry effects are corrected for. The Low GHG portfolio generates an annualised 
alpha of 3.61% (p<0.10, adjusted R-squared of 98%).41 This result suggests that the 
market does not efficiently price climate change induced systematic risk as proxied 
by the level of absolute GHG-emissions in Fama’s original version of EMH. 
However, when hypothetical information and transaction costs are accounted for in 
the economically more reasonable version of EMH of Jensen (1978) (cf. chapter 2.1.3 
Three Conditions for an Efficient Market), the alpha becomes statistically 
insignificant. In other words, when a rather high total expense ratio of 1.50% for 
carrying out the investment strategy is assumed (cf. Geczy et al., 2005; Renneboog et 
al., 2008b; Statman, 2000) no statistically significant outperformance is found. Only 
when the hypothetical total expense ratio of the investment strategy is as low as 
0.35%, the low GHG portfolio generates a statistically significant abnormal return of 
3.26% (p<0.01). 
 
As also shown in Table 23, there is no outperformance of the long-short portfolio 
based on equal-weighted returns. However, when portfolio returns are value-weighted 
(see Appendix A.4 Absolute Levels of GHG-emissions), a trading strategy that goes 
long in companies with low absolute levels of GHG-emissions and short in 
companies with high absolute levels of GHG-emissions generates an annualised alpha 
of 5.59% (p<0.01). This outperformance is statistically significant, even when a total 
expense ratio of 1.50% for carrying out the investment strategy is assumed (cf. Geczy 
et al., 2005; Renneboog et al., 2008b; Statman, 2000). In other words, when portfolio 
returns are value-weighted, the market is inefficient not only in Fama’s original 
                                            
40    When returns are value-weighted the High GHG portfolio generates a significant 
annualised loss of -2.08% (p<0.01, adjusted R-squared of 99%). See Appendix 
A.4 Absolute Levels of GHG-emissions. 
41    When returns are value-weighted the Low GHG portfolio also generates an 
annualised alpha of 3.51% (p<0.01, adjusted R-squared of 97%). See Appendix 
A.4 Absolute Levels of GHG-emissions. 
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version of EMH (1970), but also in Jensen’s adaption (1978) with regard to 
transaction and information costs (cf. chapter 2.1.4 Methodologies and Findings). 
 
Results based on value-weighted returns might be stronger in these regressions, as the 
criteria for portfolio creation relates to the size of a company. Consequently, the 
importance and effect of company size in the creation of the portfolio is reinforced in 
two ways: by value-weighing returns based on company size and constructing 
portfolios based on a rule that is related to company size. In summary, the persistent 
outperformance of the equal-weighted Low GHG portfolio suggests that the market is 
inefficient in pricing the absolute level of GHG-emissions as a proxy for climate 
change induced systematic risk in Fama’s version of EMH. In Jensen’s less strong but 
economically more reasonable version of EMH, the market is inefficient when 
portfolio returns are value-weighted. In this case, as a trading strategy that goes long 
in companies with low absolute levels of GHG-emissions and short in companies 
with high absolute levels of GHG-emissions generates an economically significant 
alpha even when transaction and information costs are accounted for. As it was 
hypothesised that high absolute levels of GHG-emissions result in higher exposure 
towards the systematic risk induced by climate change, there is no risk-based 
explanation for the abnormal returns found. The market rewards companies with low 
GHG-emissions and thus does not price the positive effect of low absolute levels of 
GHG-emissions correctly. Hypothesis 4a is consequently rejected. 
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6.4.2 Tests of Robustness 
As a first test of robustness, to ensure that results obtained from testing hypothesis 4a 
are not driven by incompletely reporting companies, returns are weighted by the 
completeness of GHG-emissions reporting (cf. chapter 5.4.1 Incompleteness of GHG-
emissions Data). There is essentially no difference in the performance of portfolios 
constructed from high, medium and low levels of GHG-emissions and those 
portfolios in which the returns of the respective companies are weighted by their 
score on the Disclosure Completeness Index (see Table 23). This test of robustness 
illustrates that results of the low GHG portfolio are not driven by incompletely 
reporting companies. The Low GHG portfolio generates an annualised return of 
3.64% (p<0.10, adjusted R-squared of 98%) when reporting completeness is 
controlled for. 
 
Results obtained are also stable with regard to the construction of the portfolios with 
GHG-emissions data from year t-2. Interestingly, the Medium GHG portfolio 
generates an annualised return of 2.14% (p<0.05, adjusted R-squared of 99%), when 
portfolios are created with GHG-emissions from year t-2. As this portfolio does not 
show significant exposure to the crisis factor, this effect can be related to the 
timeliness of GHG-emissions data and/or differences in portfolio composition. Other 
portfolios do not change their performance when constructed with GHG-emissions 
data from year t-2, i.e. results obtained are robust to the timeliness of GHG-emissions 
data and the accompanying differences in portfolio composition.  
 
Results of the High GHG and the Medium GHG portfolio are also robust to the 
creation of the respective portfolios in June of each year under analysis. The 
outperformance of the Low GHG portfolio however disappears. As the portfolio 
shows no exposure to the crisis factor, which would allow explaining the insignificant 
performance with a shift of the period under analysis to more months of financial 
market crisis, this performance can be related to the timeliness of financial data 
and/or differences in portfolio composition.  
 
The Low GHG portfolio is not significantly exposed to any of the additional control 
variables. As to be expected, the High GHG and Medium GHG portfolio show a 
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significant, yet small, exposure to changes in the price of carbon. Only the Medium 
GHG portfolio shows exposure to the changes in the price of oil. However, neither 
one of these additional control variables significantly impact portfolio performance. 
The final control variable, crisis, is only significant in the High GHG portfolio, where 
the negative exposure suggests that the portfolio underperforms the market in months 
of financial market crisis.  
6.5 GHG-efficiency 
With regard to GHG-efficiency as a proxy for climate change induced systematic 
risk, it was hypothesised in chapter 3.5 GHG-efficiency that in an efficient market 
there is no difference in risk-adjusted returns between portfolios constructed from 
companies that have a high GHG-efficiency and those that have a low GHG-
efficiency (Hypothesis 5a). Three mutually exclusive portfolios were constructed to 
test this hypothesis, based on companies with high, medium or low levels of GHG-
efficiency respectively (cf. chapter 5.3 Portfolio Construction). To ensure that results 
obtained from testing this hypothesis are not driven by incompletely reporting 
companies, the additional test of robustness that controls for the incompleteness of 
reported emissions data is also performed for these regressions (cf. chapter 5.4.1 
Incompleteness of GHG-emissions Data). 
 
6.5.1 Regression Results 
Table 24 illustrates that in the CAPM portfolios constructed from companies with a 
high and a low GHG-efficiency do not generate any significant out- or 
underperformance. The Medium GHG-efficiency portfolio generates an annualised 
alpha of 2.63% (p<0.10, adjusted R-squared of 97%). It is noticeable that the Low 
GHG-efficiency shows the highest beta among all portfolios with equal-weighted 
returns, suggesting that low GHG-efficiency might be related to higher systematic 
risk, as argued in chapter 3.5 GHG-efficiency. However, given the fact that there is a 
difference in risk-adjusted returns, these initial results also hint at the fact that the 
market may not be pricing GHG-efficiency as a proxy for climate change induced 
systematic risk efficiently. 
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When factors generally accepted to impact stock performance are controlled for in the 
C4FM, the outperformance of the Medium GHG-efficiency portfolio increases to 
3.04% annually (p<0.05, adjusted R-squared of 97%). The Medium GHG-efficiency 
portfolio loads negatively on SMB and HML, suggesting that it contains rather large 
companies with a low book-to-market-ratio. Performances of the High GHG-
efficiency and Low GHG-efficiency portfolio remain unchanged in the C4FM. 
 
As these three portfolios can be expected to show differences in industry 
composition, industry effects are controlled for. Results of equal-weighted GHG-
efficiency portfolios change when controlled for industry effects: For example, the 
High GHG-efficiency generates an annualised alpha of 3.04% (p<0.05, adjusted R-
squared of 97%), when its exposure to the comparatively poor performing 
Telecommunications industry (ICB 6000) is controlled for.42 The outperformance of 
the Medium GHG-efficiency portfolio is reduced to an annualised return of 2.59% 
(p<0.10, adjusted R-squared of 98%). This reduction is due to the significant positive 
exposure of the Medium GHG-efficiency portfolio to the comparatively well-
performing Oil & Gas industry (ICB 0001). The Low GHG-efficiency portfolio has a 
negative alpha, which however is not statistically significant at any conventional 
significance level.43 Though these portfolios are only significantly exposed to few 
industry variables, the adjusted R-squared of the C4FM extended with industry 
effects increases significantly compared to the traditional C4FM, for example from 
94% to 97% in the case of the High GHG-efficiency portfolio. This increase in 
adjusted R-squared suggests that controlling for industry effects increases the fit of 
the model and that controlling for industry effects thus enhances the explanatory 
power of the regression. In summary, these results obtained with the C4FM extended 
                                            
42    When returns are value-weighted the High GHG-efficiency portfolio also 
generates an annualised return of 2.74% (p<0.05, adjusted R-squared of 96%). 
See Appendix A.5 GHG-efficiency. 
43    When returns are value-weighted the Low GHG-efficiency portfolio generates a 
statistically significant annualised loss of -2.72% (p<0.10, adjusted R-squared of 
98%). See Appendix A.5 GHG-efficiency. 
 
- 167 - 
with industry effects suggest that portfolios constructed from companies with a 
comparatively high GHG-efficiency generate abnormal returns. 
 
As also shown in Table 24, a trading strategy that goes long in companies with a high 
GHG-efficiency and short in companies with a low GHG-efficiency generates an 
annualised alpha of 4.10% (p<0.10). These abnormal returns of 4.10% not only cover 
transaction and information costs, but remain statistically and economically 
significant even when a rather high annual total expense ratio of 1.50% for carrying 
out the investment strategy is assumed (cf. Geczy et al., 2005; Renneboog et al., 
2008b; Statman, 2000). Results thus indicate market inefficiency not only in Fama’s 
original version of EMH, but also in Jensen’s adaption of EMH (cf. chapter 2.1.3 
Three Conditions for an Efficient Market), which accounts for transaction and 
information costs. The outperformance identified is even higher when a long-short 
trading strategy is applied under complementary weighting procedures: Annualised 
returns of 5.46% (p<0.01) and 5.48% (p<0.01) are obtained when returns are value-
weighted (see Appendix A.5 GHG-efficiency) and when equal-weighted portfolio 
returns are regressed on value-weighted factors (see Appendix B.5 GHG-efficiency) 
respectively.  
 
In summary, the persistent differences in the risk-adjusted returns between the 
portfolios suggest that the market is inefficient in pricing GHG-efficiency as a proxy 
for climate change induced systematic risk. As it was argued that low GHG-
efficiency hints at high exposure towards the systematic risk induced by climate 
change (cf. chapter 3.5 GHG-efficiency), there is no risk-based explanation for the 
abnormal returns of portfolios constructed from companies with high and medium 
levels of GHG-efficiency. The market rewards companies with higher levels of GHG-
efficiency and thus does not price the positive effect of comparatively high levels of 
GHG-efficiency correctly. Hypothesis 5a is consequently rejected. 
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6.5.2 Tests of Robustness 
The results obtained are robust to a weighting of portfolio returns according to 
disclosure completeness (cf. chapter 5.4.1 Incompleteness of GHG-emissions Data). 
The performance of equal-weighted portfolios constructed from high, medium and 
low levels of GHG-efficiency is slightly higher to those portfolios in which the 
returns of the respective companies are weighted by their score on the Disclosure 
Completeness Index (see Table 24). For example, the disclosure weighted Medium 
GHG-efficiency portfolio generates an annualised return of 3.01% (p<0.05, adjusted 
R-squared 98%), as compared to an annualised return of 2.59% (p<0.10, adjusted R-
squared of 98%) for the original Medium GHG-efficiency portfolio. This difference 
in risk-adjusted returns of 0.46% suggests that the returns of the original Medium 
GHG-efficiency portfolio are driven by more completely reporting companies. 
Consequently, it is ensured that incompletely reporting companies are not driving the 
results of the Medium GHG-efficiency portfolio. 
 
Results obtained are also robust to the construction of the portfolios with GHG-
emissions data from year t-2, i.e. no significant change in portfolio performance takes 
place when portfolios are constructed with returns from year t-2. Results of the 
Medium GHG-efficiency and the Low GHG-efficiency portfolios are robust to the 
construction of portfolios in June of each respective year. Results of the High GHG-
efficiency portfolio are however not robust to portfolio creation in June, suggesting 
that the timeliness of financial performance data and/or differences in portfolio 
composition (cf. chapter 5.4.5 Portfolio Creation in June) might be important here, as 
the portfolio shows no exposure to the crisis factor, which would allow explaining the 
insignificant performance with a shift of the period under analysis to more months of 
financial market crisis.  
 
The additional control variables for the changes in the price of carbon and oil, as well 
as financial market crisis are insignificant for the High GHG-efficiency portfolio. The 
Medium GHG-efficiency portfolio shows a significant, yet small, exposure to 
changes in the price of carbon and oil. While portfolio returns are robust to the 
changes in the price of oil, changes in the price of carbon significantly affect portfolio 
returns of the Medium GHG-efficiency portfolio. The final control variable, crisis, is 
only significant in the Low GHG-efficiency portfolio, where the negative exposure 
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suggests that the Low GHG-efficiency portfolio underperforms the market in months 
of financial market crisis. 
6.6 High Carbon Industries 
With regard to the affiliation with high carbon industries as a proxy for climate 
change induced systematic risk, it was hypothesised in chapter 3.6 High carbon 
industries that in an efficient market there is no difference in risk-adjusted returns 
between portfolios constructed from companies from high carbon and those from low 
carbon industries (Hypothesis 6a). 
 
6.6.1 Regression Results 
In the CAPM, as illustrated in Table 25, the High carbon industries portfolio 
generates an annualised alpha of 3.60% while the Low Carbon Industries portfolio 
generates an annualised loss of -2.92% (both at p<0.10 and an adjusted R-squared of 
97%). The increased beta coefficient of the High carbon industries portfolio suggests 
that this portfolio is more exposed to systematic risk than the Low carbon industries 
portfolio. However, given the fact that there is a difference in risk-adjusted returns, 
these initial results hint at the fact that the market may not incorporate climate change 
induced systematic risk in beta. 
 
When factors generally accepted to explain financial market performance are 
controlled for in the C4FM, the outperformance of the High carbon industries 
portfolio increases to 4.17% (p<0.05, adjusted R-squared of 98%) annually.44 The 
loss of the Low carbon industries portfolio grows to -3.42% on an annual basis 
(p<0.05, adjusted R-squared of 98%). Both portfolios show significant exposure to 
the HML and UMD factors. The performance of the High carbon industries portfolio 
was consequently corrected for the fact that it contains predominantly stocks with a 
low book to market ratio which performed poor historically. In contrast, the 
performance of the Low carbon industries portfolio shows positive exposure to the 
                                            
44    Similar results are obtained for the High carbon industries portfolio when returns 
are value-weighted (see Appendix A.6 High Carbon Industries) and when equal-
weighted portfolio returns are regressed on value-weighted factors (see Appendix 
B.6 High Carbon Industries). 
- 171 - 
HML and UMD factors, i.e. it contains predominantly stocks with a high book to 
market ratio (value stocks) which performed well historically. As discussed in chapter 
5.2.1 Controlling for industry effects, these portfolios are not controlled for industry 
effects, as doings so would cancel out the climate change induced systematic risk at 
industry level, which is of interest in this context.  
 
 
Table 25: Regression results: Affiliation to high carbon industries 
 
When a long-short trading strategy is applied, an investor that goes long in companies 
from high carbon industries and short in companies from low carbon industries 
generates an annualised return of 7.59% (p<0.05). 45 Results thus suggest that the 
financial market was not efficiently pricing this proxy for climate change induced 
systematic risk between January 2005 and December 2009 in Fama’s (1970) original 
                                            
45    Similar results are obtained when equal-weighted portfolio returns are regressed 
on value-weighted factors (see Appendix B.6 High Carbon Industries), but not 
returns are value-weighted (see Appendix A.6 High Carbon Industries). 
Portfolio α (Rm-Rf) SMB HML UMD ACV Adj. R2
High carbon industries
CAPM 3.596% * 1.094 *** 0.973
C4FM 4.170% ** 1.112 *** 0.009  -0.185 * -0.202 *** 0.977
C4FM / June 2.952% * 1.112 *** -0.205 ** -0.023 -0.139 *** 0.977
C4FM + Carbon price 4.016% ** 1.043 *** -0.091 0.049 -0.109 * 0.000 0.972
C4FM + Oil price 3.803% ** 1.097 *** -0.003 -0.155 * -0.181 *** 0.026 ** 0.978
C4FM + Crisis 4.642% ** 1.103 *** 0.027 -0.192 * -0.204 *** -0.006 0.977
Low carbon industries
CAPM -2.924% * 0.918 *** 0.971
C4FM -3.416% ** 0.904 *** -0.012  0.159 * 0.176 *** 0.976
C4FM / June -2.452% 0.902 *** 0.170 ** 0.028 0.127 *** 0.975
C4FM + Carbon price -3.358% ** 0.961 *** 0.060 -0.025 0.102 * -0.000 0.974
C4FM + Oil price -3.106% ** 0.917 *** -0.003 0.133 * 0.159 *** -0.022 * 0.977
C4FM + Crisis -3.791% ** 0.912 *** -0.026 0.164 * 0.178 *** 0.004 0.976
Long High carbon industries -
Short Low carbon industries 7.586% ** 0.209 *** 0.021 -0.344 * -0.378 *** 0.339
Notes: This table reports regression results for the High carbon indstries and the Low carbon industries portfolios, 
as well as the long-short portfolio, using monthly equal-weighted returns and equal-weighted SMB, HML and 
UMD factors. Rows represent the different models used, i.e. CAPM, C4FM, as well as the tests of robustness of 
results. Tests of robustness include portfolio creation in June (/ June) and the inclusion of additional control 
variables (ACV) for changes in the price of carbon (Carbon) and oil (Oil), as well as financial market crisis 
(Crisis). Columns show the annualised alpha in per cent, beta estimations (Rm - Rf), coefficient exposure on the 
SMB, HML and UMD factors and ACV, as well as the adjusted R-squared. ***, ** and * indicate the 1%, 5% 
and 10% significance level respectively. Coefficient covariances and standard errors are made heteroscedasticity 
and autocorrelation consistent based on Newey and West (1987). 
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version of the EMH. When assuming a rather high annual total expense ratio of 
1.50% for carrying out the investment strategy (cf. Geczy et al., 2005; Renneboog et 
al., 2008b; Statman, 2000), the alpha of 7.59% remains statistically significant. The 
persistent risk-adjusted abnormal returns identified consequently not only cover 
transaction and information costs. The market is thus inefficiently pricing this proxy 
for climate change induced systematic risk also in Jensen’s (1978) less strong but 
economically more reasonable definition of EMH (cf. chapter 2.1.3 Three Conditions 
for an Efficient Market). Consequently, hypothesis 6a is rejected. 
 
As it was argued that affiliation with high carbon industries hints at higher exposure 
towards the systematic risk induced by climate change, there is a risk-based 
explanation for the abnormal returns of a portfolio constructed from companies 
affiliated with high carbon industries. If there is a risk-based explanation, and the 
abnormal returns exist in different markets and time periods, the abnormal returns can 
be attributed to shortcomings in the underlying asset pricing model to price the 
respective risk correctly. If the abnormal risk-adjusted returns identified here were to 
continue to exist outside of this sample and the period studied, the increased 
systematic risk related to high carbon industries might qualify as an additional risk 
premium in the future. This interpretation of the results can then be aligned with the 
EMH. However, as discussed in chapter 2.1.4 Methodologies and Findings, further 
research is needed before a conclusion of this magnitude can be drawn and therefore 
any risk-adjusted abnormal returns found in this research is interpreted as market 
inefficiency (cf. chapter 2.1.6 Application of EMH in this Research). It must further 
be acknowledged in this context that the differences of risk-adjusted performance at 
the industry level might have other explanations than climate change induced 
systematic risk. Nevertheless, as the Utilities industry, Basic Materials industry, 
Industrials and Oil & Gas industry are more likely to be targeted by political and 
market initiatives for the reduction of GHG-emissions (cf. chapter 3.6 High Carbon 
Industries) and represent the industries with the highest average reported GHG-
emissions per company in this research, climate change induced systematic risk can 
be identified as one common characteristic of the out- and underperformance found.  
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6.6.2 Tests of Robustness 
Results obtained are robust to all tests of robustness (see Table 25), i.e. the creation of 
portfolios in June of each year under analysis, as well as the additional control 
variables. When portfolios are constructed in June, the alpha of the Low carbon 
industries portfolio is almost significant at p = 0.1085 (unreported). Consequently 
results are interpreted to be robust for the creation of the portfolio in June as well. 
Both portfolios show significant exposure to the additional control variables of 
changes in the price of oil. The High carbon industries portfolio shows a significant 
positive exposure, while the low carbon industries portfolio shows a significant 
negative exposure. These exposures do however not strongly affect portfolio results. 
Other additional control variables are insignificant, i.e. there is no significant 
exposure of portfolio returns to the changes in the price of carbon or months of 
financial market crisis.  
 
In the following final chapter of this thesis, the results presented are summarised and 
critically discussed in the light of the EMH. The relevance and contribution of this 
research to both academia and investors are illustrated. Finally, limitations of this 
research and its implications for future research are shown. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions and Discussion 
The objective of this research was to assess the level of market efficiency towards 
climate change induced systematic risk. In summary, the results obtained in chapter 6 
Regression Results suggest that the market was inefficient in pricing climate change 
induced systematic risk of companies from the European Union in the years 2005 to 
2009.  
 
Results obtained with regard to the each of the six proxies for climate change induced 
systematic risk are briefly summarised and discussed in the light of their implications 
from the perspective of EMH in chapter 7.1 Summary of Results in Light of EMH. 
Subsequently, the implications for the investment community of the results obtained, 
as well as the contribution of this research to knowledge are illustrated in chapter 7.2 
Relevance and Contribution to Knowledge. Finally, limitations of this study and 
suggestions for future research are discussed in chapter 7.3 Limitations and Avenues 
for Future Research. 
7.1 Summary of Results in Light of EMH   
With regard to the first proxy for climate change induced systematic risk in this 
research, it was found that a trading strategy that goes long in companies affiliated 
with the EU ETS and short in companies not affiliated with the EU ETS generates an 
annualised alpha of 5.12% (p<0.10) (see Table 20), when portfolio returns are equal-
weighted. Even higher persistent and significant abnormal returns were found when 
supplementary weighting procedures of returns were applied (see Appendices A.1 
European Emission Trading Scheme and B.1 European Emission Trading Scheme). 
Hypothesis 1a, which stipulated that the market is efficient, i.e. there is no difference 
in risk-adjusted returns between portfolios constructed from companies that are 
affiliated and those that are not affiliated with the EU ETS, was consequently 
rejected.  
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It was argued in chapter 3.1 European Emissions Trading Scheme that the returns of 
companies that are affiliated with the EU ETS are more sensitive to the market-wide 
risk induced by climate change due to the unpredictability of future costs related to 
emitting GHG-emissions under the EU ETS. Following this line of argument, there is 
a risk-based explanation for the persistently risk-adjusted abnormal returns found for 
the portfolio constructed from companies affiliated with the EU ETS. As discussed in 
chapter 2.1.4 Methodologies and Findings, opponents of the EMH tend to interpret 
any abnormal risk-adjusted returns as evidence for market inefficiencies. Advocates 
of the EMH argue that, if abnormal returns for which there is a risk-based explanation 
exist in different markets and time periods, these abnormal returns can be attributed 
to shortcomings in the underlying asset pricing model to price the respective risk 
correctly (cf. chapter 6.1.1 Regression Results). 
 
Consequently, if the risk-adjusted abnormal returns found here were to continue to 
exist outside of this sample and the period studied, the increased climate change 
induced systematic risk related to the EU ETS might qualify as an additional risk 
premium at some point in the future. Results of this research could then be attributed 
to the inability of beta to grasp climate change induced systematic risk as proxied by 
affiliation to the EU ETS correctly. In this case, results obtained could be aligned 
with the EMH, according to which investors are rewarded for taking risk. However, 
as discussed in chapter 2.1.4 Methodologies and findings, further research is needed 
before any conclusion of this magnitude can be made and consequently the abnormal 
risk-adjusted return found in this study is interpreted as market inefficiency (cf. 
chapter 2.1.6 Application of EMH in this Research).  
 
In fact, the tests of robustness performed in this study cannot exclude the possibility 
that the risk-adjusted abnormal returns identified occurs only in the period analysed 
in this study (cf. chapter 6.1.2 Tests of robustness) and that consequently the 
inefficiency found cannot be attributed to a shortcoming in the underlying asset 
pricing model. If risk-adjusted abnormal returns were to occur only in the period 
analysed in this study, a reasonable explanation for the abnormal returns found in this 
research would be that the financial market took time to efficiently incorporate the 
new phenomenon that the EU ETS represented during the period analysed in this 
study. Such an explanation however cannot be aligned with the notion of an efficient 
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market, as prices that are only slowly adjusting to reflect available information are 
not consistent with the EMH. EMH stipulates that prices at every time represent good 
estimates of intrinsic value. 
 
With regard to the second proxy of climate change induced systematic risk, i.e. the 
existence of disclosure of GHG-emissions, the financial market was also found to be 
inefficient. It was argued in chapter 3.2 Existence of Disclosure of GHG-Emissions 
that companies that disclose their absolute levels of GHG-emissions to market 
participants reduce their estimation and information risk by facilitating better and 
more reliable estimations of their specific future cash flows, which reduces the 
covariance of their returns with market returns and, ceteris paribus, their beta. As 
shown at the bottom of Table 21 in chapter 6.2.1 Regression Results, a trading 
strategy that goes long in companies reporting GHG-emissions and short in 
companies not reporting GHG-emissions generates an annualised alpha of 4.34% 
(p<0.01) in the C4FM extended for industry effects. These results confirm findings of 
Ziegler et al. (2011) who reported for a short sub-period of their study that an 
investment strategy that goes long in companies disclosing a general responses to 
climate change and short in non-disclosing companies generated an annualised 
abnormal return of almost 7% between 2004 and 2006 in Europe (cf. chapter 2.2.7 
Review of Studies). 
 
The significant persistent difference in portfolio returns shows that the market is 
inefficient in pricing this second proxy for climate change induced systematic risk. 
Tests of robustness confirm these results (cf. chapter 6.2.2 Tests of Robustness). 
Hypothesis 2a, which stipulated that the market is efficient, i.e. there is no difference 
in risk-adjusted returns between portfolios constructed from companies that report 
and those that do not report GHG-emissions, is consequently rejected. In the absence 
of a risk-based explanation for the abnormal returns found, there is no possibility to 
align the outperformance of GHG-disclosing firms with the EMH. In this context it is 
worth mentioning that some scholars discuss the possibility that committing financial 
resources to environmental disclosure or an improvement of environmental 
performance increases the risk of a company (Salama et al., 2011). This conclusion 
does not apply to the results of this research as the interpretation of risk in the 
mentioned argument refers to downside risk and is consequently different to the 
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notion of systematic risk applied in this study. Furthermore, the in-depth analysis of 
sample characteristics carried out in chapter 4.4 Understanding Sample 
Characteristics showed that there are no significant differences in the profitability of 
companies disclosing GHG-emissions and those not disclosing, or companies that 
report complete GHG-emissions as opposed to incompletely reporting companies.  
 
The completeness of corporate disclosures on absolute levels of GHG-emissions was 
the third proxy for climate change induced systematic risk applied in this study. It 
was argued in chapter 3.3 Disclosure Completeness that incomplete disclosure of 
GHG-emissions results in higher non-diversifiable estimation and information risk. In 
chapter 6.3.1 Regression Results, a trading strategy that goes long in companies 
reporting complete GHG-emissions (3 Score) and short in companies reporting 
incomplete GHG-emissions (0 Score) was identified to generate an annualised alpha 
of 13.05% (p<0.01) in the C4FM extended for industry effects. Tests of robustness 
largely confirm these results (cf. chapter 6.3.2 Tests of Robustness). There is no risk-
based explanation for the significant abnormal returns of completely reporting 
companies, i.e. companies that report scope 1 and 2 GHG-emissions for group-wide 
activities in line with the requirements of dominant reporting guidelines. At the same 
time, incompletely reporting companies (0 Score) not only have higher estimation 
and information risk, but – as evidenced in chapter 4.4.2 Completeness of Corporate 
GHG-disclosure – are also more likely to be affiliated with the EU ETS and 
consequently are even more exposed to climate change induced systematic risk. 
Despite this increased risk, the 0 Score portfolios generate an annualised loss of 
8.15% (p<0.01). Consequently, the financial market is concluded to be inefficient 
towards this proxy for climate change induced systematic risk between January 2005 
and December 2010. Hypothesis 3a, which stipulated that the market is efficient, i.e. 
there is no difference in risk-adjusted returns between companies that report complete 
and those that report incomplete GHG-emissions, is consequently rejected. 
 
With regard to the fourth proxy for climate change induced systematic risk, i.e. 
absolute levels of GHG-emissions, the market was also found to be inefficient. It was 
argued in chapter 3.4 Absolute Levels of Emissions that the returns of companies that 
emit comparatively high levels of GHG-emissions are more exposed to the systematic 
risk induced by climate change and that in an efficient market there is no difference in 
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risk-adjusted returns between companies that have high and those have low levels of 
absolute GHG-emissions (Hypothesis 4a). In chapter 6.4.1 Regression Results it was 
evidenced that the Low GHG portfolio generates a risk-adjusted annualised alpha of 
3.61% (p<0.10) when portfolio returns are equal-weighted and regressed on the 
C4FM extended for industry effects. When portfolio returns are value-weighted (see 
Appendix A.4 Absolute Levels of GHG-emissions), a trading strategy that goes long in 
companies with low absolute levels of GHG-emissions and short in companies with 
high absolute levels of GHG-emissions generates an annualised alpha of 5.59% 
(p<0.01).  
 
These results suggest that the financial market was inefficient in pricing the absolute 
level of GHG-emissions as a proxy for climate change induced systematic risk of 
European companies between January 2005 and December 2009. Hypothesis 4a is 
consequently rejected. In an additional test of robustness of these results, company 
returns were weighted according to the completeness of their GHG-emissions 
disclosure (cf. chapter 5.4.1 Incompleteness of GHG-emissions Data) to make sure 
that incompletely reporting companies are not driving the results obtained with 
portfolios constructed from absolute levels of GHG-emissions. Results obtained in 
this tests of robustness confirmed results of the original regression (cf. chapter 6.3.2 
Tests of Robustness). As it was argued in this research that higher absolute levels of 
GHG-emissions result in higher exposure towards the systematic risk induced by 
climate change, no risk-based explanation for the abnormal returns of a portfolio 
constructed from companies with low levels of GHG-emissions is available. Results 
cannot be aligned with the EMH, in which investors are rewarded for taking risk.  
 
With regard to the fifth proxy of climate change induced systematic risk in this study, 
it was argued that the ratio of net income to GHG-emissions, i.e. its GHG-efficiency, 
impacts a company’s exposure and the sensitivity of its returns towards the 
systematic risk induced by climate change (cf. chapter 3.5 GHG-efficiency). In 
chapter 6.5.1 Regression Results it was found that a trading strategy that goes long in 
companies with a high GHG-efficiency and short in companies with a low GHG-
efficiency generates an annualised alpha of 4.10% (p<0.10) when portfolio returns are 
equal-weighted and regressed on the C4FM extended for industry effects. This 
outperformance increases to 5.46% (p<0.01) and 5.48% (p<0.01) when returns are 
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value-weighted (see Appendix A.5 GHG-efficiency) and when equal-weighted portfolio 
returns are regressed on value-weighted factors (see Appendix B.5 GHG-efficiency) 
respectively. The results obtained are robust to a weighting of portfolio returns 
according to the completeness of GHG-emissions disclosure (cf. chapter 5.4.1 
Incompleteness of GHG-emissions Data), i.e. incomplete reporting companies are not 
driving the results obtained. Results are also reasonably robust to other tests of 
robustness (cf. chapter 6.5.2 Tests of Robustness). 
 
As it was argued that low levels of GHG-efficiency results in higher exposure 
towards the systematic risk induced by climate change, there is no risk-based 
explanation for the persistent abnormal returns of portfolios constructed from 
companies with high and medium levels of GHG-efficiency (see Table 24). The 
differences in risk-adjusted returns between the portfolios evidenced with the long-
short investment strategy suggest that the market is inefficient in pricing GHG-
efficiency as a proxy for climate change induced systematic risk. Consequently, 
hypothesis 5a, which stipulated that the market is efficient, i.e. there is no difference 
in risk-adjusted returns between companies that have a high GHG-efficiency and 
those have a low GHG-efficiency, is also rejected. 
 
With regard to the final proxy of climate change induced systematic risk in this study, 
affiliation with high carbon industries, it was argued in 3.6 High Carbon Industries 
that the returns of companies affiliated with high carbon industries show a higher 
exposure and the sensitivity towards the systematic risk induced by climate change. 
Results of regressions in chapter 6.6.1 Regression Results showed that an investor 
that goes long in companies from high carbon industries and short in companies from 
low carbon industries generates an annualised alpha of 7.59% (p<0.05). This 
persistent difference in equal-weighted risk-adjusted portfolio returns illustrated by 
the long-short investment strategy suggests that the financial market was not 
efficiently pricing this proxy for climate change induced systematic risk between 
2005 and 2009. The results obtained are robust to all tests of robustness (cf. chapter 
6.6.2 Tests of Robustness). Consequently, hypothesis 6a, which stipulated that the 
market is efficient, i.e. there is no difference in risk-adjusted returns between 
companies from high carbon and those from low carbon industries, is also rejected.  
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As there is a risk-based explanation for the outperformance found, advocates of the 
EMH would argue that they might be due to a shortcoming in the underlying asset 
pricing model, i.e. the inability of beta to grasp climate change induced risk correctly. 
Results obtained could then be aligned with the basic notion of the EMH according to 
which investors are rewarded for taking risk. However, as discussed in chapter 2.1.4 
Methodologies and findings, further research is needed before any conclusion of this 
magnitude can be made and consequently any abnormal risk-adjusted return found in 
this study is interpreted as market inefficiency (cf. chapter 2.1.6 Application of EMH 
in this Research). Also, while the Utilities industry, Basic Materials industry, 
Industrials and Oil & Gas industry share the characteristic that they are more likely to 
be targeted by political and market initiatives for the reduction of GHG-emissions 
and contain the highest average reported GHG-emissions per company, this research 
cannot exclude the possibility that factors other than climate change induced 
systematic risk might be responsible for the outperformance found. 
 
Overall, the financial market was concluded to be inefficient with regard to the six 
proxies for the climate change induced systematic risk of European companies 
between 2005 and 2009. As discussed in chapter 2.1.3 Three Conditions for an 
Efficient Market, the inefficiencies identified do not come as a complete surprise, 
given that conditions for an efficient market are not entirely fulfilled in the context of 
CSP and proxies for climate change induced systematic risk. While the market may 
be efficient even if these conditions are not met, the potential for market inefficiency 
increases when the conditions are not fulfilled (Fama, 1970). In this context, results 
of this study are especially interesting with regard to the third condition for market 
efficiency, which stipulates that all market participants agree on the implications of 
information to the future price of a stock. On one hand, the abnormal returns found in 
this study clearly indicate that the information underlying the different proxies for 
climate change induced systematic risk used in this study are relevant to the intrinsic 
value of the firm. At the same time, findings confirm the circumstance that not all 
market participants agree on the implications of information on CSP and climate 
change induced systematic risk to the future price of a stock (cf. chapter 2.1.3 Three 
Conditions for an Efficient Market). If all market participants agreed and 
consequently had acted on the value-relevance of the six proxies for climate change 
induced systematic risk applied in this study, no arbitrage opportunities would exist. 
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In fact, results of this research thus indicate that in retrospect a large share of market 
participants was wrong not to incorporate information on a company’s affiliation to 
the EU ETS and high carbon industries, its GHG-emissions disclosure strategy or its 
climate change performance into their assessment of the intrinsic value of a firm 
during the period analysed in this study. While this is a bold statement, it would not 
be the first time the majority of market participants were homogeneously wrong 
(Malkiel, 2003a). 
 
Violations of the first and second condition for market efficiency, which state that 
there are no transaction costs and all available information is costless available to all 
market participants (cf. chapter 2.1.3 Three Conditions for an Efficient Market), are 
fully accounted for in this research. As discussed in chapter 4.2 Data Collection, 
information used in this research comes from publicly available sources, which were 
available at no cost during the time analysed in this study. Nevertheless, some 
scholars would argue that there are costs involved in the gathering of information for 
the six proxies for climate change induced systematic risk used in this study, which 
relate to the time invested in producing the information for each of the companies in 
the sample of this study (Ball, 1994). These information costs, as well as hypothetical 
transaction costs, are accounted for in this test of market efficiency by means of a 
total expense ratio of 1.5%, which corresponds to a rather high level of transaction 
and information costs for SRI mutual funds (cf. Geczy et al., 2005; Renneboog et al., 
2008b; Statman, 2000). In summary, all conclusions on market inefficiency discussed 
above hold even when approximated costs for transactions and information are 
deducted (cf. chapter chapter 6 Regression Results).46 Consequently, the market is 
inefficient not only in Fama’s original version of the EMH (1970), but also in the less 
strong but economically more reasonable version of the EMH suggested by Jensen 
(1978) with regard to the first and second condition for market efficiency. Jensen’s 
adaption of EMH stipulates that in an efficient market an investment strategy cannot 
generate abnormal risk-adjusted returns in excess of its transaction and information 
costs. 
                                            
46    With regard to the fourth proxy for climate change induced systematic risk, i.e. 
absolute levels of GHG-emissions, this conclusion is only valid when portfolio 
results are value-weighted (cf. chapter 6.4.1 Regression Results). 
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In the light of EMH, results of this study are furthermore interesting with regard to 
the existence of risk-based explanations for the abnormal results found. As discussed 
before, further research is necessary before abnormal returns for which there is a risk-
based explanation can be related to shortcomings in the underlying asset pricing 
model and consequently be aligned with the EMH (cf. chapter 2.1.4 Methodologies 
and Findings). Keeping this constraint in mind, it is nevertheless interesting to 
theoretically discuss the implications of these results from an EMH perspective under 
the assumption that (1) they will be validated by future research and (2) the 
outperformance at the industry level is related to climate change induced systematic 
risk:  
 
Risk-based explanations are only available in this study for proxies for market-wide 
climate change risk that refer to the industry level, i.e. company affiliation with the 
EU ETS and high carbon industries. In the remaining regressions, which examine 
market efficiency towards climate change induced systematic risk via proxies that 
refer to the company level, results do not imply risk-based explanations. Results of 
this research thus hint at the circumstance that the market was able to grasp climate 
change induced systematic risk at industry level but not at company level. As 
discussed in chapter 1 Introduction, investors have been slow to incorporate the risks 
related to climate change into their investment strategies. In fact, one driver for 
market inefficiency is that market participants do not make use of available 
information, as a result of the fact that they do not regard it as value relevant (cf. 
chapter 2.1.3 Three Conditions for an Efficient Market). In summary, results of this 
research thus suggest that investors were able to grasp climate change induced 
systematic risk on industry level, but did not make the effort to properly analyse and 
take into account climate change induced systematic risk at the company level during 
the time of this study. Referring to Fama’s interest to research “the level of 
information at which the hypothesis breaks down” (Fama, 1970, p. 383), results point 
towards the circumstance that it might be the lacking effort of market participants to 
analyse information on climate change induced systematic risk at company level at 
which the EMH breaks down. 
 
Results of this study furthermore show that the market inefficiently priced the 
positive effects of (complete) GHG-disclosure or good corporate climate change 
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performance, as portfolios constructed from (completely) reporting companies or 
companies with a good climate change performance generate abnormal risk-adjusted 
returns. In this context, results support the findings and observation of other scholars 
(Derwall et al., 2005; Herremans et al., 1993; Renneboog et al., 2008b) that the risk-
adjusted returns of companies with good CSP will only be constantly higher than 
those of companies with poor CSP when the financial market does not price 
information on CSP accurately. Nevertheless, in this study the Not reporting GHG 
portfolio, as well as the 0 Score portfolio and – when returns are value-weighted – the 
High GHG portfolio and the Low GHG-efficiency portfolio (cf. chapter 6 Regression 
Results) at the same time generate significant abnormal losses. Assuming that these 
latter portfolios show higher levels of climate change induced systematic risk (cf. 
chapter 3 Hypotheses Development), the market is not only not rewarding investors 
for taking on additional risk but is in fact penalising them financially. The market was 
consequently particularly inefficient from an EMH perspective in pricing the 
stipulated higher exposure to climate change induced systematic risk of companies 
that do not disclose GHG-emissions, report incompletely or show high absolute levels 
of GHG-emissions or a low GHG-efficiency. 
 
As discussed in chapter 2.1.2 Definitions and Important Notions of EMH, Fama did 
not conceptualize the efficient market to be able to perfectly predict the intrinsic 
value of a stock correctly all of the time. Nevertheless, the fact that the abnormal 
returns found in this study are persistent over a five year period suggests that they 
constitute market inefficiency. With regard to the expected future persistence of these 
abnormal returns two cases must be distinguished. Where there is no risk-based 
explanation for an inefficiency found, the abnormal returns are expected to be “erased 
with the knowledge of its existence” (Fama, 1991, p. 1593). As discussed in chapter 
2.1.4 Methodologies and Findings, stock markets are made efficient by market 
participants believing it is inefficient and acting on arbitrage opportunities until prices 
have adjusted to reflect information (Dimson & Mussavian, 1998; Grossmann & 
Stiglitz, 1980; Lee, 2001). This process ensures that stock prices fully reflect 
information again and consequently give accurate signals for resource allocation, 
which allows the stock market to fulfil its task to correctly allocate ownership of the 
economy’s capital stock (Fama, 1970).  
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In the evidenced inefficient state, the stock market does not sufficiently take into 
account the climate change induced systematic risk of European companies when 
allocating ownership of capital stock. The inefficient allocation of capital comes at a 
cost not only to investors but to the whole economy, given that investments in real 
assets are heavily influenced by the valuation of financial assets (Barro, 1990; Bodie 
et al., 2008). If stock prices do not accurately reflect the intrinsic value of the firm 
and climate change induced systematic risk, the beta calculated under consideration 
of these stock prices is incorrect. Consequently, the cost of equity, which is often 
calculated based on historic betas, is also incorrect and in turn the overall cost of 
capital of all companies in the sample cannot be expected to be estimated correctly. 
This cost of capital however is important to various corporate decisions, “[f]rom 
determining the hurdle rate for investment projects to influencing the composition of 
the firm’s capital structure” (Easley & O'Hara, 2004, p. 1553). If incorrect rates for 
the cost of capital of companies are used for investment decisions, the capital in the 
economy is not allocated efficiently, as companies do not know their respective 
opportunity costs and therefore cannot correctly determine the profitability of capital 
investment decisions. As a result, all companies in the sample can be expected to 
pursue value-destroying projects and/or incorrectly reject value-enhancing projects, 
which would impede economic growth (Hayek, 1941). 
 
At the same time, inefficient markets allow companies to raise additional capital at an 
overvalued price (Lin & Wu, 2010). Among others, Spiess and Affleck-Graves 
(1995) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) evidenced that overvalued firms are more 
likely to raise additional capital on financial markets in order to exploit the temporary 
market inefficiency. In the context of this study, this means that the outperforming 
(completely) reporting companies, as well as companies with comparatively good 
climate change performance, can be expected to be more likely to raise additional 
capital on financial markets. This increase in financial capital would entail an 
increase of their investments in real assets and thus support the general growth of 
these companies in the real economy (cf. Wurgler, 2000). Therefore, ironically and 
unwanted from the perspective of EMH, the aimed-at transition to a low carbon 
economy might in fact be supported by the current inefficiency of the market to price 
climate change induced systematic risk at the company level efficiently. 
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According to the EMH, investors making use of the arbitrage opportunities evidenced 
would however soon change the evidenced state of market inefficiency. These 
arbitrage forces would eliminate the abnormal returns of companies that report GHG-
emissions, the abnormal returns of completely reporting companies, the abnormal 
returns of companies with low GHG-emissions and finally the abnormal returns of 
companies with a high and medium GHG-efficiency. After this exploitation of the 
abnormal risk-adjusted returns found, no outperformance on the basis of risk-adjusted 
returns can be expected from investing in companies with (complete) GHG-
disclosure or good corporate climate change performance. In this state of market 
efficiency the lower levels of climate change induced systematic risk of these 
companies would, ceteris paribus, result in a lower beta (cf. chapter 3 Hypotheses 
Development). As beta, despite its shortcomings, is used to calculate the cost of 
equity (Fama & French, 1997), these companies, ceteris paribus, would also show 
lower cost of equity. This lower cost of equity results in a lower cost of capital, which 
in turn fosters the real investments of companies with (complete) GHG-disclosure or 
good corporate climate change performance, as the opportunity costs for investment 
projects of these companies are comparatively low. Thus, once the presumed state of 
market efficiency is achieved, the lower systematic risk and resulting lower cost of 
equity of companies with (complete) GHG-disclosure or good corporate climate 
change performance would encourage growth of these companies in the real economy 
and thus support the aimed-at transition to a low-carbon economy. At the same time, 
the stipulated higher climate change induced systematic risk of companies that, for 
example, show high levels of absolute GHG-emissions would, ceteris paribus, result 
in a higher beta (cf. chapter 3.4 Absolute Levels of Emissions) in an efficient market. 
This higher beta would manifest itself in increased cost of capital for such companies 
and consequently, as the opportunity costs for investment projects of these companies 
are comparatively high, impede their economic growth.  
 
With regard to the expected future persistence of the risk-adjusted abnormal returns 
found at industry level for the EU ETS and the High Carbon portfolios, these 
“abnormal” returns might persist in the future given that there is a risk-based 
explanation. As discussed, abnormal returns for which there is a risk-based 
explanation may be attributable to a shortcoming in the underlying asset pricing 
models to correctly price the systematic risk induced by climate change. As indicated 
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before, a conclusion of this magnitude however requires further research. It is 
nevertheless interesting to theoretically discuss a scenario where these abnormal 
returns are a rational compensation for the additional risk investors take on when 
investing in companies that show higher exposure to climate change induced 
systematic risk. In this scenario, returns of the EU ETS and High carbon industries 
portfolios would persist in future and traditional asset pricing models applied to test 
market efficiency would need to be extended for a factor that controls for climate 
change induced systematic risk. In this scenario, these returns do not constitute 
“abnormal” returns but can be aligned with the basic notion of the EMH that 
investors are rewarded for taking non-diversifiable risk. The relevance and practical 
implications of these and other discussed findings are illustrated in the following 
chapter. 
7.2 Relevance and Contribution to Knowledge 
The findings of this study are relevant and constitute a contribution to knowledge in 
several ways. First and foremost, this research represents the first assessment of 
market efficiency dedicated towards climate change induced systematic risk. Results 
of this research thus add to the sparse literature that allows drawing conclusions on 
market efficiency towards CSP (cf. chapter 2.2 Literature linking CSP and SMP). 
Furthermore, as briefly discussed above in the context of EMH, this research is 
expected to contribute to raising the level of market efficiency. Schwert (2003) 
showed that inefficiencies disappear once they are published, i.e. research causes the 
market to become more efficient because market participants act on the inefficiencies 
evidenced. This research may consequently make a contribution to raising the level of 
market efficiency towards climate change induced systematic risk of European 
companies by having evidenced the arbitrage opportunities discussed. 
 
While not targeted towards investment practitioners, the arbitrage opportunities 
evidenced are expected to be of interest to mainstream and SRI investors. This was 
ensured to be the case in this research by applying a C4FM extended for industry 
effects, as investment practitioners tend to focus more heavily on industry factors 
than academia traditionally has done in models of asset pricing (Hsu et al., 2011). 
Interestingly, when exploiting the arbitrage opportunities evidenced in this research, 
the interests of SRI and mainstream investors are aligned. The value-driven SRI 
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investor (Derwall, Koedijk, & Ter Horst, 2011) would tend to invest in companies 
reporting (complete) GHG-emissions and showing a comparatively good climate 
change performance for ethical reasons. The mainstream investor, out of purely 
financial motivation, would also invest in these companies in order to benefit from 
the inefficiency of the financial market to correctly price the positive effect of 
(complete) GHG-emissions reporting and good climate change performance. During 
this period of exploiting the market inefficiency identified, the interests of both types 
of investors are consequently aligned, while simultaneously resulting in a reduction 
of the exposure of their portfolios towards climate change induced systematic risk. 
 
In this context, it is interesting to refer to an argument of Heinkel, Kraus and Zechner 
(2001), who proposed that if a sufficiently large number of investors refuse to hold 
shares of polluting firms, the price of these shares falls and as a consequently the cost 
of capital of the respective firms would rise. They argue that polluting firms will 
become greener if the increased cost of capital surpasses the cost of switching to less 
polluting business practices and show that theoretically “roughly 25% green investors 
are necessary to overcome a firm's cost of reforming” (Heinkel et al., 2001, p. 447). 
Theoretically speaking, if, during the time of exploiting the anomalies evidenced in 
this research, the share of market participants investing in companies with low GHG-
emissions and a high GHG-efficiency surpasses this threshold, the economy might be 
changed towards greener business practises in the long term. 
 
According to the EMH, market participants will erase inefficiencies by acting on 
arbitrage opportunities and, as a result, the financial market at some point will 
correctly reflect the information concerning (complete) GHG-emissions reporting and 
good climate change performance. In this scenario of market efficiency, investors will 
no longer be able to generate an abnormal return by investing in companies that 
report (complete) GHG-emissions and show a comparatively good climate change 
performance. Relating this argument to studies gathering evidence on whether it pays 
to be green illustrates that it can only be financially rewarding – in the sense of 
abnormal risk-adjusted returns – for investors to be green in the short term, i.e. until 
market participants have erased the inefficiencies evidenced. In an efficient market, 
investors would only be rewarded for taking on higher levels of climate change 
induced systematic risk. As argued in chapter 3 Hypotheses Development, companies 
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that do not report GHG-emission, report incomplete GHG-emissions, show 
comparatively high absolute levels of GHG-emissions and a comparatively low 
GHG-efficiency would consequently generate higher returns, while no difference in 
risk-adjusted returns between portfolios would be obtainable by market participants. 
In this scenario of market efficiency, mainstream investors with a higher taste for risk 
would – at the unknown point in time when the market becomes efficient – switch to 
companies that do not report GHG-emissions (completely) or have a poor climate 
change performance. They would do so because in an efficient market, ceteris 
paribus, these latter companies would generate higher returns as a compensation for 
the additional climate change induced systematic risk assumed. This type of investor 
would also invest in companies affiliated with the EU ETS and high carbon 
industries. The value-driven SRI investor on the other hand would continue investing 
in companies with good climate change performance and, ceteris paribus, receive a 
lower return in light of his or her reduced exposure to climate change induced 
systematic risk. If, in this scenario of market efficiency, investors do not actively 
optimise their portfolios according to their specific taste for climate change induced 
systematic risk, they are exposing themselves to unidentified levels of systematic risk. 
 
Interestingly, in this scenario of an efficient market and in the context of the 
presumed climate change induced systematic risk, the value-driven SRI investor does 
not act irrationally by investing in companies that, for example, show a good climate 
change performance, given that the portfolio is reasonable diversified. As described 
in chapter 2.1.2 Definitions and Important Notions of EMH, Fama and French believe 
that socially responsible investors trade in parts of their risk-adjusted return for 
knowledge that their investments do not violate their social or environmental 
conscience (Fama & French, 2007). If however, lower returns stem from lower 
systematic climate change induced risk, the socially responsible investor is not 
irrational and does not receive lower levels of risk-adjusted returns. In this scenario, 
the assessment of Fama and French (2007, p. 673) that “the world is a better place 
(prices are more rational)” when socially responsible investors switch to a passive 
market portfolio strategy requires the following footnote: When lower returns in an 
efficient market stem from lower levels of climate change induced systematic risk, 
green investors are not acting irrationally, do not trade in risk-adjusted return for 
ethical values and consequently do not hamper market efficiency. 
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In addition to this implication and the implications of results for investment practice 
discussed, this research makes a contribution to knowledge with regard to the on-
going debate on the value-relevance of information on corporate climate change 
performance. Identifying economically significant abnormal risk-adjusted returns in a 
large European sample over five years, this research gives strong evidence that the 
existence and quality of corporate disclosures on climate change performance, as well 
as the information on the actual levels of absolute GHG-emissions and GHG-
efficiency, is regarded as relevant to the intrinsic value of the firm by financial 
markets. On a related note, findings of this research should consequently also 
motivate companies to report (complete) GHG-emissions to the public, given that the 
current inefficiency of the market results in significant annualised abnormal returns of 
e.g. 4.90% (p<0.05) for companies that report complete GHG-emissions in line with 
the GHG Protocol and the CDP. At the same time, results suggest that incompletely 
reporting companies were severely penalised by financial markets during the time of 
this study (cf. chapter 6.3.1 Regression Results). If, at some point in the future, the 
market efficiently prices climate change induced systematic risk at the company 
level, companies should also be motivated to report (completely) on their climate 
change performance in order to reduce their systematic risk, as discussed in chapter 3 
Hypotheses Development. 
 
Furthermore, as it represents the first comprehensive analysis of the completeness of 
quantitative corporate GHG-emissions reporting in Europe, this study makes a more 
general contribution to knowledge with regard to the state of corporate GHG-
emissions reporting. By means of the constructed Disclosure Completeness Index, 
descriptive results suggested that on average over the five years under analysis, only 
15% of companies strictly follow the recommendations of the GHG Protocol and the 
CDP (cf. chapter 4.3.2 Disclosure Completeness). In other words, on average 
between 2005 and 2009 only 15% of the European constituents of the FTSE AWI 
reported scope 1 and 2 GHG-emissions for group-wide corporate activities. 
Consequently, results of this study also show that while the GHG Protocol and the 
CDP give companies useful tools for the reporting of GHG-emissions, these reporting 
guidelines are not applied in a precise manner without regulatory enforcement. 
Finally, to be able to control for the incompleteness of reported GHG-emissions data 
evidenced, this research made a methodological contribution: By weighting company 
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returns according to the completeness of its GHG-emission reporting (cf. chapter 
5.4.1 Incompleteness of GHG-emissions Data), it suggested a methodology that 
allows ensuring that incompletely reported emissions data is not driving the returns of 
portfolios constructed from specific levels of absolute GHG-emissions or GHG-
efficiency. Given that the quality of environmental data represents a general problem 
in SRI, this methodological innovation should constitute an interesting test of 
robustness for other studies. As long as the environmental performance data reported 
by companies is not complete and reliable, this test of robustness is necessary as it 
allows eliminating the possibility that the performance of a socially responsible 
investment strategy is driven by incompletely reported data. 
 
In summary, this test of financial market efficiency evidenced that the market was 
inefficient in pricing the climate change induced systematic risk of European 
companies between 2005 and 2009. However, leaving aside the ideology of EMH, 
this research has also produced a lot of insight into the behaviour of stock prices 
towards the affiliation of companies with the EU ETS and high carbon industries, the 
existence and completeness of corporate disclosure on GHG-emissions, as well as 
climate change performance, as measured by absolute levels of GHG-emissions and 
GHG-efficiency. As such, and as illustrated above, the findings of this research have 
implications for investment practise, the choice of companies to disclosure (complete) 
GHG-emissions, the discussion on the value-relevance of such disclosures, as well as 
methodologies applied in SRI research that allow controlling for incomplete 
environmental data. At the same time, the findings of this research open up 
interesting avenues for future research, which are discussed in the remaining 
paragraphs of this thesis. 
7.3 Limitations and Avenues for Future Research 
The findings of this study are limited to the sample and period under analysis, i.e. 
mid- and large cap non-financial companies from the European Union in the years 
2005 to 2009. Further research, analysing the six proxies for climate change induced 
systematic risk introduced in this study outside of the sample and period of this 
research, is required to generalise or contrast the results found. For example, this 
future research would be able to verify whether the outperformance found at the 
industry level for portfolios constructed from companies affiliated with the EU ETS 
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and high carbon industries is in fact related to climate change induced systematic risk 
and is persistent in other markets and periods. If this was the case, climate change 
induced systematic risk would qualify as an additional risk premium in the future. On 
the other hand, repeating this test of market efficiency with the sample examined in 
this study in the years after 2009 would allow examining whether the arbitrage 
opportunities evidenced at the company level for (complete) reporting companies and 
companies with a good climate change performance are being erased by market 
participants, as stipulated by the EMH, or continue to exist. 
 
As it has been evidenced in this test of semi-strong market efficiency, complete 
information on corporate GHG-emissions is not readily available to the market (cf. 
chapter 4.3.2 Disclosure Completeness). Consequently, GHG-emissions data actually 
lends itself for a rarely possible large-scale test of strong market efficiency (i.e. a 
market in which even private information is accounted for in a stock price (cf. chapter 
2.1.1 The Short History of EMH)). Though tests of robustness performed in this study 
confirmed that the incompleteness of GHG-emissions data is not driving the returns 
of portfolios constructed from different dimensions of GHG-emissions, it would 
nevertheless be conceptually interesting to contrast these results with a test of strong 
market efficiency on company level based on privately held information on complete 
GHG-emissions data.  
 
Making the necessary informed extrapolations for such a test of strong market 
efficiency of incomplete GHG-emissions data to cover scope 1 and 2 GHG-emissions 
for group-wide corporate activities for all companies in a sufficiently large sample 
would be a challenging task. The resulting complete GHG-emissions data would 
however also allow relating this data to accounting measures of financial performance 
as a return figure. An assessment of whether it is financially rewarding in accounting 
terms for companies to have a good climate change performance would then be 
possible. Furthermore, the specific characteristics of companies with different levels 
of complete GHG-emissions could then be investigated and – more importantly – the 
specific characteristics of companies reducing their GHG-emissions could be 
determined. If drivers for the reduction of absolute levels of corporate GHG-
emissions were known, the transition to a low carbon economy could be expedited 
via political and market initiatives focussing on these drivers. 
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Finally, while the Joint Hypothesis Problem in tests of market efficiency cannot be 
eliminated (cf. chapter 2.1.4 Methodologies and Findings), this research made an 
effort to minimise this limitation by using the most advanced yet established C4FM 
extended for industry effects. With regard to the discussed potential shortcoming of 
prevailing asset pricing models to price climate change induced systematic risk at the 
industry level further research is required, as discussed before. Overall, this study 
thus opens up some interesting avenues for future research. 
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Appendix A 
Regression Results: Value-weighted Returns 
A.1 European Emission Trading Scheme 
 
  
Portfolio α (Rm-Rf) SMB HML UMD ACV Adj. R2
EU ETS
CAPM 2.318% 1.045 *** 0.946
C4FM 2.915% * 1.148 *** -0.145 *** -0.064 0.212 *** 0.965
C4FM / June 1.249% 1.107 *** -0.255 *** 0.076 0.151 *** 0.972
C4FM + Carbon 1.512% 1.089 *** -0.220 *** 0.137 0.201 *** -0.000 0.961
C4FM + Oil 2.412% * 1.113 *** -0.155 *** -0.041 0.176 *** 0.037 *** 0.969
C4FM + Crisis 4.294% ** 1.112 *** -0.122 ** -0.068 0.215 *** -0.022 ** 0.965
Not in EU ETS
CAPM -1.993% 0.959 *** 0.930
C4FM -2.603% 0.849 *** 0.163 *** 0.064 -0.222 *** 0.956
C4FM / June -1.889% 0.880 *** 0.263 *** -0.059 -0.186 *** 0.965
C4FM + Carbon -2.148% 0.908 *** 0.200 *** -0.106 -0.201 *** -0.000 0.955
C4FM + Oil -2.074% 0.886 *** 0.174 *** 0.039 -0.184 *** -0.039 *** 0.961
C4FM + Crisis -4.091% ** 0.888 *** 0.138 ** 0.068 -0.225 *** 0.024 * 0.957
Long EU ETS - 
Short Not in EU ETS 5.516% * 0.299 *** -0.309 *** -0.128 0.434 *** 0.368
Notes: This table reports regression results for EU ETS and Not in EU ETS portfolios using monthly value-
weighted returns and value-weighted SMB, HML and UMD factors. Rows represent the different models 
used, i.e. CAPM, C4FM, as well as the tests of robustness of results. Tests of robustness include portfolio 
creation in June (/ June) and the inclusion of additional control variables (ACV) for changes in the price of 
carbon (Carbon) and oil (Oil), as well as financial market crisis (Crisis). Columns show the annualised alpha 
in per cent, beta estimations (Rm - Rf), coefficient exposure on the SMB, HML and UMD factors and ACV, 
as well as the adjusted R-squared. ***, ** and * indicate the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level 
respectively. Coefficient covariances and standard errors are made heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
consistent based on Newey and West (1987). 
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 + Industry / G
H
G
 t-2
0.216%
 
1.199
***
0.310
***-0.195 
***
0.081
 
-0.109 
 
0.125
 
0.166
 
-0.039 
 
-0.106 
 
0.148
 
0.050
 
0.031
 
0.117
**
0.985
C
4FM
 + Industry / June
-1.133%
 
1.114
***
0.171
 
0.035
 
-0.000 
 
-0.109 
 
0.031
 
0.121
 
-0.021 
 
-0.163 
*
0.123
 
-0.025 
 
-0.065 
 
0.068
 
0.978
C
4FM
 + Industry + C
arbon 
0.594%
 
1.077
***
-0.031 
 
0.120
 
-0.095 
 
0.046
 
0.070
 
0.172
 
0.211
 
-0.065 
 
0.412
**
0.001
 
0.008
 
0.169
***-0.001 
 
0.971
C
4FM
 + Industry + O
il 
1.243%
 
1.006
***
0.403
***-0.030 
 
-0.049 
 
-0.276 
***-0.137 
**
-0.199 
*
-0.208 
**
-0.232 
***
0.039
 
-0.127 
**
-0.253 
***
0.039
 
0.019
*
0.986
C
4FM
 + Industry + C
risis
1.200%
 
1.016
***
0.417
***-0.035 
 
-0.040 
 
-0.248 
***-0.110 
*
-0.181 
*
-0.175 
*
-0.219 
***
0.031
 
-0.113 
*
-0.231 
***
0.042
 
-0.001 
 
0.986
Long Reporting G
H
G
 - 
Short N
ot Reporting G
H
G
-1.362%
 
-0.020 
 
-0.483 
***
0.040
 
0.038
 
0.344
***
0.168
**
0.274
**
0.256
**
0.300
***-0.026 
 
0.169
**
0.303
*** -0.047 
 
0.840
N
otes: This table reports regression results for R
eporting G
H
G
 and N
ot reporting G
H
G
 portfolios, as w
ell as the long-short portfolio, using m
onthly value-w
eighted returns and value-w
eighted SM
B
, H
M
L and 
U
M
D
 factors. R
ow
s represent the different m
odels used, i.e. C
A
PM
, C
4FM
, C
4FM
 controlled for industry effects, as w
ell as the tests of robustness of results. Tests of robustness include portfolio creation w
ith 
G
H
G
-data from
 t-2 (/ G
H
G
 t-2) and in June (/ June) and the introduction of additional control variables (A
C
V
) for changes in the price of carbon (C
arbon) and oil (O
il), as w
ell as financial m
arket crisis (C
risis). 
C
olum
ns show
 the annualised alpha in per cent, beta estim
ations (R
m
 - R
f), coefficient exposure on the SM
B
, H
M
L and U
M
D
 factors, as w
ell as on orthogonalised industry returns represented by their 
respective IC
B
 code. The rem
aining colum
ns show
 coefficient exposure on A
C
V
 and the adjusted R
-squared. ***, ** and * indicate the 1%
, 5%
 and 10%
 significance level respectively. C
oefficient covariances 
and standard errors are m
ade heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent based on N
ew
ey and W
est (1987). 
A.2 
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A.3 Disclosure Completeness 
  
A
.3 D
isclosure C
om
pleteness 
Portfolio
α
(R
m
-R
f)
SM
B
H
M
L
U
M
D
0001
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
9000
A
C
V
A
dj. R
2
0 Score
C
A
PM
-0.391%
0.999
***
0.834
C
4FM
1.440%
1.038
***
0.190
-0.321 
**
0.060
0.850
C
4FM
 + Industry
-2.119%
 
0.974
***
0.351
 
-0.157 
 
0.124
 
-0.654 
***-0.266 
*
-0.531 
**
-0.511 
**
-0.301 
**
-0.612 
***-0.470 
***-0.123 
 
-0.189 
**
0.885
C
4FM
 + Industry / G
H
G
 t-2
-1.332%
 
0.948
***
0.690
**
0.178
 
0.587
*
-0.949 
***-0.444 
**
-0.573 
 
-0.673 
***-0.398 
**
-1.120 
***-0.427 
**
-0.182 
 
-0.131 
 
0.903
C
4FM
 + Industry / June
-3.818%
 
1.007
***
0.419
 
-0.042 
 
0.204
 
-0.737 
***-0.212 
*
-0.346 
 
-0.557 
**
-0.179 
 
-0.844 
***-0.440 
***-0.136 
 
-0.219 
**
0.876
C
4FM
 + Industry + C
arbon 
-0.637%
 
0.934
***
-0.225 
 
0.123
 
-0.264 
 
-0.409 
 
-0.121 
 
0.047
 
-0.101 
 
0.044
 
-0.287 
 
-0.409 
**
0.042
 
-0.136 
 
0.005
*
0.821
C
4FM
 + Industry + O
il 
-1.368%
 
0.924
***
0.286
 
-0.141 
 
0.078
 
-0.786 
***-0.392 
**
-0.614 
**
-0.670 
**
-0.367 
**
-0.572 
***-0.544 
***-0.236 
 
-0.204 
***
0.084
***
0.904
C
4FM
 + Industry + C
risis
0.172%
 
0.937
***
0.329
 
-0.166 
 
0.096
 
-0.679 
***-0.302 
*
-0.560 
**
-0.568 
**
-0.334 
**
-0.597 
***-0.523 
***-0.198 
 
-0.193 
**
-0.027 
 
0.884
1 Score
C
A
PM
0.797%
0.940
***
0.937
C
4FM
0.834%
1.016
***
-0.110 
**
0.028
0.224
***
0.959
C
4FM
 + Industry
0.223%
***
1.059
***
0.003
 
-0.008 
**
0.004
 
-0.001 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.003 
 
0.309
***
0.113
***
0.394
***
0.111
***-0.006 
*
0.079
***
1.000
C
4FM
 + Industry / G
H
G
 t-2
0.266%
 
0.892
***
-0.180 
**
0.119
***-0.073 
 
0.078
 
-0.107 
 
-0.224 
*
0.093
 
-0.025 
 
0.102
 
-0.136 
 
0.020
 
-0.029 
 
0.980
C
4FM
 + Industry / June
-0.076%
 
0.929
***
-0.051 
 
-0.001 
 
0.007
 
0.178
**
0.003
 
-0.100 
 
0.193
**
0.026
 
0.141
 
-0.012 
 
0.171
**
0.023
 
0.975
C
4FM
 + Industry + C
arbon 
0.418%
 
0.895
***
-0.169 
 
0.052
 
-0.097 
 
0.209
*
-0.011 
 
-0.083 
 
0.281
 
0.064
 
0.250
*
-0.055 
 
0.174
*
0.036
 
-0.001 
 
0.963
C
4FM
 + Industry + O
il 
-0.200%
 
0.965
***
-0.034 
 
0.004
 
0.058
 
0.156
 
-0.013 
 
-0.046 
 
0.187
 
0.026
 
0.012
 
-0.046 
 
0.197
**
0.022
 
-0.005 
 
0.973
C
4FM
 + Industry + C
risis
1.826%
 
0.930
***
-0.058 
 
-0.002 
 
0.030
 
0.126
 
-0.053 
 
-0.076 
 
0.128
 
-0.007 
 
0.028
 
-0.096 
 
0.125
 
0.017
 
-0.023 
 
0.974
2 Score
C
A
PM
-0.314%
1.020
***
0.965
C
4FM
-0.424%
1.007
***
-0.113 
**
0.012
-0.163 
**
0.968
C
4FM
 + Industry
-1.060%
 
1.056
***
-0.248 
**
0.015
 
-0.103 
 
0.184
*
0.177
**
0.416
***
0.182
 
0.205
***
0.103
 
0.183
*
0.075
 
0.003
 
0.975
C
4FM
 + Industry / G
H
G
 t-2
-2.432%
*
0.963
***
-0.108 
 
0.142
***-0.111 
 
0.291
**
0.168
*
0.386
***
0.187
 
0.224
***
0.042
 
0.214
**
0.080
 
-0.000 
 
0.976
C
4FM
 + Industry / June
-2.022%
 
1.021
***
-0.171 
 
0.023
 
-0.168 
 
0.311
***
0.232
***
0.459
***
0.331
***
0.303
***
0.138
 
0.278
***
0.203
**
0.032
 
0.975
C
4FM
 + Industry + C
arbon 
-2.503%
 
1.014
***
0.057
 
0.021
 
0.001
 
0.197
*
0.189
 
0.289
*
0.093
 
0.260
***-0.085 
 
0.263
**
0.126
 
-0.029 
 
-0.001 
 
0.971
C
4FM
 + Industry + O
il 
-1.117%
 
1.059
***
-0.243 
**
0.014
 
-0.100 
 
0.194
*
0.186
**
0.422
***
0.194
 
0.210
***
0.100
 
0.188
*
0.084
 
0.004
 
-0.006 
 
0.975
C
4FM
 + Industry + C
risis
-4.451%
**
1.110
***
-0.215 
***
0.027
 
-0.061 
 
0.220
*
0.230
**
0.459
***
0.265
 
0.254
***
0.080
 
0.261
**
0.186
 
0.009
 
0.040
***
0.978
3 Score
C
A
PM
3.260%
1.016
***
0.882
C
4FM
4.207%
*
1.076
***
0.011
-0.148 
*
0.119
0.882
C
4FM
 + Industry
2.488%
 
1.043
***
0.258
 
-0.056 
 
0.337
 
0.341
 
0.334
 
0.170
 
0.128
 
0.195
 
0.132
 
0.435
**
0.279
 
0.106
 
0.914
C
4FM
 + Industry / G
H
G
 t-2
3.922%
 
1.105
***
-0.024 
 
-0.256 
***
0.052
 
0.432
 
0.459
*
0.346
 
0.326
 
0.291
 
0.102
 
0.389
*
0.292
 
0.049
 
0.890
C
4FM
 + Industry / June
5.624%
*
1.096
***
0.184
 
-0.011 
 
0.508
*
0.089
 
0.177
 
0.081
 
-0.207 
 
-0.062 
 
-0.059 
 
0.205
 
0.032
 
0.054
 
0.885
C
4FM
 + Industry + C
arbon 
2.599%
 
1.256
***
0.348
 
-0.251 
 
0.654
 
0.020
 
0.294
 
0.234
 
-0.221 
 
-0.182 
 
-0.302 
 
0.338
 
0.120
 
0.060
 
0.004
 
0.816
C
4FM
 + Industry + O
il 
2.256%
 
1.058
***
0.278
*
-0.060 
 
0.351
 
0.381
 
0.373
*
0.196
 
0.177
 
0.215
 
0.120
 
0.458
**
0.314
 
0.111
 
-0.026 
 
0.914
C
4FM
 + Industry + C
risis
3.917%
 
1.020
***
0.244
 
-0.061 
 
0.319
 
0.325
 
0.312
 
0.152
 
0.093
 
0.174
 
0.141
 
0.402
*
0.232
 
0.104
 
-0.017 
 
0.913
Long 3 Score -
Short 0 Score
4.606%
 
0.069
 
-0.093 
 
0.102
 
0.213
 
0.995
***
0.601
**
0.701
**
0.639
 
0.496
**
0.744
***
0.905
***
0.402
 
0.295
**
0.283
N
otes: This table reports regression results for the four portfolios constructed from
 levels of G
H
G
-em
issions disclosure com
pleteness, as w
ell as the long-short portfolio, using m
onthly value-w
eighted returns and 
value-w
eighted SM
B
, H
M
L and U
M
D
 factors. R
ow
s represent the different m
odels used, i.e. C
A
PM
, C
4FM
, C
4FM
 controlled for industry effects, as w
ell as the tests of robustness of results. Tests of 
robustness include portfolio creation w
ith G
H
G
-data from
 t-2 (/ G
H
G
 t-2) and in June (/ June) and the introduction of additional control variables (A
C
V
) for changes in the price of carbon (C
arbon) and oil (O
il), as 
w
ell as financial m
arket crisis (C
risis). C
olum
ns show
 the annualised alpha in per cent, beta estim
ations (R
m
 - R
f), coefficient exposure on the SM
B
, H
M
L and U
M
D
 factors, as w
ell as on orthogonalised industry 
returns represented by their respective IC
B
 code. The rem
aining colum
ns show
 coefficient exposure on A
C
V
 and the adjusted R
-squared. ***, ** and * indicate the 1%
, 5%
 and 10%
 significance level 
respectively. C
oefficient covariances and standard errors are m
ade heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent based on N
ew
ey and W
est (1987). 
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Portfolio
α
(R
m
-R
f)
SM
B
H
M
L
U
M
D
0001
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
9000
A
C
V
A
dj. R
2
H
igh G
H
G
C
A
PM
2.634%
1.094
***
0.901
C
4FM
3.007%
1.201
***
-0.232 
***
-0.022 
0.179
**
0.920
C
4FM
 + Industry
-2.080%
***
1.106
***
-0.254 
***
0.139
***
-0.090 
 
0.441
***
0.238
***
0.150
 
0.263
***
0.066
 
0.004
 
-0.044 
 
0.359
***
-0.004 
 
0.988
C
4FM
 + Industry / W
eighted
-1.200%
 
1.107
***
0.019
 
0.197
***
-0.032 
 
0.517
***
0.387
***
0.364
***
0.426
***
0.154
***
0.111
 
0.121
**
0.529
***
0.044
 
0.991
C
4FM
 + Industry / G
H
G
 t-2
-3.174%
***
1.036
***
-0.272 
***
0.263
***
-0.043 
 
0.295
**
0.126
 
0.006
 
0.072
 
-0.007 
 
-0.160 
 
-0.154 
 
0.212
**
-0.053 
*
0.980
C
4FM
 + Industry / June
-2.633%
***
1.041
***
-0.277 
***
0.218
***
-0.178 
***
0.561
***
0.294
***
0.213
*
0.404
***
0.151
**
0.144
*
0.042
 
0.456
***
0.035
 
0.986
C
4FM
 + Industry + C
arbon
-2.591%
**
1.060
***
-0.294 
**
0.183
**
-0.231 
**
0.637
***
0.337
***
0.322
**
0.468
**
0.177
*
0.223
**
0.088
 
0.492
***
0.046
 
0.001
 
0.981
C
4FM
 + Industry + O
il
-2.035%
***
1.103
***
-0.257 
***
0.140
***
-0.093 
 
0.433
***
0.230
***
0.145
 
0.253
**
0.063
 
0.006
 
-0.048 
 
0.352
***
-0.005 
 
0.005
 
0.988
C
4FM
 + Industry + C
risis
-1.435%
 
1.095
***
-0.260 
***
0.136
***
-0.099 
*
0.434
***
0.227
***
0.142
 
0.247
***
0.057
 
0.008
 
-0.059 
 
0.338
***
-0.006 
 
-0.008 
 
0.988
M
edium
 G
H
G
C
A
PM
-1.392%
0.861
***
0.907
C
4FM
-1.717%
0.842
***
-0.080 
0.050
-0.120 
**
0.906
C
4FM
 + Industry
0.628%
 
0.877
***
0.023
 
-0.098 
***
-0.003 
 
-0.039 
 
-0.032 
 
0.135
 
0.098
 
0.194
***
0.067
 
0.249
***
-0.104 
 
0.002
 
0.975
C
4FM
 + Industry / W
eighted
0.772%
 
0.989
***
0.208
***
-0.067 
**
0.060
 
-0.058 
 
0.012
 
0.132
 
0.097
 
0.093
 
0.089
 
0.188
**
-0.105 
 
0.016
 
0.978
C
4FM
 + Industry / G
H
G
 t-2
0.980%
 
0.843
***
0.018
 
-0.069 
*
-0.118 
 
0.184
*
0.076
 
0.245
*
0.343
**
0.311
***
0.246
**
0.357
***
0.054
 
0.037
 
0.976
C
4FM
 + Industry / June
0.798%
 
0.900
***
0.051
 
-0.140 
***
0.029
 
-0.065 
 
-0.065 
 
0.099
 
0.033
 
0.170
***
0.028
 
0.218
***
-0.163 
**
-0.019 
 
0.979
C
4FM
 + Industry + C
arbon
0.293%
 
0.871
***
0.107
 
-0.121 
*
0.082
 
-0.155 
 
-0.087 
 
0.014
 
-0.050 
 
0.157
**
-0.134 
*
0.191
**
-0.176 
 
-0.062 
 
0.001
 
0.977
C
4FM
 + Industry + O
il
0.506%
 
0.885
***
0.033
 
-0.101 
***
0.004
 
-0.018 
 
-0.012 
 
0.148
 
0.124
 
0.205
***
0.061
 
0.261
***
-0.085 
 
0.004
 
-0.013 
 
0.976
C
4FM
 + Industry + C
risis
-0.766%
 
0.899
***
0.036
 
-0.093 
***
0.014
 
-0.024 
 
-0.010 
 
0.152
 
0.132
 
0.215
***
0.058
 
0.281
***
-0.058 
 
0.004
 
0.016
 
0.976
L
ow
 G
H
G
C
A
PM
0.461%
0.981
***
0.893
C
4FM
0.521%
0.867
***
0.364
***
-0.060 
-0.142 
*
0.936
C
4FM
 + Industry
3.508%
***
0.990
***
0.179
 
-0.175 
**
0.062
 
0.066
 
0.084
 
0.299
*
0.181
 
0.097
 
0.326
**
0.199
 
0.110
 
0.123
**
0.967
C
4FM
 + Industry / W
eighted
2.279%
**
0.972
***
0.410
***
-0.114 
*
0.001
 
0.248
*
0.143
 
0.335
**
0.325
*
0.198
**
0.463
***
0.295
**
0.206
 
0.157
***
0.979
C
4FM
 + Industry / G
H
G
 t-2
4.688%
***
0.962
***
0.128
 
-0.106 
 
0.130
 
-0.185 
 
-0.168 
 
0.030
 
-0.123 
 
-0.097 
 
0.091
 
-0.015 
 
-0.219 
 
0.048
 
0.956
C
4FM
 + Industry / June
4.667%
***
0.989
***
0.367
***
-0.244 
**
0.153
*
-0.148 
 
-0.020 
 
0.111
 
-0.048 
 
-0.020 
 
0.042
 
0.097
 
-0.061 
 
0.063
 
0.965
C
4FM
 + Industry + C
arbon
4.343%
***
0.953
***
0.297
*
-0.023 
 
0.241
**
-0.480 
***
-0.237 
**
-0.301 
**
-0.485 
**
-0.143 
 
-0.154 
 
-0.187 
 
-0.337 
**
-0.043 
 
-0.002 
 
0.958
C
4FM
 + Industry + O
il
3.598%
**
0.984
***
0.171
 
-0.173 
**
0.056
 
0.050
 
0.069
 
0.290
*
0.162
 
0.089
 
0.331
**
0.190
 
0.097
 
0.121
**
0.010
 
0.967
C
4FM
 + Industry + C
risis
3.364%
*
0.992
***
0.180
 
-0.174 
**
0.064
 
0.068
 
0.087
 
0.301
*
0.185
 
0.099
 
0.325
**
0.202
 
0.115
 
0.123
**
0.002
 
0.967
Long Low
 G
H
G
 - 
Short H
igh G
H
G
5.587%
***
-0.116 
*
0.432
**
-0.313 
***
0.152
 
-0.375 
*
-0.153 
 
0.149
 
-0.081 
 
0.031
 
0.322
**
0.243
 
-0.249 
 
0.127
*
0.846
N
otes: This table reports regression results for the three portfolios contructed from
 absolute levels of G
H
G
-em
issions, as w
ell as the long-short portfolio, using m
onthly value-w
eighted returns and value-w
eighted SM
B
, 
H
M
L and U
M
D
 factors. R
ow
s represent the different m
odels used, i.e. C
A
PM
, C
4FM
, C
4FM
 controlled for industry effects, as w
ell as the tests of robustness of results. Tests of robustness include w
eighting by 
disclosure com
pleteness (/ w
eighted), portfolio creation w
ith G
H
G
-data from
 t-2 (/ G
H
G
 t-2) and in June (/ June) and the introduction of additional control variables (A
C
V
) for changes in the price of carbon (C
arbon) 
and oil (O
il), as w
ell as financial m
arket crisis (C
risis). C
olum
ns show
 the annualised alpha in per cent, beta estim
ations (R
m
 - R
f), coefficient exposure on the SM
B
, H
M
L and U
M
D
 factors, as w
ell as on 
orthogonalised industry returns represented by their respective IC
B
 code. The rem
aining colum
ns show
 coefficient exposure on A
C
V
 and the adjusted R
-squared. ***, ** and * indicate the 1%
, 5%
 and 10%
 
significance level respectively. C
oefficient covariances and standard errors are m
ade heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent based on N
ew
ey and W
est (1987). 
A
.4 A
bsolute L
evels of G
H
G
-em
issions 
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A.5 GHG-efficiency 
 
 
  
A
.5 G
H
G
-efficiency 
Portfolio
α
(R
m
-R
f)
SM
B
H
M
L
U
M
D
0001
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
9000
A
C
V
A
dj. R
2
H
igh G
H
G
-efficiency
C
A
PM
-0.674%
0.795
***
0.845
C
4FM
-0.696%
0.772
***
-0.004 
-0.007 
-0.105 
0.840
C
4FM
 + Industry
2.740%
**
0.861
***
-0.059 
 
-0.204 
***
0.018
 
0.109
 
0.084
 
0.311
**
0.317
**
0.296
***
0.339
***
0.318
***
0.108
 
0.133
**
0.957
C
4FM
 + Industry / W
eighted
3.156%
***
0.912
***
0.139
 
-0.170 
***
0.028
 
0.133
 
0.075
 
0.310
**
0.293
**
0.239
***
0.370
***
0.301
***
0.112
 
0.148
***
0.97
C
4FM
 + Industry / G
H
G
 t-2
2.892%
 
0.795
***
-0.008 
 
-0.158 
**
-0.013 
 
-0.048 
 
-0.080 
 
0.097
 
0.123
 
0.209
*
0.170
 
0.198
 
-0.119 
 
0.062
 
0.947
C
4FM
 + Industry / June
2.701%
*
0.845
***
0.129
 
-0.224 
***
0.068
 
-0.044 
 
0.002
 
0.142
 
0.181
 
0.218
**
0.119
 
0.259
***
0.011
 
0.096
 
0.955
C
4FM
 + Industry + C
arbon
2.707%
 
0.775
***
0.214
 
-0.096 
 
0.133
 
-0.179 
 
-0.091 
 
-0.134 
 
0.014
 
0.235
*
0.005
 
0.121
 
-0.101 
 
0.044
 
-0.004 
***
0.956
C
4FM
 + Industry + O
il
2.759%
**
0.860
***
-0.061 
 
-0.203 
***
0.017
 
0.105
 
0.081
 
0.309
**
0.313
**
0.295
***
0.340
***
0.316
***
0.105
 
0.133
**
0.002
 
0.956
C
4FM
 + Industry + C
risis
1.334%
 
0.884
***
-0.046 
 
-0.199 
***
0.036
 
0.124
 
0.106
 
0.329
**
0.352
**
0.316
***
0.330
***
0.350
***
0.154
 
0.135
**
0.016
 
0.957
M
edium
 G
H
G
-efficiency
C
A
PM
1.544%
0.964
***
0.899
C
4FM
0.821%
1.048
***
-0.194 
***
0.174
**
0.309
***
0.952
C
4FM
 + Industry
-1.037%
 
0.970
***
-0.298 
***
0.174
***
-0.132 
**
0.429
***
0.130
*
0.110
 
0.336
***
0.097
 
0.157
 
-0.017 
 
0.036
 
-0.031 
 
0.985
C
4FM
 + Industry / W
eighted
1.144%
 
0.995
***
-0.023 
 
0.040
 
-0.138 
**
0.419
***
0.199
**
0.183
*
0.430
***
0.130
 
0.310
***
0.097
 
0.089
 
0.029
 
0.986
C
4FM
 + Industry / G
H
G
 t-2
-1.906%
 
0.932
***
-0.364 
***
0.242
***
-0.155 
 
0.506
***
0.185
 
0.234
 
0.427
***
0.150
 
0.190
 
0.022
 
0.145
 
-0.041 
 
0.980
C
4FM
 + Industry / June
-0.445%
 
0.940
***
-0.317 
***
0.120
***
-0.159 
**
0.530
***
0.124
*
0.162
**
0.427
***
0.144
**
0.241
**
0.027
 
0.084
 
-0.012 
 
0.984
C
4FM
 + Industry + C
arbon
-2.087%
*
1.043
***
-0.259 
**
-0.009 
 
-0.087 
 
0.445
***
0.154
**
0.214
***
0.285
**
0.042
 
0.101
 
0.051
 
0.060
 
-0.039 
 
0.002
***
0.984
C
4FM
 + Industry + O
il
-1.184%
 
0.980
***
-0.285 
***
0.171
***
-0.123 
**
0.455
***
0.155
**
0.126
 
0.367
***
0.110
 
0.150
 
-0.002 
 
0.058
 
-0.028 
 
-0.016 
**
0.985
C
4FM
 + Industry + C
risis
-1.316%
 
0.974
***
-0.295 
***
0.175
***
-0.128 
**
0.432
***
0.134
*
0.114
 
0.343
***
0.101
 
0.156
 
-0.011 
 
0.045
 
-0.031 
 
0.003
 
0.984
L
ow
 G
H
G
-efficiency
C
A
PM
0.932%
1.230
***
0.922
C
4FM
1.571%
1.196
***
-0.026 
-0.138 
-0.302 
***
0.936
C
4FM
 + Industry
-2.717%
*
1.153
***
0.272
***
0.092
**
0.057
 
-0.321 
**
-0.052 
 
-0.127 
 
-0.432 
**
-0.093 
 
-0.524 
***
-0.101 
 
0.198
 
-0.094 
*
0.976
C
4FM
 + Industry / W
eighted
-2.606%
*
1.144
***
0.505
***
0.265
***
0.102
 
-0.099 
 
0.091
 
0.159
*
-0.194 
 
0.015
 
-0.362 
***
0.007
 
0.287
**
-0.045 
 
0.987
C
4FM
 + Industry / G
H
G
 t-2
-1.980%
*
1.104
***
0.267
***
0.272
***
0.046
 
-0.176 
 
-0.049 
 
-0.162 
 
-0.363 
*
-0.078 
 
-0.451 
**
-0.107 
 
0.211
 
-0.061 
*
0.985
C
4FM
 + Industry / June
-3.466%
**
1.133
***
0.192
 
0.193
***
0.007
 
-0.143 
 
0.127
 
-0.014 
 
-0.297 
**
0.028
 
-0.249 
*
0.049
 
0.314
**
-0.047 
 
0.973
C
4FM
 + Industry + C
arbon
-1.681%
 
1.063
***
-0.034 
 
0.288
**
-0.192 
 
-0.041 
 
0.114
 
0.103
 
-0.176 
 
0.111
 
-0.074 
 
0.031
 
0.346
**
-0.044 
 
0.002
 
0.953
C
4FM
 + Industry + O
il
-2.627%
 
1.147
***
0.264
***
0.094
**
0.052
 
-0.337 
*
-0.067 
 
-0.137 
 
-0.451 
**
-0.101 
 
-0.519 
***
-0.110 
 
0.185
 
-0.096 
*
0.010
 
0.975
C
4FM
 + Industry + C
risis
-0.768%
 
1.121
***
0.253
**
0.085
*
0.033
 
-0.342 
**
-0.083 
 
-0.152 
 
-0.480 
**
-0.121 
 
-0.511 
***
-0.146 
 
0.134
 
-0.098 
*
-0.023 
 
0.976
Long Low
 G
H
G
-efficiency -
Short H
igh G
H
G
-efficiency
5.458%
***
-0.292 
***
-0.331 
**
-0.296 
***
-0.039 
 
0.430
**
0.136
 
0.439
**
0.750
***
0.389
***
0.863
***
0.419
***
-0.090 
 
0.227
***
0.836
N
otes: This table reports regression results for the portfolios contructed from
 three levels of G
H
G
-efficiency, as w
ell as the long-short portfolio, using m
onthly value-w
eighted returns and value-w
eighted SM
B
, H
M
L 
and U
M
D
 factors. R
ow
s represent the different m
odels used, i.e. C
A
PM
, C
4FM
, C
4FM
 controlled for industry effects, as w
ell as the tests of robustness of results. Tests of robustness include w
eighting by disclosure 
com
pleteness (/ w
eighted), portfolio creation w
ith G
H
G
-data from
 t-2 (/ G
H
G
 t-2) and in June (/ June) and the introduction of additional control variables (A
C
V
) for changes in the price of carbon (C
arbon) and oil 
(O
il), as w
ell as financial m
arket crisis (C
risis). C
olum
ns show
 the annualised alpha in per cent, beta estim
ations (R
m
 - R
f), coefficient exposure on the SM
B
, H
M
L and U
M
D
 factors, as w
ell as on orthogonalised 
industry returns represented by their respective IC
B
 code. The rem
aining colum
ns show
 coefficient exposure on A
C
V
 and the adjusted R
-squared. ***, ** and * indicate the 1%
, 5%
 and 10%
 significance level 
respectively. C
oefficient covariances and standard errors are m
ade heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent based on N
ew
ey and W
est (1987). 
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A.6 High Carbon Industries 
 
  
Portfolio α (Rm-Rf) SMB HML UMD ACV Adj. R2
High carbon industries
CAPM 2.336% 1.179 0.946
C4FM 3.329% * 1.197 *** 0.065  -0.176 * -0.021  0.949
C4FM / June 2.152% 1.175 *** -0.096 -0.053 -0.122 * 0.946
C4FM + Carbon price 2.510% 1.102 *** -0.056 0.167 0.029 0.000 0.942
C4FM + Oil price 2.707% 1.154 *** 0.053 -0.147 * -0.066 0.046 * 0.953
C4FM + Crisis 3.184% 1.201 *** 0.062 -0.176 * -0.022 0.002 0.948
Low carbon industries
CAPM -1.740%  0.816 *** 0.880
C4FM -3.004%  0.787 *** -0.056  0.222 * 0.031  0.890
C4FM / June -1.748% 0.810 *** 0.126 0.079 0.138 * 0.881
C4FM + Carbon price -2.274% 0.901 *** 0.057 -0.148 -0.015 -0.000 0.908
C4FM + Oil price -2.376% 0.831 *** -0.044 0.193 * 0.077 -0.046 ** 0.899
C4FM + Crisis -2.744% 0.781 *** -0.052 0.221 * 0.032 -0.004 0.888
Long High carbon industries -
Short Low carbon industries 6.332% 0.410 *** 0.121 -0.398 * -0.052 0.322
Notes: This table reports regression results for the High carbon indstries and the Low carbon industries portfolios, 
as well as the long-short portfolio, using monthly value-weighted returns and value-weighted SMB, HML and 
UMD factors. Rows represent the different models used, i.e. CAPM, C4FM, as well as the tests of robustness of 
results. Tests of robustness include portfolio creation in June (/ June) and the inclusion of additional control 
variables (ACV) for changes in the price of carbon (Carbon) and oil (Oil), as well as financial market crisis 
(Crisis). Columns show the annualised alpha in per cent, beta estimations (Rm - Rf), coefficient exposure on the 
SMB, HML and UMD factors and ACV, as well as the adjusted R-squared. ***, ** and * indicate the 1%, 5% 
and 10% significance level respectively. Coefficient covariances and standard errors are made heteroscedasticity 
and autocorrelation consistent based on Newey and West (1987). 
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Appendix B 
Regression Results: Equal-weighted Returns on Value-weighted 
Factors 
B.1 European Emission Trading Scheme 
 
  
Portfolio α (Rm-Rf) SMB HML UMD ACV Adj. R2
EU ETS
CAPM 4.001% * 1.211 *** 0.941
C4FM 3.616% * 1.089 *** 0.458 *** 0.023  0.006  0.970
C4FM / June 3.048% 1.093 *** 0.345 *** 0.121 -0.084 0.966
C4FM + Carbon 4.643% *** 1.045 *** 0.350 *** 0.253 ** 0.072 -0.001 0.963
C4FM + Oil 3.156% * 1.058 *** 0.449 0.044 -0.028 *** 0.034 *** 0.973
C4FM + Crisis 5.501% *** 1.040 *** 0.490 *** 0.017 0.010 -0.031 * 0.972
Not in EU ETS
CAPM -1.546%  1.150 *** 0.885
C4FM -3.134% ** 0.909 *** 0.741 *** 0.196 *** -0.020  0.977
C4FM / June -0.056% 1.017 *** 0.832 *** -0.003 -0.025 0.971
C4FM + Carbon 0.023% 0.992 *** 0.845 *** -0.062 -0.143 * 0.002 ** 0.959
C4FM + Oil -2.982% ** 0.920 *** 0.744 *** 0.189 *** -0.009 -0.011 0.977
C4FM + Crisis -3.868% ** 0.929 *** 0.729 *** 0.198 ** -0.022 0.012 0.977
Long EU ETS - 
Short Not in EU ETS 6.750% ** 0.180 *** -0.283 ** -0.174 0.026 0.153
Notes: This table reports regression results for EU ETS and Not in EU ETS portfolios using monthly equal-
weighted returns and value-weighted SMB, HML and UMD factors. Rows represent the different models 
used, i.e. CAPM, C4FM, as well as the tests of robustness of results. Tests of robustness include portfolio 
creation in June (/ June) and the inclusion of additional control variables (ACV) for changes in the price of 
carbon (Carbon) and oil (Oil), as well as financial market crisis (Crisis). Columns show the annualised alpha 
in per cent, beta estimations (Rm - Rf), coefficient exposure on the SMB, HML and UMD factors and ACV, 
as well as the adjusted R-squared. ***, ** and * indicate the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level 
respectively. Coefficient covariances and standard errors are made heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
consistent based on Newey and West (1987). 
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B.2 Existence of Disclosure of GHG-emissions 
 
  
B
.2 E
xistence of D
isclosure of G
H
G
-em
issions 
Portfolio
α
(R
m
-R
f)
SM
B
H
M
L
U
M
D
0001
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
9000
A
C
V
A
dj. R
2
Reporting G
H
G
C
A
PM
2.296%
 
1.156
***
 
0.937
C
4FM
1.441%
**
0.985
***
0.557
***
0.088
*
-0.030 
0.991
C
4FM
 + Industry
1.296%
*
1.034
***
0.439
***
0.042
*
0.002
 
0.262
***
0.205
***
0.332
***
0.353
***
0.163
***
0.251
***
0.206
***
0.242
***
0.091
***
0.995
C
4FM
 + Industry / G
H
G
 t-2
2.185%
***
1.005
***
0.428
***
0.094
***
0.022
 
0.271
***
0.209
***
0.305
***
0.369
***
0.162
***
0.255
***
0.209
***
0.266
***
0.099
***
0.997
C
4FM
 + Industry / June
2.947%
**
1.065
***
0.517
***
0.000
 
-0.032 
 
0.078
 
0.112
*
0.161
**
0.131
*
0.090
 
0.066
 
0.051
 
0.078
 
0.059
**
0.991
C
4FM
 + Industry + C
arbon 
3.233%
***
1.055
***
0.500
*** -0.025 
 
-0.059 
 
0.119
 
0.131
 
0.251
**
0.167
 
0.094
 
0.063
 
0.102
 
0.119
 
0.054
 
0.002
***
0.986
C
4FM
 + Industry + O
il 
1.385%
**
1.028
***
0.431
***
0.044
**
-0.003 
 
0.247
***
0.190
***
0.322
***
0.334
***
0.156
***
0.256
***
0.197
***
0.229
***
0.089
***
0.010
*
0.995
C
4FM
 + Industry + C
risis
1.084%
 
1.037
***
0.441
***
0.043
*
0.005
 
0.265
***
0.208
***
0.335
***
0.358
***
0.166
***
0.249
***
0.211
***
0.249
***
0.092
***
0.002
 
0.995
N
ot reporting G
H
G
C
A
PM
-2.651%
 
1.200
***
0.884
C
4FM
-4.610%
***
0.936
***
0.812
***
0.256
***
0.014
 
0.983
C
4FM
 + Industry
-3.338%
***
0.995
***
0.600
***
0.209
***-0.011 
 
0.095
 
0.112
 
0.140
 
0.189
*
0.056
 
0.257
***
0.030
 
0.094
 
0.111
***
0.989
C
4FM
 + Industry / G
H
G
 t-2
-2.292%
*
1.097
***
0.562
***
0.085
**
0.121
 
0.277
*
0.269
**
0.398
**
0.384
**
0.123
 
0.434
***
0.204
*
0.258
 
0.170
***
0.987
C
4FM
 + Industry / June
-1.124%
 
1.102
***
0.478
***
0.158
 
0.013
 
0.216
 
0.269
 
0.333
 
0.329
 
0.110
 
0.383
**
0.100
 
0.190
 
0.180
 
0.963
C
4FM
 + Industry + C
arbon 
-0.043%
 
1.119
***
0.435
 
0.040
 
-0.102 
 
0.530
 
0.437
 
0.673
*
0.739
 
0.238
 
0.658
**
0.318
 
0.416
 
0.294
*
0.001
 
0.942
C
4FM
 + Industry + O
il 
-3.112%
***
0.980
***
0.580
***
0.214
***-0.024 
 
0.056
 
0.073
 
0.115
 
0.141
 
0.036
 
0.269
***
0.008
 
0.060
 
0.106
***
0.025
**
0.990
C
4FM
 + Industry + C
risis
-2.224%
*
0.977
***
0.589
***
0.205
***-0.025 
 
0.083
 
0.094
 
0.126
 
0.161
*
0.040
 
0.265
***
0.004
 
0.057
 
0.109
***-0.013 
 
0.989
Long Reporting G
H
G
 -
Short N
ot Reporting G
H
G
4.636%
***
0.039
*
-0.161 
***-0.167 
***
0.013
 
0.167
**
0.093
 
0.192
*
0.164
*
0.108
*
-0.007 
 
0.176
***
0.148
*
-0.019 
 
0.519
N
otes: This table reports regression results for R
eporting G
H
G
 and N
ot reporting G
H
G
 portfolios, as w
ell as the long-short portfolio, using m
onthly equal-w
eighted returns and value-w
eighted SM
B
, H
M
L and 
U
M
D
 factors. R
ow
s represent the different m
odels used, i.e. C
A
PM
, C
4FM
, C
4FM
 controlled for industry effects, as w
ell as the tests of robustness of results. Tests of robustness include portfolio creation w
ith 
G
H
G
-data from
 t-2 ( / G
H
G
 t-2) and in June ( / June) and the introduction of additional control variables (A
C
V
) for changes in the price of carbon (C
arbon) and oil (O
il), as w
ell as financial m
arket crisis (C
risis). 
C
olum
ns show
 the annualised alpha in per cent, beta estim
ations (R
m
 - R
f), coefficient exposure on the SM
B
, H
M
L and U
M
D
 factors, as w
ell as on orthogonalised industry returns represented by their 
respective IC
B
 code. The rem
aining colum
ns show
 coefficient exposure on A
C
V
 and the adjusted R
-squared. ***, ** and * indicate the 1%
, 5%
 and 10%
 significance level respectively. C
oefficient covariances 
and standard errors are m
ade heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent based on N
ew
ey and W
est (1987). 
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B.3 Disclosure Completeness 
 
  
B
.3 D
isclosure C
om
pleteness 
Portfolio
α
(R
m
-R
f)
SM
B
H
M
L
U
M
D
0001
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
9000
A
C
V
A
dj. R
2
0 Score
C
A
PM
-0.995%
 
1.206
***
0.888
C
4FM
-1.457%
 
1.087
***
0.527
***
0.040
 
0.110
 
0.917
C
4FM
 + Industry
-5.626%
**
1.080
***
0.470
**
0.143
 
0.116
 
-0.221 
 
-0.002 
 
0.095
 
0.025
 
0.016
 
-0.389 
**
-0.230 
 
0.156
 
-0.074 
 
0.945
C
4FM
 + Industry / G
H
G
 t-2
-2.238%
 
0.882
***
1.050
***
0.577
***
0.198
 
-0.420 
 
-0.183 
 
-0.212 
 
-0.110 
 
-0.019 
 
-0.880 
***-0.274 
 
0.143
 
-0.058 
 
0.931
C
4FM
 + Industry / June
-3.623%
 
1.079
***
0.755
***
0.270
 
-0.022 
 
-0.354 
 
0.006
 
-0.129 
 
-0.150 
 
0.113
 
-0.562 
**
-0.327 
*
0.150
 
-0.067 
 
0.905
C
4FM
 + Industry + C
arbon 
-2.688%
 
1.141
***
0.374
 
0.117
 
-0.332 
 
-0.132 
 
0.177
 
0.279
 
0.107
 
0.214
 
-0.237 
 
-0.242 
 
0.299
 
0.012
 
0.004
 
0.855
C
4FM
 + Industry + O
il 
-5.263%
**
1.056
***
0.439
**
0.151
 
0.094
 
-0.285 
 
-0.062 
 
0.055
 
-0.052 
 
-0.016 
 
-0.370 
**
-0.266 
 
0.101
 
-0.081 
 
0.040
 
0.948
C
4FM
 + Industry + C
risis
-3.535%
 
1.046
***
0.450
**
0.135
 
0.089
 
-0.244 
 
-0.034 
 
0.068
 
-0.026 
 
-0.014 
 
-0.375 
**
-0.279 
 
0.088
 
-0.077 
 
-0.024 
 
0.945
1 Score
C
A
PM
2.521%
 
1.135
***
0.910
C
4FM
1.277%
 
0.953
***
0.622
***
0.158
**
0.059
 
0.970
C
4FM
 + Industry
1.153%
 
0.995
***
0.527
***
0.075
 
0.056
 
0.364
***
0.240
**
0.328
***
0.523
***
0.178
**
0.341
***
0.244
***
0.398
***
0.157
***
0.979
C
4FM
 + Industry / G
H
G
 t-2
3.496%
**
0.955
***
0.428
***
0.088
*
0.076
 
0.308
***
0.190
**
0.169
**
0.412
***
0.130
**
0.406
***
0.199
***
0.332
***
0.111
***
0.983
C
4FM
 + Industry / June
3.664%
***
0.996
***
0.633
***-0.018 
 
0.008
 
0.088
 
0.105
 
-0.019 
 
0.162
 
0.054
 
0.183
*
0.071
 
0.146
 
0.082
**
0.985
C
4FM
 + Industry + C
arbon 
5.122%
***
0.941
***
0.715
***-0.003 
 
0.048
 
0.052
 
0.011
-0.077 
 
0.038
 
0.005
 
0.083
 
0.060
*
0.085
 
0.044
 
0.000
0.985
C
4FM
 + Industry + O
il 
1.240%
 
0.990
***
0.519
***
0.077
 
0.051
 
0.348
***
0.226
**
0.318
***
0.504
***
0.170
**
0.346
***
0.235
**
0.385
***
0.156
***
0.010
 
0.979
C
4FM
 + Industry + C
risis
2.342%
 
1.198
***
-0.173 
 
0.002
 
0.117
*
0.067
**
0.121
**
0.298
***
0.251
***
0.016
 
0.198
***
0.077
*
0.214
***
0.065
*
-0.006 
 
0.986
2 Score
C
A
PM
1.632%
 
1.194
***
0.916
C
4FM
0.803%
 
1.000
***
0.531
***
0.072
 
-0.172 
***
0.976
C
4FM
 + Industry
0.688%
 
1.063
***
0.407
***
0.026
 
-0.085 
 
0.309
**
0.228
*
0.491
***
0.345
**
0.251
***
0.249
 
0.288
**
0.229
 
0.067
*
0.981
C
4FM
 + Industry / G
H
G
 t-2
-0.410%
 
1.009
***
0.396
***
0.098
**
-0.112 
 
0.355
***
0.239
**
0.478
***
0.387
**
0.251
***
0.281
**
0.293
***
0.241
 
0.096
***
0.984
C
4FM
 + Industry / June
1.744%
 
1.111
***
0.502
***-0.030 
 
-0.131 
 
0.199
*
0.159
*
0.423
***
0.228
**
0.227
***
0.023
 
0.155
 
0.125
 
0.072
 
0.975
C
4FM
 + Industry + C
arbon 
2.000%
 
1.101
***
0.488
***-0.045 
 
-0.141 
 
0.264
 
0.200
 
0.523
**
0.306
 
0.246
**
0.034
 
0.235
 
0.197
 
0.084
 
0.003
*
0.955
C
4FM
 + Industry + O
il 
0.754%
 
1.059
***
0.401
***
0.028
 
-0.089 
 
0.297
**
0.217
*
0.484
***
0.331
*
0.245
***
0.252
 
0.282
**
0.219
 
0.066
*
0.007
 
0.981
C
4FM
 + Industry + C
risis
0.180%
 
1.071
***
0.412
***
0.028
 
-0.078 
 
0.314
**
0.236
*
0.498
***
0.358
**
0.258
***
0.245
 
0.300
**
0.245
 
0.068
*
0.006
 
0.981
3 Score
C
A
PM
4.751%
*
1.095
***
0.916
C
4FM
4.615%
**
1.009
***
0.442
***-0.007 
 
0.107
 
0.942
C
4FM
 + Industry
6.560%
***
1.073
***
0.234
*
0.002
 
0.161
 
0.076
 
0.126
 
0.057
 
0.000
 
-0.084 
 
0.223
 
0.055
 
-0.109 
 
0.109
*
0.953
C
4FM
 + Industry / G
H
G
 t-2
7.169%
***
1.254
***
0.072
 
-0.192 
***
0.103
 
0.358
 
0.430
**
0.542
*
0.403
*
0.110
 
0.355
 
0.254
*
0.111
 
0.182
***
0.951
C
4FM
 + Industry / June
7.307%
***
1.134
***
0.083
 
0.032
 
0.200
 
0.092
 
0.128
 
0.211
 
-0.009 
 
-0.153 
 
0.221
 
-0.011 
 
-0.157 
 
0.092
 
0.947
C
4FM
 + Industry + C
arbon 
4.823%
 
1.244
***
0.006
 
-0.137 
 
0.109
 
0.204
 
0.331
 
0.539
 
0.162
 
-0.109 
 
0.269
 
0.134
 
0.012
 
0.099
 
0.005
**
0.919
C
4FM
 + Industry + O
il 
6.562%
***
1.073
***
0.234
*
0.002
 
0.161
 
0.076
 
0.125
 
0.057
 
0.000
 
-0.084 
 
0.223
 
0.054
 
-0.109 
 
0.109
*
0.000
 
0.952
C
4FM
 + Industry + C
risis
6.020%
**
1.082
***
0.239
*
0.004
 
0.168
 
0.082
 
0.134
 
0.064
 
0.014
 
-0.076 
 
0.219
 
0.067
 
-0.091 
 
0.110
*
0.006
0.952
Long 3 Score -
Short 0 Score
12.186%
***
-0.006 
 
-0.236 
 
-0.141 
 
0.045
 
0.297
 
0.127
 
-0.038 
 
-0.025 
 
-0.100 
 
0.612
**
0.285
 
-0.265 
 
0.183
*
0.382
N
otes: This table reports regression results for the four portfolios constructed from
 levels of G
H
G
-em
issions disclosure com
pleteness, as w
ell as the long-short portfolio, using m
onthly equal-w
eighted returns and 
value-w
eighted SM
B
, H
M
L and U
M
D
 factors. R
ow
s represent the different m
odels used, i.e. C
A
PM
, C
4FM
, C
4FM
 controlled for industry effects, as w
ell as the tests of robustness of results. Tests of 
robustness include portfolio creation w
ith G
H
G
-data from
 t-2 (/ G
H
G
 t-2) and in June (/ June) and the introduction of additional control variables (A
C
V
) for changes in the price of carbon (C
arbon) and oil (O
il), as 
w
ell as financial m
arket crisis (C
risis). C
olum
ns show
 the annualised alpha in per cent, beta estim
ations (R
m
 - R
f), coefficient exposure on the SM
B
, H
M
L and U
M
D
 factors, as w
ell as on orthogonalised industry 
returns represented by their respective IC
B
 code. The rem
aining colum
ns show
 coefficient exposure on A
C
V
 and the adjusted R
-squared. ***, ** and * indicate the 1%
, 5%
 and 10%
 significance level 
respectively. C
oefficient covariances and standard errors are m
ade heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent based on N
ew
ey and W
est (1987). 
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B.4 Absolute Levels of GHG-emissions 
  
B
.4 A
bsolute L
evels of G
H
G
-em
issions 
Portfolio
α
(R
m
-R
f)
SM
B
H
M
L
U
M
D
0001
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
9000
A
C
V
A
dj. R
2
H
igh G
H
G
C
A
PM
5.700%
**
1.223
***
0.926
C
4FM
4.745%
*
1.091
***
0.410
***
0.123
 
0.003
 
0.949
C
4FM
 + Industry
-0.726%
 
1.089
***
0.331
**
0.254
***
0.037
 
0.492
***
0.438
***
0.476
***
0.512
***
0.200
***
0.184
*
0.213
**
0.688
***
0.081
 
0.983
C
4FM
 + Industry / W
eighted
-0.439%
 
1.111
***
0.293
***
0.245
***
0.025
 
0.604
***
0.546
***
0.588
***
0.603
***
0.248
***
0.226
**
0.297
***
0.709
***
0.094
**
0.986
C
4FM
 + Industry / G
H
G
 t-2
-1.278%
 
1.030
***
0.331
***
0.363
***
0.031
 
0.395
***
0.368
***
0.403
***
0.378
**
0.171
**
0.040
 
0.135
 
0.609
***
0.069
 
0.984
C
4FM
 + Industry / June
0.750%
 
1.056
***
0.486
***
0.240
***
-0.046 
 
0.286
**
0.336
***
0.195
*
0.275
**
0.167
**
-0.009 
 
0.107
 
0.529
***
0.068
 
0.977
C
4FM
 + Industry + C
arbon
2.376%
**
1.018
***
0.455
***
0.244
**
-0.166 
*
0.338
*
0.278
*
0.283
 
0.225
 
0.168
*
0.048
 
0.095
 
0.482
***
0.033
 
0.001
 
0.975
C
4FM
 + Industry + O
il
-0.462%
 
1.072
***
0.308
***
0.260
***
0.021
 
0.446
***
0.394
***
0.447
***
0.456
***
0.177
**
0.198
*
0.187
**
0.648
***
0.076
*
0.029
*
0.985
C
4FM
 + Industry + C
risis
-0.650%
 
1.088
***
0.330
***
0.254
***
0.036
 
0.492
***
0.437
***
0.475
***
0.510
***
0.199
***
0.184
*
0.211
**
0.685
***
0.081
 
-0.001 
 
0.983
M
edium
 G
H
G
C
A
PM
1.982%
 
1.138
***
0.920
C
4FM
1.438%
 
0.987
***
0.541
***
0.040
 
-0.014 
 
0.968
C
4FM
 + Industry
3.070%
**
1.053
***
0.392
***
-0.037 
 
0.032
 
-0.065 
 
-0.015 
 
0.153
 
0.073
 
-0.003 
 
0.016
 
0.035
 
-0.172 
 
0.010
 
0.977
C
4FM
 + Industry / W
eighted
0.805%
 
1.104
***
0.394
***
-0.043 
 
0.124
 
-0.073 
 
0.060
 
0.133
 
0.100
 
-0.007 
 
0.114
 
0.133
 
-0.102 
 
0.031
 
0.971
C
4FM
 + Industry / G
H
G
 t-2
3.911%
***
1.009
***
0.323
***
0.016
 
-0.083 
 
0.097
 
0.087
 
0.196
 
0.300
*
0.104
 
0.191
 
0.110
 
0.016
 
0.064
*
0.986
C
4FM
 + Industry / June
3.175%
**
1.083
***
0.369
***
-0.067 
 
-0.009 
 
-0.055 
 
0.020
 
0.156
 
0.030
 
0.022
 
0.017
 
-0.004 
 
-0.178 
*
-0.010 
 
0.977
C
4FM
 + Industry + C
arbon
3.013%
**
1.049
***
0.344
***
-0.128 
**
-0.059 
 
0.131
 
0.184
 
0.356
**
0.363
**
0.150
 
0.112
 
0.167
 
0.047
 
0.059
 
0.002
***
0.982
C
4FM
 + Industry + O
il
2.947%
**
1.062
***
0.402
***
-0.039 
 
0.039
 
-0.043 
 
0.005
 
0.166
 
0.099
 
0.007
 
0.009
 
0.047
 
-0.154 
 
0.013
 
-0.014 
 
0.977
C
4FM
 + Industry + C
risis
2.268%
 
1.066
***
0.400
***
-0.034 
 
0.042
 
-0.056 
 
-0.002 
 
0.163
 
0.093
 
0.008
 
0.010
 
0.053
 
-0.146 
 
0.012
 
0.009
 
0.976
L
ow
 G
H
G
C
A
PM
-0.890%
 
1.113
***
0.847
C
4FM
-2.058%
 
0.879
***
0.725
***
0.120
 
-0.087 
 
0.940
C
4FM
 + Industry
0.809%
 
0.956
***
0.604
***
-0.065 
 
-0.071 
 
0.460
***
0.260
**
0.423
**
0.558
***
0.341
***
0.630
***
0.422
***
0.344
**
0.208
***
0.976
C
4FM
 + Industry / W
eighted
1.004%
 
0.955
***
0.639
***
-0.056 
 
-0.060 
 
0.433
***
0.203
 
0.373
**
0.471
**
0.300
***
0.603
***
0.394
***
0.303
*
0.192
***
0.975
C
4FM
 + Industry / G
H
G
 t-2
3.098%
*
0.976
***
0.661
***
-0.067 
 
0.151
 
0.369
***
0.205
*
0.344
**
0.441
***
0.219
***
0.556
***
0.406
***
0.255
*
0.177
***
0.981
C
4FM
 + Industry / June
4.584%
**
1.050
***
0.742
***
-0.150 
**
-0.043 
 
0.051
 
0.014
 
0.140
 
0.127
 
0.104
 
0.216
 
0.077
 
-0.022 
 
0.142
**
0.960
C
4FM
 + Industry + C
arbon
4.369%
*
1.098
***
0.746
***
-0.154 
 
0.050
 
-0.115 
 
-0.088 
 
0.075
 
-0.157 
 
-0.054 
 
0.018
 
0.024
 
-0.142 
 
0.072
 
0.003
**
0.935
C
4FM
 + Industry + O
il
1.000%
 
0.944
***
0.587
***
-0.061 
 
-0.082 
 
0.427
***
0.228
*
0.402
**
0.518
***
0.324
***
0.641
***
0.403
***
0.315
*
0.204
***
0.021
*
0.977
C
4FM
 + Industry + C
risis
1.139%
 
0.951
***
0.600
***
-0.066 
 
-0.075 
 
0.456
***
0.254
**
0.419
**
0.550
***
0.336
***
0.633
***
0.414
***
0.333
*
0.208
***
-0.004 
 
0.975
Long Low
 G
H
G
 - 
Short H
igh G
H
G
1.536%
 
-0.133 
**
0.273
**
-0.319 
***
-0.107 
 
-0.032 
 
-0.179 
 
-0.053 
 
0.046
 
0.140
 
0.447
**
0.209
 
-0.344 
*
0.127
**
0.740
N
otes: This table reports regression results for the three portfolios contructed from
 absolute levels of G
H
G
-em
issions, as w
ell as the long-short portfolio, using m
onthly equal-w
eighted returns and value-w
eighted SM
B
, 
H
M
L and U
M
D
 factors.  R
ow
s represent the different m
odels used, i.e. C
A
PM
, C
4FM
, C
4FM
 controlled for industry effects, as w
ell as the tests of robustness of results. Tests of robustness include w
eighting by 
disclosure com
pleteness (/ w
eighted), portfolio creation w
ith G
H
G
-data from
 t-2 (/ G
H
G
 t-2) and in June (/ June) and the introduction of additional control variables (A
C
V
) for changes in the price of carbon (C
arbon) 
and oil (O
il), as w
ell as financial m
arket crisis (C
risis). C
olum
ns show
 the annualised alpha in per cent, beta estim
ations (R
m
 - R
f), coefficient exposure on the SM
B
, H
M
L and U
M
D
 factors, as w
ell as on 
orthogonalised industry returns represented by their respective IC
B
 code. The rem
aining colum
ns show
 coefficient exposure on A
C
V
 and the adjusted R
-squared. ***, ** and * indicate the 1%
, 5%
 and 10%
 
significance level respectively. C
oefficient covariances and standard errors are m
ade heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent based on N
ew
ey and W
est (1987). 
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B.5 GHG-efficiency 
  
B
.5 G
H
G
-efficiency 
Portfolio
α
(R
m
-R
f)
SM
B
H
M
L
U
M
D
0001
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
9000
A
C
V
A
dj. R
2
H
igh G
H
G
-efficiency
C
A
PM
-0.118%
 
0.998
***
0.864
C
4FM
-0.799%
 
0.841
***
0.462
***
0.060
 
-0.104 
 
0.915
C
4FM
 + Industry
3.097%
***
0.951
***
0.347
***
-0.135 
***
0.046
 
0.186
 
0.092
 
0.346
**
0.347
**
0.202
**
0.403
**
0.315
***
0.145
 
0.170
***
0.972
C
4FM
 + Industry / W
eighted
3.512%
***
0.966
***
0.335
***
-0.142 
***
0.038
 
0.161
 
0.071
 
0.314
**
0.274
*
0.183
**
0.405
**
0.290
***
0.120
 
0.164
***
0.969
C
4FM
 + Industry / G
H
G
 t-2
4.868%
***
0.927
***
0.375
***
-0.113 
*
0.185
 
-0.063 
 
-0.091 
 
0.075
 
0.039
 
0.009
 
0.214
 
0.200
 
-0.076 
 
0.092
*
0.966
C
4FM
 + Industry / June
5.345%
***
0.990
***
0.597
***
-0.213 
***
-0.024 
 
-0.125 
 
-0.126 
 
-0.015 
 
-0.029 
 
0.046
 
0.032
 
0.042
 
-0.160 
 
0.105
*
0.961
C
4FM
 + Industry + C
arbon
5.480%
***
0.988
***
0.696
***
-0.263 
**
0.025
 
-0.228 
 
-0.172 
 
-0.086 
 
-0.179 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.150 
 
0.006
 
-0.216 
 
0.070
 
0.000
 
0.930
C
4FM
 + Industry + O
il
3.179%
***
0.945
***
0.340
***
-0.133 
***
0.041
 
0.172
 
0.079
 
0.337
**
0.330
**
0.195
**
0.407
**
0.307
***
0.133
 
0.168
***
0.009
 
0.972
C
4FM
 + Industry + C
risis
3.536%
**
0.944
***
0.343
***
-0.137 
***
0.040
 
0.181
 
0.086
 
0.340
**
0.337
**
0.196
**
0.406
**
0.305
***
0.130
 
0.169
***
-0.005 
 
0.972
M
edium
 G
H
G
-efficiency
C
A
PM
2.742%
 
1.122
***
0.932
C
4FM
2.645%
 
1.014
***
0.496
***
-0.024 
 
0.061
 
0.969
C
4FM
 + Industry
2.458%
 
1.043
***
0.261
***
-0.113 
***
-0.157 
**
0.424
***
0.296
***
0.281
**
0.572
***
0.154
 
0.457
***
0.205
**
0.174
 
0.088
**
0.982
C
4FM
 + Industry / W
eighted
3.146%
*
1.024
***
0.258
***
-0.103 
***
-0.144 
**
0.422
***
0.281
***
0.271
**
0.542
***
0.170
 
0.470
***
0.225
**
0.155
 
0.093
**
0.981
C
4FM
 + Industry / G
H
G
 t-2
3.312%
*
1.017
***
0.143
 
-0.062 
 
-0.278 
**
0.549
***
0.388
***
0.404
***
0.725
***
0.229
**
0.563
***
0.235
*
0.270
*
0.094
 
0.981
C
4FM
 + Industry / June
4.214%
***
1.054
***
0.280
***
-0.104 
**
-0.166 
**
0.194
**
0.156
**
0.175
*
0.311
***
0.028
 
0.207
**
-0.023 
 
-0.064 
 
0.026
 
0.985
C
4FM
 + Industry + C
arbon
3.001%
**
1.076
***
0.244
***
-0.128 
*
-0.137 
**
0.181
 
0.212
**
0.244
 
0.319
**
0.004
 
0.155
 
0.034
 
-0.011 
 
0.017
 
0.004
***
0.986
C
4FM
 + Industry + O
il
2.429%
 
1.045
***
0.264
***
-0.114 
***
-0.155 
**
0.429
***
0.301
***
0.285
**
0.578
***
0.156
 
0.455
***
0.208
**
0.178
 
0.089
**
-0.003 
 
0.981
C
4FM
 + Industry + C
risis
1.240%
 
1.063
***
0.273
***
-0.109 
***
-0.142 
**
0.437
***
0.315
**
0.297
**
0.602
***
0.171
 
0.449
***
0.233
**
0.214
 
0.090
**
0.014
 
0.982
L
ow
 G
H
G
-efficiency
C
A
PM
3.779%
 
1.358
***
C
4FM
1.763%
 
1.092
***
0.727
***
0.263
***
-0.080 
 
0.965
0.894
C
4FM
 + Industry
-2.380%
 
1.108
***
0.756
***
0.423
***
0.172
 
0.124
 
0.199
**
0.391
***
0.068
 
0.138
 
-0.169 
 
0.101
 
0.434
***
0.016
 
0.986
C
4FM
 + Industry / W
eighted
-2.586%
 
1.137
***
0.735
***
0.430
***
0.147
 
0.128
 
0.237
***
0.449
***
0.051
 
0.124
 
-0.194 
*
0.121
 
0.381
***
0.004
 
0.988
C
4FM
 + Industry / G
H
G
 t-2
-2.486%
 
1.071
***
0.854
***
0.502
***
0.263
*
0.238
 
0.280
**
0.409
***
0.231
 
0.229
**
-0.105 
 
0.191
 
0.614
***
0.113
**
0.987
C
4FM
 + Industry / June
-1.469%
 
1.154
***
0.750
***
0.352
***
0.133
 
0.124
 
0.288
***
0.312
**
0.047
 
0.218
***
-0.081 
 
0.159
 
0.509
***
0.053
 
0.979
C
4FM
 + Industry + C
arbon
1.003%
 
1.092
***
0.642
***
0.352
***
-0.042 
 
0.377
 
0.322
*
0.585
**
0.305
 
0.314
**
0.156
 
0.286
 
0.629
***
0.087
 
0.002
 
0.972
C
4FM
 + Industry + O
il
-2.141%
 
1.092
***
0.735
***
0.428
***
0.158
 
0.082
 
0.159
**
0.365
***
0.017
 
0.117
 
-0.156 
 
0.077
 
0.398
***
0.011
 
0.027
**
0.987
C
4FM
 + Industry + C
risis
-1.894%
 
1.100
***
0.751
***
0.421
***
0.166
 
0.119
 
0.191
**
0.385
***
0.056
 
0.131
 
-0.166 
 
0.090
 
0.418
***
0.015
 
-0.006 
0.986
Long Low
 G
H
G
-efficiency -
Short H
igh G
H
G
-efficiency
5.476%
***
-0.158 
**
-0.409 
***
-0.558 
***
-0.127 
 
0.062
 
-0.106 
 
-0.045 
 
0.280
 
0.064
 
0.572
***
0.215
 
-0.289 
 
0.154
***
0.836
N
otes: This table reports regression results for the portfolios contructed from
 three levels of G
H
G
-efficiency, as w
ell as the long-short portfolio, using m
onthly equal-w
eighted returns and value-w
eighted SM
B
, H
M
L 
and U
M
D
 factors. R
ow
s represent the different m
odels used, i.e. C
A
PM
, C
4FM
, C
4FM
 controlled for industry effects, as w
ell as the tests of robustness of results. Tests of robustness include w
eighting by disclosure 
com
pleteness (/ w
eighted), portfolio creation w
ith G
H
G
-data from
 t-2 (/ G
H
G
 t-2) and in June (/ June) and the introduction of additional control variables (A
C
V
) for changes in the price of carbon (C
arbon) and oil 
(O
il), as w
ell as financial m
arket crisis (C
risis). C
olum
ns show
 the annualised alpha in per cent, beta estim
ations (R
m
 - R
f), coefficient exposure on the SM
B
, H
M
L and U
M
D
 factors, as w
ell as on orthogonalised 
industry returns represented by their respective IC
B
 code. The rem
aining colum
ns show
 coefficient exposure on A
C
V
 and the adjusted R
-squared. ***, ** and * indicate the 1%
, 5%
 and 10%
 significance level 
respectively. C
oefficient covariances and standard errors are m
ade heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent based on N
ew
ey and W
est (1987). 
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B.6 High Carbon Industries 
 Portfolio α (Rm-Rf) SMB HML UMD ACV Adj. R2
High carbon industries
CAPM 3.758%  1.292 *** 0.916
C4FM 3.637% ** 1.118 *** 0.709 *** -0.048  -0.010  0.981
C4FM / June 4.267% * 1.166 *** 0.570 *** -0.029 -0.109 * 0.967
C4FM + Carbon price 5.885% *** 1.065 *** 0.600 *** 0.155 0.033 0.000 0.966
C4FM + Oil price 3.151% ** 1.085 *** 0.700 *** -0.025 -0.045 0.036 * 0.983
C4FM + Crisis 3.619% ** 1.119 *** 0.709 *** -0.048 -0.010 0.000 0.981
Low carbon industries
CAPM -2.731%  1.061 *** 0.876
C4FM -4.864% ** 0.835 *** 0.598 *** 0.303 *** -0.011  0.952
C4FM / June -2.189% 0.932 *** 0.701 *** 0.035 0.029 0.958
C4FM + Carbon price -2.244% 0.941 0.656 -0.081 -0.111 0.001 0.958
C4FM + Oil price -4.519% *** 0.859 *** 0.604 *** 0.286 *** 0.014 -0.025 0.954
C4FM + Crisis -4.636% * 0.830 *** 0.602 *** 0.302 * -0.011 -0.004 0.952
Long High carbon industries -
Short Low carbon industries 8.500% ** 0.283 *** 0.111 -0.350 ** 0.001 0.332
Notes: This table reports regression results for the High carbon indstries and the Low carbon industries portfolios, 
as well as the long-short portfolio, using monthly equal-weighted returns and value-weighted SMB, HML and 
UMD factors. Rows represent the different models used, i.e. CAPM, C4FM, as well as the tests of robustness of 
results. Tests of robustness include portfolio creation in June (/ June) and the inclusion of additional control 
variables (ACV) for changes in the price of carbon (Carbon) and oil (Oil), as well as financial market crisis 
(Crisis). Columns show the annualised alpha in per cent, beta estimations (Rm - Rf), coefficient exposure on the 
SMB, HML and UMD factors and ACV, as well as the adjusted R-squared. ***, ** and * indicate the 1%, 5% 
and 10% significance level respectively. Coefficient covariances and standard errors are made heteroscedasticity 
and autocorrelation consistent based on Newey and West (1987). 
